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ABSTRACT
The value concept in sociology is traced from its beginnings 
in phenomenological philosophy to its contemporary status as a 
concept of many meanings and usages, articles from five sociological 
journals and books by sociologists expose the value concepts as one 
which has been variously defined as the motive power for particular 
behaviors, the goals towards which particular actions are directed, 
and highly generalized abstractions of social preferences. The 
Vanfossen typology of values is used as the organizing principle 
for discussing the various value concepts.
The intention of discovering the value concept of greatest 
utility is thwarted by the realization that different conceptualizations 
are able to encompass different ranges of meaning. It is determined 
that the concepts of greatest range are lacking in internal discrimin­
ation. It is also determined that highly discriminative concepts, 
or concepts which are very precise about what does and what does not 
constitute a value usually exclude a great area of meaning.
It is determined that "value" cannot logically function as an 
independent variable or hold causal status. It is argued that 
"value” can serve as a "correlative" or complementary principle for 
the development of causal explanations. The sociological premise 
that human ideas are related, in fact, to the physical and social 
reality in which these ideas are found requires the maintenance of 
a value concept of broad range and high discrimination.
v
THE MEANING OF VALUE: A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS
* OF A*SOCIOLOGICAL “CONCEPT
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is concerned with a particular sociological concept—  
value. There are two major ways in which the subject may be approached. 
The first approach is to apply the concept to social entities with 
the intention of discovering the values of these social entities.
The first approach then, is to concentrate on the substance or 
content of values.
The second major approach to the subject is to compare value 
concepts with each other. In this case the researcher examines 
different value concepts in order to discover the range of meaning or 
substance that a concept can encompass. The result of such an 
effort, if successful, would be an indication as to the most useful, 
discriminating, or informing concept available. If the results of 
such an investigation cannot determine the most useful concept, then 
the researcher must explain why this is the case and what implica­
tions this has for the use of the concept.
This paper examines the concept of value with regard to its 
conceptual meaning. In other words, this thesis intends to explain 
what value "means." The term "value" means different things to 
different researchers and these differences become evident when the 
various definitions and usages are compared. The second intention
3of this thesis is to discover which value concepts have the greatest 
utility for the sociological discipline. This involves recommendations 
for the future conceptualization of "value." There are in the 
literature actually very few attempts to compare values in this way.
For the most part, sociologists who use a value concept either 
make up a definition of their own or may adopt a usage from one 
or another of the more "eminent" practitioners in the discipline.
In his efforts to discover the varieties of conceptualization the 
researcher will find himself examining the literature in a variety 
of substantive areas. In other words, the researcher will read works 
on criminology or delinquency, race relations, political sociology, 
medical sociology, comparative sociology, social stratification, the 
sociology of religion, social organization, rural sociology, and 
virtually every other content area that can be named. The curious 
problem for the researcher of the value concept is to abstract -from 
each study the value concept employed or, if an explicit definition 
is lacking, extrapolate the concept’s meaning from a number of 
studies on the same subject. To undertake a conceptual investigation 
the researcher needs a framework within which to work and a method for 
accumulating "the literature" on the subject.
The Framework
This writer had adopted a typology of values developed by 
Marion Vanfossen. "Value" is understood as a generic term for "all 
those belief and expressive idea forms to which some positive or 
negative (valuational) meaning is attached (Vanfossen, page 5)." As 
such, value is not a quality of an object. A value is a quality which
4is conceived by the actor. Unlike some definitions which regard 
value simply as an affective quality that implies the "good" and 
distinguish it from the existential which implies the true and the 
false, this writer’s understanding of value includes both. Valuative 
meaning may be based on a wide range of criteria from the actor’s 
preference for a kind of food to the validity of a scientific theory. 
This understanding of value is different from many others since 
judgements of truth or fact are included with the more conventional 
understanding which regards value as non-factual.
Values are of five basic types: norms, beliefs, ideals,
systems, and complexes. Norms, beliefs, *and ideals are Specific. 
values. These involve "particular separable standards, explanations, 
and sentiments (Vanfossen, page 5)." "Systems and complexes are 
Diffuse; they are clusters or constellations of values focused around 
some general referent (Vanfossen, page 5).” Complexes are more 
inclusive than Systems. While a complex includes all of a societies’ 
major values, a System may include very few.
Norms
Norms are situationally specific prescriptions or proscriptions 
for behavior. Norms are divided into three types. They are 
customary, moral, and legal norms. Vanfossen attributes this 
distinction to Sumner’s original distinction between folkways, 
mores, and laws. Customary norms are recognized as standards of 
social appropriateness. They are highly visible standards or rules 
for behavior. Customary norms dictate the boundaries of surface 
conformity. In the light of customary norms a behavior is judged
5as correct or incorrect.
Moral norms are customary norms that are considered so important
as to have a direct bearing on the social welfare. The violation
of a moral norm is seen as morally wrong behavior as opposed to being
merely socially incorrect. While the violation of a customary norm
may evoke anything from amusement, to curiosity, to ridicule, the
violation of a moral norm evokes a sense of evil and the violator
is thought to have some terrible flaw. Because an actor considers
moral norms to be of greater importance than customary norms, moral
norms are violated less frequently than customary norms. Ironically,
customary norms prove to be more important with regard to an
individual’s future since it is this kind of norm which is more
likely to be violated. The distinction between moral norms and
customary norms, according to Vanfossen:
. . . often carries with it the inference that folkways are thus 
somehow not very important norms. This is unfortunate, since 
both in terms of their pervasiveness and what they are likely 
to mean regarding life's chances, folkways are exceedingly 
important. Most things in life do not really hinge on moral 
considerations, in part because the mores are in large measure 
internalized as absolutes and are thus not as often matters for 
decision. To indicate only a few general examples, such things 
as what cliques and groups a person may join; the sample from 
which he may draw friends, a date, a spouse; his job or 
profession, and advancement in it; his socio-economic position 
and potential mobility; and indeed his overall style of life 
can depend in large measure upon his familiarity with and 
sensitivity to the proper performance of folkways. (Vanfossen, 
page 6)
In contrast with customary norms, moral norms change very 
slowly. A moral norm is one which an actor views as morally binding. 
As a result, this actor is not going to view the norm in question 
as one which should be changed. It is frequently the case that moral 
norms are incorporated into a societies' institutional structure.
Legal norms are "formalized, codified, and institutionalized 
customary and moral norms . . . (Vanfossen, page 8)." Legal norms 
may be of two types; customary law and enacted law. Customary law 
reflects "at least some cultural consensus" while enacted law is 
created "ordinarily for the purpose of regulation of large-scale 
secondary interaction (Vanfossen, page 8)."
According to Vanfossen, enacted law is expected to be "reasonably 
compatible" with other values but at the same time the great majority 
of people are unaware of most of these laws and are not expected to 
be aware of them.
Beliefs
Beliefs are propositional statements or "explanations of the way 
phenomena are to be viewed and understood (Vanfossen, page 9)."
Beliefs are of three types; fictions, myths, and theories. Fictions, 
myths, and theories are all explanations but there are important 
differences. While myths and theories are explanations that are 
expected to be believed, fictions are explanations that are known 
to be untrue.
A fiction is a consensually agreed upon social lie which we all 
tell each other because it supports an idea or justifies a 
practice which we individually know to be untrue, but which as 
a group we' find useful or convenient to employ. (Vanfossen, 
page 9)
Fictions are not lies in the usual sense of the word because everyone 
involved in the fiction is aware of the falsehood. For example, one 
may visit a sick friend and ask how he feels. Of course, we know 
he is sick and he knows he is sick. Nevertheless, the sick friend 
will say he feels fine. In this case a fiction is employed as a
7simple courtesy.
Myths differ from fictions in two important respects. First, 
a fiction is known to be untrue while a myth, also being untrue, 
is taken as fact. For those people that accept a myth as a value 
the myth is regarded as an accurate account of how things are.
Second, a fiction is usually a simple statement while a myth is 
usually a long explanatory account. In any event, neither myths 
nor fictions have any empirical support. That is, they fail to meet 
the criteria for truth required of theories.
Theories are like myths in that both are taken to be accurate 
explanatory accounts. * As Vanfossen pointfed out, the fact that myths 
and theories are both beliefs makes for a confusion of the differences. 
This confusion leads to the superficial conclusion that myths and 
theories have equal validity since it is a case of what you believe 
against what I believe. As Vanfossen put it: ”1 believe this— you
believe that— all truth is relative anyway— and who’s to say?” The 
primary difference between myths and theories is not "the inherent 
validity of the explanation" but "the kinds of things which are 
acceptable as evidence."
Myths are deductive, a priori explanations. They rely on the 
initial faith of the believer in the premises of the explanations.
To qualify as a theory an explanation must (1) be able to handle 
all of the relevant data which is available;■(2) it must be the only 
logical explanation which is able to handle all the data (the 
alternative could not logically exist); and (3) the explanation 
must be congruent with what else is known.
Theories may exist in three conditions: (1) A theory may have
been demonstrated true; (2) it may not have been demonstrated true 
as yet; or (3) it may have been demonstrated false. If a theory has 
been demonstrated false but is still believed, ^that theory is a myth.
Ideals
"An ideal is a generalized ’good.’ Ideals are values 
representing widely agreed upon definitions of virtue or excellence 
(Vanfossen, page 13)." Ideals may appear in the form of idealized 
norms or idealized beliefs. Idealized norms are often thought of as 
goals towards which men should strive. In actuality there is 
considerable deviance and operational norms may dictate that the 
individual act contrary to the ideal.
"Idealized beliefs are those generally held definitions and 
explanations which have become so traditional and time-honored as to 
be raised to the level of hallowed verities, such as that crime 
doesn’t pay, that all men are equal before the law, or that mothers 
instinctively love their babies (Vanfossen, page 13)." Both 
idealized norms and idealized beliefs provide a wide basis for 
consensus and exceptions do little to challenge the virtue and 
truth of ideals.
Whether ideals are presented in the form of norms or beliefs 
or as a "named virtue (honesty)," all ideals are expressions.of 
"abstract sentiments." Abstract sentiments are broad, vague, 
generalized sentiments. They are frequently used as justifications 
of other specific values, institutions, or social structure. By 
associating an abstract sentiment with some practice it is hoped 
that the goodness inherent to the sentiment will be identified with
9the particular practice in question.
The same abstract sentiment may be used to justify quite different 
norms, beliefs, or behaviors, as for example when several 
political parties justify opposite positions by appealing to 
identical sentiments; or different sentiments can be used to 
justify logically inconsistent or contradictory values or 
behavior engaged in by the same person or group, as for 
example when we send aid to one country because of the "brother­
hood of man” and drop napalm on another (or perhaps the same 
one) to "preserve freedom," "contain Communism," or "defend 
our national security." (Vanfossen, page 14)
The most important function of ideals is that they provide
the basis for consensus that could not possibly be attained on more
Value systems are. highly focused and highly visible constella­
tions of values around some practice or idea. Systems include 
interrelated norms, beliefs, and ideals. Systems are of two kinds; 
Institutions and Ideologies,
Institutions are generally thought of in structural terms.
Institutions are also interrelated systems of values. All 
institutions, the basic pivotal ones, as well as the secondary 
or derived ones of a specific society, will have incorporated 
within them many other types of values— folkways, mores, 
fictions, myths, sentiments, models, and so forth. (Vanfossen, 
page 16) •
Institutions have two major characteristics: They are pervasive
and serve as systems of social control. Institutions are pervasive
in that virtually every aspect of life is touched in. some way or
another by an institution. Because institutions are values, their
pervasiveness serves a controlling function. This control is not
the. uncomfortable, restraining kind of thing which is brought to
mind by the word "control." A stable institution is one in which
specific grounds such as behavior.
Systems
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most people believe or approve. For the most part, institutions are
pressed upon us from birth and the values or rules of the institutions
become our values. Though institutions change, the change is hardly
ever radical or ’’revolutionary."
Even in revolutions,, people are more likely to be changed than 
are value-structures. Whepu^institutions are challenged to some 
degree, as has been happening in our society, many people are 
left with a sense of r-dlsquietude. ambivalence, or even 
ay^natiop. . . .
Institutions are essentially conservative and they ordinarily 
change->more by evolution than by revolution. Some specific values 
fade and some new ones emerge (they are seldom really new by 
the time they have become institutionalized) but the bulk 
provides a certain constancy and continuity both with the past 
and in terms of the various interrelationships among institu­
tions. (Vanfossen, page 17)
Ideologies are also value systems.
Any ideology will include many particular norms, beliefs, and 
ideals. But whereas institutions are always made up of both 
values and highly patterned interrelated behaviors (a structure), 
ideologies may exist as systems of ideas and meaning more or 
less independent of anv SDecific social structure. . . .
 0,1 ,iit—  ■ *i iiimi'i n w i  « i i M n f m ? i i i - - - - - - - - , -r|1 « ;  ■  . . . . . . . . . . i w m h i
Institutionalized ideologies constitute the value aspect of 
institutions, and are used to justify or legitimize existing 
social structures. Christianity, Democracy, Capitalism, Racism, 
Communism, Facism, and Monogamy are a few ideological systems 
which have become highly institutionalized at one time or another 
somewhere in the world. (Vanfossen, page 18)
For an ideology to pose a great threat to an institution, that 
is for it to bjecome a movement, an ideology requires a structure , 
organization, and a hierarchy of leadership. Without structure
^   ^   . T ^ - H I rt l '-— —  mum .l»
("highly patterned interrelated behaviors"), organization (a 
coordination of activities and policies), and a hierarchy of leader­
ship, an ideology would necessarily remain a fragmented system of 
ideas that cannot systematically attack the problems with which it 
is concerned. However, even an ideology which lacks organization, 
structure, and a hierarchy of leadership can have some effect on or
11
at least annoy the proponents of an institution.
While an ideology contains all sorts of specific values, its 
■ ...
' "
most important element is "myth." .,j„
Once the integral relation between myth and ideology is recognized, 
the question arises as to whether ideologies can^srirvive without
their suppor.ting^mv tfcs. If they cannot, a full understanding
of the logical tie-up between these two types of values could be 
most relevant for programs which attempt to change attitudes and 
policies. An ideology is a diffuse system of values, so broad 
and generalized that it is almost impossible to attack directly; 
however, myths are specific values, particularized explanations 
which claim that certain things are so or not so, or exist in a 
certain relationship. A myth can be challens^ad^dA-rectlv on 
efflpiricaT grounds. if indeed the empirical evidence with which 
to disprove it is available. (Vanfossen, page 19)
Complexes ‘
Like systems. value complexes are diffu^e-hut they are more
encompassing or inclusive than systems.
That complex which incorporates all of the major values of a
society into an overall "style" may be referred to as that
societies1 Ethos; that complex which portrays the image or 
range of alternative images of man himself may be termed an 
Ethic and includes various major Personality Cynosures and.,-their 
associaiad? Emulation Models. (VanTdssen, page 20)
Each society has an ethos all its own. An ethos may be 
described by pointing out the central themes of a societies’ 
institutions.
Ethics may run across cultures and are not necessarily grounded
to a particular society. Unlike ethos, ethics are not necessarily
grounded in a temporal or spatial context. An Ethic is composed of
a definition of man ("the guide for living"), a personality cynosure
("the personality type most characteristic of an ethic"), and emulation
models (examples of persons representative of an ethic).
An image arises in the form of folk heroes, painted in broad 
strokes or narrowly detailed, portraying the attitudes, motivations,
12
goals, styles, interaction techniques, carriage, and even 
physical characteristics that personify the ethic. . . .
. . . the ethic both directly..and „ indirectly reflects the 
broad-^rganizafj-pnal and structural forms of an-.era*, and 
indicates something about what kind or kinds of personalities 
are called for to be able^to^onerate most effectively within 
these forms. In that relatively free-wheeling era of Western 
history when the concentration was an expansionism, conquest 
and exploitation of the natural environment, and later, emerg­
ing industrialism, the Protestant Ethic made a great deal of 
sense. However, neither the value complex of the Protestant 
Ethic nor the personality cynosure of the individualized inner- 
directed man make quite as much sense in a highly urban and 
bureaucratically structured world of collective authority 
systems, which of necessity must begin to think of conservation, 
rather than exploitation, and the coordinated e£forts required 
by the new industrial state, rather than^the.^..individualized 
entrepreneurship of farm, ranch, or first Ford plant. (Vanfossen, 
pages 21-22) — —
■» * *
The Method
The sources of information which this writer has used in 
researching the value concept consist of books and sociological 
journals. The journals examined are the American Sociological Review, 
American Journal of Sociology, Social Forces, Social Problems, and 
Sociological Quarterly. The journals have indexes* which list 
articles by topic. All articles were examined which were listed under 
the heading of "values” or were listed under a heading in which the 
term "value" appeared. Not all of the articles that were listed 
in this manner proved relevant. Generally, only those articles in
*There are two exceptions. Social Forces and Sociological 
Quarterly did not have indexes available. Instead, this writer 
worked by examining titles. These two journals represent the least 
systematic and reliable sources in this research.
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which "value" served as a central concept were used in this examina­
tion.* The footnotes and citations which appeared in those articles 
served as a secondary source of relevant information. Of course, 
not all of these citations and footnotes proved useful.
The books which were used in this examination were discovered 
by three methods: The first (1) involved the citations and footnotes
from- the journals listed above; the second (2) involved a search of 
card catalogs in the libraries of the College of William and Mary 
and Hamline University where the "subject" catalog had listings 
under "Value" or "Values"; the third (3) involved whatever relevant 
material this writer was able to pull together from his studies in 
sociology.**
In general, all of the sources used are sociological. With 
some exceptions the fields of economics, psychology, philosophy, and 
political science were excluded from this examination. For example, 
John Dewey is most frequently cited as an educator but is often 
cited by sociologists as having been influential in their
*Regardless of the utility of "value" to an article, all those 
articles which were examined are listed in the Bibliography. For 
example, "The Development and Transformation of Monetary Meanings 
in the Child," by Anselm Strauss, was examined but did not directly 
apply to the subject.
**Some of the materials which are included were discovered by 
chance. Specifically, the section of Fictions is very short and 
exists by virtue of accident. One of the three articles is included 
because its subject matter may be interpreted as dealing with 
fictions. The other two writers are discussed because they explicitly 
used the term "fiction." This writer happened to stumble across 
the writings while searching for other information. The articles 
were not discovered as a result of the method used by this writer 
for researching the value concept.
14
conceptualizations of value. Milton Rokeach is considered a 
psychologist and does not receive great attention from sociologists.
He is, however, the most renowned student of "values" is^syehology, 
and is Professor of Psychology and Sociology at Washington State 
University.
The Organization
Chapters III through VII constitute the main body of the
paper. Each of these five chapters is titled with one of the
five basic typological categories discussed in The Framework.
Chapter II is entitled "The Origins of Value in Sociology." This is 
the only chapter which is organized chronologically. Chapter III is 
entitled "Norms"; Chapter IV is entitled "Beliefs," and so on.
The literature discussed in each of the five chapters (III-
VII) is the result of a rough categorization. In other words, an
author might define or use the concept of "value" in a sense which 
approximates the definition of "Ideals." The categorization is 
"rough" because the literature examined does not necessarily fall 
into one single category. In some cases a book or article is 
discussed in several different chapters as it pertains to the subject 
at hand. It is very important that the reader understands that the 
literature discussed in each chapter was discovered by researching 
the subject of "values." In other words, this writer did not 
examine the literature dealing with "beliefs," or "norms," or 
"ideals." This writer is concerned with how sociologists use the 
concept of "value." How sociologists use the concept of "norm" and 
"belief" and "ideal" is another project altogether and would
15
constitute a far greater scope than intended in this context.
The sections and sub-sections in each chapter were determined 
by the concerns or issues which recur in the literature as opposed 
to some predetermined plan of this writer. Of course, this writer 
had to structure the discussions as he perceived them.
Chapter VIII is entitled "Conclusion." The first section in 
this chapter presents the only formal theory of value which was 
discovered. By "formal" this writer means that a set of hypotheses 
and corrolaries were developed to explain the relationships between 
valuers and values. The theory is criticized. The second section 
involves a general account Of how values “have been categorized by 
others and the criticisms which value concepts have received. The 
third and final section involves recommendations for the future 
conceptualization of value. These recommendations are intended to 
allow the greatest possible utility for sociology.
CHAPTER II
THE ORIGINS OF VALUE IN SOCIOLOGY
European Origins
The use of "value" as a sociological concept arose from a
philosophical conflict. The phenomenologists searched for man's
essences. The positivists argued that things, including man, could
be understood only i n ’terms'of their external manifestations.
The phenomenological method, the method of pure sociology, 
discovers the essences of society, social behavior, and social 
relations. It is not to be confused with the inductive- 
empirical approach to social materials, although the latter 
may consist in the specialized research that applies the 
principles and discoveries of the phenomenological method.
In fact, the inductive-empirical and phenomenological methods 
are not simple alternatives, for the latter is more profound, 
establishing results more basic than the former. The 
phenomenological method, in contrast to induction, may arrive 
at judgements of absolute certainty and finality. Through 
use of this method, one discovers the ultimate, a priori facts 
of social life, the inborn but plastic dispositions— to fondle, 
to help, to fight, to sympathize, to imitate, to receive 
suggestions, to be sociable, to trust, and so on— are the 
a priori preconditions of human society, and social life is 
reducible to the development of them. Because they are inborn, 
they are discoverable directly— if only one has the proper 
method. As original qualities of mental experience, they 
are susceptible only to phenomenological analysis, which 
discovers them and reduces all other qualities of experience 
to them. (Martindale, 1960: 272)
Phenomenology had its greatest impact on the course of
sociological thought through the work of two philosophers; Max
Scheler and perhaps of greater influence, Heinrich Rickert.
16
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Fundamental to all aspects of Scheler’s thought was the distinc­
tion characteristic of the phenomenologists between the realm 
of ideal value— essence— and the realm of existential fact.
While they partly parallel one another, they must not be identi­
fied. Real existence consists in factual relationships changing 
in time; the realm of values is a sphere of timelessly valid, 
intuited meanings. This metaphysical distinction is essential 
to the contrast between cultural sociology and the sociology 
of real factors. Cultural data are "ideal," existing in the 
realm of ideas and values. Real factors are part of changing 
events in time. Cultural data are defined by ideal goals or 
intentions; real data form an impulse structure around such 
things as sex, hunger and striving for power. It is wrong to 
assume that real factors such as race, political power, and 
economic production exclusively determine meanings. It is also 
wrong to assume that external events of experience consist in 
the unfolding of spiritualistic and perso'nalistic ideas.
Ideas do not become concrete and actualized unless bound up in 
some fashion in collective tendencies and incorporated in 
institutional structures. The peculiar problem of historical 
knowledge for Schelar is the explanation of how these two 
realms are jointly effective. (Martindale, 1960: 273)
Rickert accepts the doctrine of immediate experience, maintaining 
that being does not exist except as the content of consciousness. 
Immanent in consciousness is immediate reality as representation. 
The immanence of being, as found in consciousness, is that of 
the universal, the concept of formal logic in its representation. 
However, the objective of knowledge cannot be obtained from 
formal logic. All that is given in consciousness is the play 
of representations, and between representations there is no 
universal and necessary validity. To establish the objectivity 
of knowledge it is necessary to get away from consciousness and 
to devise a transcendant standard that has required validity.
The transcendant standard is not a content of consciousness. It 
is an "ought to be." This "ought" is the standard of logical 
valuations. The feeling of self-evidence is the only 
indication of its presence. Such self-evidence is the ultimate 
criterion of truth. In the further development of his ideas, 
Rickert abandons the abstract doctrine of "ought" and replaces 
it with "value," or the ideal, to which the doctrine of "ought" 
is a stepping stone. (Martindale, 1960:223)
According to Lewis Coser, Georg Simmel was a friend of Rickert 
and continually enjoyed his support. Scheler derived "major 
inspiration" from Simmel. Simmel’s understanding of value is 
essentially economic. Simmel’s description of value appeared in his
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book, The Philosophy of Money.* This writer discovered Simmel's 
interpretation in "A Chapter in the Philosophy of Value" which 
appeared in the new American Journal of Sociology (1900: 579-603).
An economic interpretation of value is important to Simmel as
the nature of human interaction is changed by the form taken by value.
When barter is replaced by money, transactions become more precise.
Money permits the determination of equivalents. "It is impersonal
in a manner in which objects of barter, like crafted gongs and
collected shells can never be (Coser, 1971: 193)."
When money becomes the prevalent link between people, it replaces 
personal ties anchored in diffuse feelings by impersonal relations 
that are limited to a specific purpose. Consequently, abstract 
calculation invades areas of social life, such as kinship 
relations or the realm of esthetic appreciation, which were 
previously the domain of qualitative rather than quantitative 
appraisals.** (Coser, 1971: 193)
Though Simmel's emphasis is upon economic value, some of his 
formulations apply to conceptions of value which are not economic.
A strict economic view would dictate that a gain in value in one 
sphere would be accompanied by a loss or sacrifice in another.
Simmel turned the matter around by noting that a sacrifice on one 
hand may result in a valuation where none had previously existed.
"In fact, there is a series of cases in which the sacrifice not 
merely raises the value of the aim, but even produces it (Simmel,
1900: 565)." Though the economic conception of value is the most 
precise or, if you will, empirical standard of value, and goes well
*As of 1971 this volume had not been translated to English.
**C. H. Cooley's formulations in this regard are similar. This 
aspect of Cooley is discussed in Chapter VI.
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with Simmel's "emphasis on the structural determinants of social 
action," he did not neglect the importance of internal factors. 
"Particular circumstances, however, are necessary in order to 
attach to an object a valuation, for every such valuation is an 
incident of the whole complex of our feelings, which is in constant 
flux, adaptation, and reconstruction (Simmel, 1900: 585)."
According to Timasheff, Durkheim and Weber are the two most
important figures in the history of sociological thought that
emphasize the significance of subjective factors in social activity.
Durkheim defined a "social fact" as "every way of acting, fixed or
not, capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint
(Coser, 1971: 129).," Coser explains that Durkheim's emphasis on the
exteriority and constraining features of "social facts" is a
characteristic of his early work; particularly his work on legal
systems. Coser says that Durkheim’s mechanical and organic
solidarity distinguish the features of "value consensus" from
"structural integration."
[Mechanical solidarity] prevails to the extent that "ideas and 
tendencies common to all members of the society are greater 
in number and intensity than those which pertain personally to 
each member. This solidarity can grow only in inverse ratio 
to personality." In other words, mechanical solidarity prevails 
where individual differences are minimized and the members of 
society are much alike in their devotion to the common weal. 
"Solidarity which comes from likeness is at its maximum when the 
collective conscience completely envelops our whole conscience 
and coincides in all points with it." Organic solidarity, in 
contrast, develops out of differences, rather than likenesses, 
between individuals. It is a product of the division of labor. 
With increasing differentiation of functions in a society 
comes increasing differentiation between its members. (Coser, 
1971: 131)
Timasheff's insistence on Durkheim's importance in stressing 
subjective factors is derived from Durkheim's later work. Coser
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agrees with the change in Durkheim’s emphasis.
The mature Durkheim stressed that social facts, and more 
particularly moral rules, become effective guides and controls 
of conduct only to the extent that they become internalized in 
the consciousness of individuals, while continuing to exist 
independently of individuals. (Coser, 1971: 129)
Though members of mechanically solidaric societies have strong
systems of common belief and members of organic societies do not
require as many common beliefs, every society must have "common
assumptions about the world around them." Durkheim refers to this
set of assumptions as the "conscience collective." Timasheff
considered this concept as that which distinguishes Durkheim’s
recognition of subjective factors. In Judgments of Reality and
Judgements of Value (1911) Durkheim .
. . . relates the collective conscience to social ideals, holding 
that a reciprocal process relates the two— social ideals bring 
into being the collective conscience and the latter in turn 
generates social ideals. Ideals arise from reality, to be sure, 
but go far beyond it; man’s conception of ideal society is 
part of social reality and therefore requires sociological study. 
Religion, law, morals, and economics— considered by Durkheim 
as the major social systems— are at once systems of values and 
ideals. Social ideals constitute the collective conscience as 
it exists independently of individual conceptions, while values 
are manifestations of the common conscience in individuals 
themselves. (Timasheff, 1955: 111)
Rickert’s phenomenological philosophy had a major impact on 
Max Weber.
The real distinctions to be made, Rickert and Windelband taught, 
hinge on the differences between individualizing and generalizing 
thought. There exist two radically opposed scientific approaches: 
The nomothetic sciences that aim at establishing universal laws 
and uniformities, and the idiographic sciences, above all 
history . . . , that only give descriptive accounts of particular 
historical constellations or individual historical actors.
(Coser, 1971: 246)
Weber’s emphasis on values was a reaction to materialist conceptions
that considered values and ideas as the product of structural
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characteristics. Weber did not deny that structural characteristics
have an impact but rather, they are not the sole determinants of
future events. "In contrast, Weber's primary focus was^on the
subjective meanings that human actors attach to their actions in
their mutual orientations within specific social-historical contexts
(Coser, 1971: 217)." These subjective meanings are the differentia
of Weber's four types of social action.
Men may engage in purposeful or goal-oriented rational action 
(zweckrational); their rational action may be value-oriented 
(wertrational); they may act from emotional or affective 
motivations; or, finally, they may engage in traditional action. 
Purposeful rationality, in which both goal and means are 
rationally chosen. . . . Value-oriented rationality is 
characterized by striving for a substantive goal, which in 
itself may not be rational. . . . Affective action is anchored
in the emotional state of the actor rather than in the rational 
weighing of means and ends. . . . Finally, traditional action 
is guided by customary habits of thought, by reliance on "the 
eternal yesterday”; . . . (Coser, 1971: 217)
Weber's types of action would later inform his types of authority
and permit him to argue the importance of subjective meanings in
determining the course of events for different societies.* "Seen
in the light of Weber’s methodology, the sociological emphasis on
key values in a social system is an effort to relate the operation
of the system to elements rooted in the past (Lipset, 1963: 531)."
Weber's sociology— "that science which aims at the interpretive 
understanding (Verstehen) of social behavior in order to gain an 
explanation of its causes, its course, and its effects (Coser, 1971: 
220)"— has been attacked as an invalid method on the grounds that it 
is not empirical. In other words, "verstehen" sociology is not
*This aspect of Weber's work is discussed in Chapter VII.
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subject to systematic verification. Weber did not see verstehen 
as an end product but as a "correlative11 or complementary principle 
in the development of causal explanations. "Immediate intuitions 
of meaning can be transformed into valid knowledge only if they 
can be incorporated into theoretical structures that aim at causal 
explanation (Coser, 1971: 221)." The use of value or subjective 
meaning in the interpretation of human action is attacked today 
even as it was attacked by the positivists at the time of Durkheim 
and Weber.* Nevertheless, Weber "helped to make clear the significant 
role of values in social life (Timasheff, 1955: 182)."
Celestin Bougie -was a'student of Durkheim and assumed the chair 
vacated by Durkheim at the Sorbonne. Bougie never reached the 
stature of his mentor. Bougie's The Evolution of Values (1926) is 
an attempt to develop the values aspect of Durkheims mechanical 
and organic solidarity. Bougie calls a value "a permanent possibility 
of satisfactions (Bougie, 1926: 19)." Durkheim's influence is 
unmistakable.
To speak of society is to speak not only of exchange of services, 
or collaboration of forces, but also of communication of 
sentiments. Men are intimately associated only when they have 
a number of things to respect in common. A civilization is not 
merely an assemblage of means of which humanity makes use in 
its operations on nature; it is system of ends designed to 
make individual activities converge. The maintenance of a 
sacred fire is a vital necessity for every society. (Bougie,
1926: 38)
Bougie used Spencer's example of the multiple function of 
priests (first judges, first doctors, first astronomers) to demonstrate
*These attacks on the value concept in general are discussed 
in Chapter VIII.
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that a differentiation of function has occurred over time. ’’The 
functions formerly pertaining to the priesthood are being made 
specific. So will be made specific the values primitively unified 
by religion. The differentiation of values keeps pace with the 
division of labor (Bougie, 1926: 63)."
Bougie*s writing suggests that values are subsequent to 
experience. It is difficult to determine if Bougie attributes 
any causal power to values. Throughout his book we find such 
comments as: "All education is initiation" and "every occupation
marks its man, internally even more than externally." Bougie takes 
particular pleasure in annpuncing the decline of religion as the 
determiner of values and the rise of individualism as a "superior 
value."
. . . the differentiation of values in society, by taking social 
complication into its service, would contribute its share 
toward differentiation of individual souls. Which amounts to 
saying that it would, in its way, prepare us to consider the 
autonomy of the human person as a superior value. (Bougie,
1926: 67)
We can take as Bougie’s major formulation that the differentiation
of values follows the division of function and we can see that Bougie
considers this a good thing as well as a fact.
The needs, the aspirations, the ideal of societies have other 
means of making themselves understood and obeyed. They have,
for a long time, been able to depend upon the values of which
worship, properly so called, is not the cement. And, indeed, 
they are obliged to do this systematically when, the principle 
of social unity is placed elsewhere than in identity of 
religious beliefs: Where the dissident become fellow citizens,
religion loses its moral monopoly. Then the authority of the 
collective conscience drops the zaimphs, the prestigious veils, 
strewn with stars, with it has so long been enveloped. It 
can no longer borrow the mouth of oracles to give orders.
In the vast and complex groupings, at once centralized and 
heterogeneous, which modern nations are, religious beliefs tend, 
more and more, to become "private affairs." We leave them free
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as all other opinions, but we can no longer confide to them 
alone, the control of the rules which are the guardians of the 
life of nations. (Bougie, 1926: 145)
It is difficult to assess the impact which Bougie has had on
contemporary sociology. Bougie is cited only infrequently by other
writers, and this writer discovered Bougie accidently while looking
for something else. By the time this book appeared the work of
American sociologists had surpassed Bougie’s contribution. As
will be discussed directly, Sumner had already delineated folkways
and mores and Thomas and Znaniecki had already completed an extensive
"empirical” study of values.
% m *
American Origins
The rational analysis .of social values in America as secular 
data and as constructs was undertaken by economists and 
philosophers earlier and with greater precision than by 
sociologists. The work of Cooley on "valuation," one of the 
first theoretical analyses of social values by a sociologist 
in this country, is said to have been shaped largely by his 
training in both economics and philosophy. Credit for the 
first American sociological analysis of values is occasionally 
given to Sumner whose "concept"* the central part of social 
institutions, was allegedly but another name for social value.
Yet there is virtually no argument against the’ position that 
the real starting-point on social values among American sociolo­
gists was in Thomas and Znaniecki’s work. (Barron, 1951: 209)
Folkways (1906) is Sumner’s most widely known work. The 
volume’s contents range from a description of how folkways and mores 
develop, to the character of institutions and the means by which 
these function. Sumner says that folkways "are habits of the 
individual and customs of the society which arise from efforts to 
satisfy needs (Sumner, 1906: iii)." According to Sumner, early man
*Sumner's "concept" is discussed in Chapter VII.
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could only discriminate pleasure and pain. By the time man becomes 
aware of his established customs the origin of these customs is 
far behind and lost in mystery. Nevertheless, Sumner is able to 
cite hunger, family, and ’’ghost fear” as the problems man had to 
overcome in order to survive. Holding an evolutionary perspective, 
Sumner reasoned that only group life would permit man to survive.
It is through group life that folkways and mores develop. Original 
group life was characterized by ’’antagonistic cooperation.”* Sumner’s 
argument for the appearance of folkways might be paraphrased as 
follows: (1) Men struggle to survive; (2) cooperation increases the
chances of survival; (3) cooperation is enhanced by the predictability 
of actions; and (4) actions are most predictable when they form 
patterns which may be called folkways.
The members of a particular society would regard their mores 
as being of greater importance than their folkways.
When the elements of truth and right are developed into 
doctrines of welfare, the folkways are raised to another plane.
They then become capable of producing inferences, developing 
into new forms, and extending their constructive influence 
over men and society. Then we call them the mores. The mores 
are the folkways, including the philosophical and ethical 
generalizations as to societal welfare which are suggested by 
them, and inherent in them as they grow. (Sumner, 1906: 30)
The survivability of a particular folkway depends a great deal 
on two factors: (1) Is the folkway detrimental or beneficial to the
existence of the group, and (2) is the folkway buttressed by the mores. 
According to Sumner, the mores influence the folkways through a 
process called "suggestion.” As the term indicates, suggestion is a
*Sumner did not mention that "antagonistic cooperation" was 
originally discussed by Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan, 1651).
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rather vague process by which folkways are perceived as beneficial
or harmful. This perception need not be a valid evaluation of a
folkway*s function. Suggestion also works through institutions and
conceptions of ideal man.*
Mores and folkways change by a process called "syncretism.11
. . . syncretism, a selection of the folkways which is destructive 
to some of them. This is the process by which folkways are 
rendered obsolete. The notion of a gradual refinement of the 
mores in time, which is assumed to go on of itself, or by 
virtue of some inherent tendency in that direction, is entirely 
unfounded. (Sumner, 1906: 116)
The examples of syncretism given by Sumner were on the inter-societal
and inter-group level; e.g., the adoption of Roman law by conquered
peoples or the alteration of Christian symbols and ethnic mores by
proselytized peoples. The notion of a gradual refinement of the
mores seems more likely than syncretism when the focus is upon modern
complex societies. The mass media and the huge numbers of people
living in close proximity makes it difficult to determine the
boundaries of groups. As a result the contact of different groups
is no longer a matter of completely distinct cultures and syncretism
becomes a difficult concept to use. It is possible that the notion
of "gradual refinement" has substance. The rapid increases in
information and the rapid means of disseminating that information,
as a stable characteristic of modern society, makes it difficult
to pinpoint the origin of particular folkways. Changes in folkways
and mores do take place and it is not possible to attribute this
change solely to Sumner's syncretism without considering syncretism
*Sumner's formulations in this regard are discussed in 
Chapter VII.
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on the interpersonal and person-media level of analysis.
Barron named Cooley as one of the three men who began "the
rational analysis of social values in America." Timasheff would
take issue with Barron in at least one respect— Timasheff would add
Giddings to the list. Timasheff said that "Giddings was one of the
first sociologists to bring out the significance of values in the
social life of man (Timasheff, 1955: 87)." The best example of this,
as given by Timasheff, was "Giddings Law":
A community endeavors to perfect its type in compliance with 
the prevailing conception of an ideal good. (In modern 
sociological language, this would mean that every large-scale 
group is influenced by the social ideal that it accepts.) 
Developing this law, Giddings stresses that the bases of 
rational social choices are social values, which he defines as 
social appraisals of certain satisfactions, relations, modes of 
activity, and forms of social organization. The supreme 
object of social values is kind itself. Giddings1 use of the 
term social value is noteworthy:, it had not yet gained general 
acceptance.
. . . the law of survival takes the following form: Those
values will survive which fit into a total of values that is 
becoming more and more complex and harmonious. This proposition 
is a reformulation of the Spencerian conception of evolution, 
with due regard to the volitional processes so important in 
Giddings1 theory. (Timasheff, 1955: 85)
Cooley* was perpetually intrigued by the idea of a transcendent 
sense of value.**
*Cooley studied at Michigan where there was no formal instruc­
tion in sociology. Instead, Cooley was examined by Giddings through 
the mail. Cooley appreciated Giddings’ work to the extent that 
he "emphasized the social psychological foundations of society 
(Coser, 1971: 322)." Giddings had invited Cooley to teach at 
Columbia. Cooley never did.
**This transcendent sense of value, which Cooley called "Value," 
is economic. The idea is examined in Chapter VI.
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Painters use the x^ord in connection with light and color, 
moralists in questions of conduct, and so on. Any man or 
group of men, in any sphere of life, it appears, may be
presumed to act according to a scale of values.
This broad use of the term seems to rest on the feeling 
that the judgement of worth is of much the same character, 
whether you apply it to a choice between a dozen eggs and a 
pound of beef in the market-place, or between shades of color
or lines of conduct: it is a matter of ascertaining how much
the alternatives appeal to you. (Cooley, 1918: 283)
Cooley’s conception of value is distinctly psychological in 
that it is man who perceives value. On the other hand, Cooley does 
not claim that values are operative only when men are conscious of 
them.
It would seem that the essential things in the conception of 
value are three: an organism, a situation, and an object. The
organism is necessary to give meaning to the idea; there must 
be worth to something. It need not be a person; a group, an 
institution, a doctrine, any organized form of life will do; and 
that it be conscious of the values that motivate it is not at 
all essential. Anything which lives and grows gives rise to a 
special system of values having reference to that growth, and 
these values are real powers in life, whether persons are aware 
of them or not; they are part of the character and tendency of 
the organism. . . .
The situation is the immediate occasion for action, in view 
of which the organism integrates the various values working 
within it (as a man does when he "makes up his mind") and meets 
the situation by an act of selection, which is a step in its own 
growth, leading on to new values and new situations. Valuation 
is only another name for the tentative organic process.
. . . taking the point of view of the object, we speak of 
grain-values, stock-values, the values of books, of pictures, 
of doctrines, of men. Evidently, however, these are indeter­
minate unless we bring in the organism and the-situation to 
define them. (Cooley, 1918: 284-285)
Cooley’s organic conception of society in combination with his
emphasis on introspection makes for a rather blurry conception of
value. Though structural analysis is not his forte, Cooley’s best
work on values deals with institutions. The economy, he'argued, was
as much an institution as the state or the church. However, "his
contributions to the subject matter consisted mainly of generalities.
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Cooley will probably rate only a footnote in future histories of 
economics (Coser, 1971: 313)."
Barron claims that the work of W. I. Thomas and Florian 
Znaniecki is the "real starting-point on social values among American 
sociologists." The "definition of the situation is the most famous 
of Thomas’ formulations and had its roots in The Polish Peasant in 
Europe and America (1927).* Coser called their book "the first great 
classic in American empirical sociology (Coser, 1971: 381)." By 
the time this book appeared, Thomas was convinced that sociology must 
consist of the "subjective aspects of social reality" as well as the 
forms of social organization in which thdse aspects operate.
Thomas and Znaniecki’s two volume work made use of letters and 
autobiographies. The concepts of greatest interest to us are found 
in the opening section: "Methodological Note." The "subjective
aspects" were conceptualized in two forms: social values and
attitudes.
By a social value we understand any datum having an empirical 
content accessible to the members of some social group and a 
meaning with regard to which it is or may be an object of 
activity. Thus a foodstuff, an instrument, a coin, a piece of 
poetry, a university, a myth, a scientific theory, are social 
values. Each of them has a content that is sensual in the case 
of the foodstuff, the instrument, the coin; partly sensual, 
partly imaginary in the piece of poetry, whose content is 
constituted not only by the images which they evoke, and in 
the case of the university, whose content is the whole complex 
of men, buildings, material accessories, and images representing 
its activity; or, finally, only imaginary in the case of a 
mythical personality or a scientific theory. (Thomas and 
Znaniecki, 1927: 21)
*This book was originally published in 1918-1920. The volume 
used by this writer was published by Alfred A. Knopf in 1927.
All references to The Polish Peasant will carry that date.
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By attitude we understand a process of individual conscious­
ness which determines reactions or possible activity of the 
individual in the social world. Thus, hunger that compels the 
consumption of the foodstuff: the workman's decision to use the 
tool; the tendency of the spendthrift to spend the coin; the 
poet's feelings and ideas expressed in the poem and the reader's 
sympathy and admiration; the needs which the institution tries 
to satisfy and the response it provokes; the fear and devotion 
manifested in the cult of the divinity; the interest in creating, 
understanding, or applying a scientific theory and the ways of 
thinking implied in it— all these are attitudes. The attitude 
is thus the individual counterpart of the social value: activity, 
in whatever form,*is the bond between them. By its reference 
to activity and thereby to individual consciousness the value 
is distingiushed from the natural thing. By reference to activity 
and thereby to the social world the attitude is distinguished 
from the psychical state. (Thomas and Ananiecki, 1927: 22)
They distinguish "value" from the thing or object. They 
distinguish attitude from the "psychical state" (whatever that may 
be). It is "activity" which links attitude and value. Thomas and 
Znaniecki's use of social value and attitude would cause problems 
in the future.
A conference was held from 1937-1938 to evaluate Thomas and 
Znanieki's book. Herbert Blumer's and Read Bain's summary of the 
conference findings.illustrates the reaction of sociologists to 
Thomas and Znanieki's mixture of value and attitude.
. . . Herbert Blumer, pointed out that, although Thomas and 
Znaniecki had set out to establish laws, they had actually 
proposed very few; that the concepts of value and attitude are 
vague; that the two concepts overlap inasmuch as both include 
meaning, and therefore no causal relationship can be established 
between them; that the authors did not in fact use the 
methodology they had worked out; and that their interpretation 
of the personal documents employed in the study is subjective, 
not really scientific. . . . Znaniecki, moreover acknowledged 
that the authors had treated attitudes and values as constant 
elements (which may be questioned) and that many years passed 
before he recognized this methodological error. (Timasheff,
1955: 154)
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. . . the conceptual scheme consisting of attitude, value, 
wishes, personal types, and definition of the situation, 
according to some, is incapable of producing laws of social 
change.* (Bain in Timasheff, 1955: 154)
It is uncommon to find attitude and value mixed in contemporary
sociology. When the mixture does appear, the same attacks are
leveled at it that were suffered by Thomas and Znaniecki. It is
perhaps the effort rather than the results which accounts for Thomas
and Znaniecki’s high standing in the history of the sociological
use of value. As Coser put it, "despite the blemishes the work
surely remains an enduring monument to that creative merger of
empirical research and theoretical sophistication which even
contemporary sociology only attains at rare moments (Coser, 1971:
381).”**
*There appears to be some historical dispute as to when Thomas 
developed the concept of "definition of the situation." Bain’s 
criticism of The Polish Peasant includes remarks about this concept. 
Coser, on the other hand, wrote that "definition of the situation" 
was "elaborated after 1919."
**If some writers would dispute the high esteem in which Coser 
holds Thomas and Znaniecki’s work in comparison with contemporary 
work, it is certain that their work was a landmark in their time.
A mention of some of their contemporaries will throw Thomas and 
Znaniecki into contrast.
Irving King (1909: 433-450) presented an argument denouncing 
the theory of a "religious instinct" (apparently a current idea). 
"The religious consciousness may be called a valuating attitude 
toward something real or imagined. By an attitude is meant an 
organization of various mental capacities in a definite way about 
certain situations or'problems of life (1909: 439)." "We choose 
to call it an attitude because it involves a‘ recognized emotional 
appreciation of the conceived values and a tendency to act in some 
way regarding them (1909: 440)." King’s rebuke of "instinct" is 
marred by his replacing it with "attitude." While instinct implies 
an inborn tendency, attitude implies an acquired tendency.
A later article by Boodin (1915: 65-103) slipped backwards a 
bit by arguing that "instincts furnish the fundamental springs of 
action and interest." "We cannot, however, reduce values altogether 
to social relations. We must take into account the surd of our own
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Later American Developments 
Ralph Linton is generally considered an anthropologist. However, 
his book The Study of Man (1936) contains ideas which are frequently 
cited in sociological work on values. "Universals," "Specialties," 
and "Alternatives" are Linton’s concepts for describing categories 
of elements for a particular culture.
First, there are those ideas, habits, and conditioned emo­
tional responses which are common to all sane, adult members of 
the society. We will call these Universals. It must be under­
stood that this terminology applies only to the context of a 
particular culture. An element classed as a universal in one 
culture may be completely lacking in another. To this category 
belong such elements as the use of a particular language, the 
tribal patterns of costume and housing, and the ideal patterns 
f.or social relationships. This category also includes the 
associations and values which lie, for the most part, below 
the level of consciousness but which are, at the same time, 
an integral part of culture.
Second, we have those elements of culture which are shared 
by the members, of certain socially recognized categories of 
individuals but which are not shared by the total population.
We will call these Specialties. Under this head come the 
patterns for all these varied but mutually interdependent acti­
vities which have been assigned to various section of the 
society in the course of its division of labor. In all societies 
certain things are done by or known to only a designated part of 
the population, although they contribute to the well being of 
the whole. Thus all the women within a tribe will be familiar 
with certain occupations and techniques, while the men will be 
familiar with a different series. As a rule, the men will only 
have a rather vague general knowledge of the things which belong 
in the women’s province and vice versa. Under this head there 
can also be classed the activities which the society has assigned 
to special craftsmen or functionaries such as the smith, 
carpenter, doctor, and priest. . . .
Third, there are in every culture a considerable number of 
traits which are shared by certain individuals but which are not 
common to all of the members of the society or even to all the
instinctive and temperamental endowment. It is this which 
furnishes the possibility, the raw material of social organization. 
And it is this which in the last analysis, when raised to conscious­
ness through social pressure, must give us the variations which 
make new values and interpretations of value possible. Only so 
can we have progress in evaluation (Boodin, 1915: 78)."
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members of any of the socially recognized categories. We will 
call these Alternatives. The elements of a culture which may be 
included in this class have a very wide range, varying from the 
special and often quite atypical ideas and habits of a particular 
family to such things as different schools of painting or 
sculpture. Aside from the nature of the participation in them, 
all these alternatives have this in common: they represent
different reactions to the same situations or different techniques 
for achieving the same end. (Linton, 1936: 272-273)
Linton’s three categories blanket the range of topics that 
could be studied by sociologists. Richard Morris (1956: 610-613) 
cited Linton’s categories as an example of previous work in norm 
typologies. Linton’s own requirement of discussing Universals with 
reference to a particular culture illustrates a concern with ethos.
His use of the term "ideas” shows a concern which goes beyond an 
interest in actions and artifacts. His reference to "mutually inter­
dependent activities" shows an interest in social structure.
Linton’s concept of "interest" is important because it recognizes 
the possibility of neuter or negative values as opposed to the 
generally accepted understanding of value with a positive valence.
The most complex and least explored field of cultural 
phenomena is that of interests. A culture interest may be 
defined as anything which has meaning for two or more of a 
societies’ component members. It differs in certain respects 
from a value as that term is commonly used. Thus while it 
falls within the broadest definition of a value as "anything 
of interest," it at once limits the field to things in which 
interest is shared. No matter how numerous or how intense 
any individual's associations with a particular thing are, 
this does not make the thing an interest as long as these 
associations are exclusively his own. Interest also differs 
from value in that it carries no implication of any relation to 
good. Although such implications do not’necessarily attach 
to value under the broad definition cited above, they have come 
to it even in philosophic usage. Thus no one would say that 
murder was a value to any society, although it must be considered 
an interest of all societies. Lastly, it must be understood 
that the thing of our definition is not necessarily an object 
or natural phenomenon. It may quite as well be an occupation, 
such as carpentry or hunting, or an abstraction such as chastity, 
generosity, or cowardice. (Linton, 1936: 422)
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Linton1s use of interest in analyzing cultural phenomena was not as 
insightful as his recognition that negative meaning is an important 
"other side of the coin." The following example illustrates the 
trap into which Linton fell.
It can be seen that although the horse far outranked the dog 
in economic importance, the dog far outranked the horse in 
interest rating. The Comanche made more use of the horse and 
he was vastly more necessary to their survival, yet they 
ascribed more meaning to the dog. It may be urged that the 
comparison of interest in a work animal with interest in a pet 
is not a fair one, since the pet is really a member of society.
The group regards it as belonging, so to speak, on the human 
side of the fence. However, this only brings us to the problem 
of why the Comanche did not make pets of their horses, as many 
other societies did. The answer is that they were not 
sufficiently interested in them. Thus we can close another 
of those circles into which culture elements arrange themselves 
whenever we study a culture continuum at a single point. (Linton, 
1936: 429)
The circularity of Linton's analysis is obvious. He seems to 
recognize circularity as a fact of cultures as if "single points" 
were misleading. Whatever Linton means in his last sentence it does 
not diminish the fact that his explanation of differential interest 
does not explain.
The sociology of Pitirim Sorokin is primarily directed at 
discovering why a culture's elements seem to.be centered about some 
particular concern.
Sorokin makes use of the fact that if we examine in a com­
prehensive way the culture and society of any people at any time, 
we begin to acquire a sense, however vague, of a relationship 
between the disparate parts of the culture. Mythology, art, 
law, philosophy, morality, family structure, the conduct of 
war, architecture, music, religion, economics, sense of time, 
logic, science, mathematics, humor, and leisure pursuits seem 
to be associated with each other. For example, in a culture 
such as ours, where affairs of the market place appear to be 
dominant, a wide variety of cultural habits and practices are 
related in their mutual support of the business ethic. The 
cultural practices of the Pueblo Indians, on the other hand,
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appear to be related to religious practices and concepts 
associated with the problem of bringing rain to an arid land. 
(Cuzzort, 1969: 237)
Why is a particular culture oriented towards a particular problem or
set of problems while another culture is oriented towards a different
set? And why do these cultures, given their particular orientations,
move in one direction as opposed to another? "Sorokin approaches
this problem by presuming that a culture will be profoundly affected
by the manner in which it defines the nature of reality. Such
definitions are pervasive and may, as a consequence, influence a
great variety of behavior ranging from art and leisure to law and
science (Cuzzort, 1969: 237)." .
According to Sorokin, reality may be approached in two ways.
The first approach Sorokin called the "Ideational mentality." The 
Ideational mentality locates reality within the spiritual or "super- 
sensory" realm. To one who views reality with an Ideational mentality 
the experiences of the senses are misleading or illusory. The second 
approach to reality emphasizes the experiences of the senses to the 
point that reality is limited, as much as possible, to what can be 
sensed. This type of culture or mentality is called "Sensate."
The nature of values in these two types of cultures varies as do 
the definitions of reality. In Ideational cultures values are 
absolute. The validity of values transcends time and situation.
Since reality is a question of the spirit, the situational differ­
ences noted by the senses are of no validity in determining what is 
of value. The values of sensate culture are oriented toward change. 
There is the belief that things are becoming better. There is the 
belief in objectivity. In Sensate culture, rules of conduct and
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morality is based on its timeless truth. Sorokin’s concern with 
definitions of reality and its effects on the whole of culture is 
translatable to a concern with Ethos. Sorokin will be discussed in 
greater detail in that context.
One of the most frequently cited individuals in the literature 
on values is John Dewey. Dewey has been called a philosopher, social 
philosopher, reformer, and an educator. Though Dewey had Cooley 
and Mead among his colleagues, Dewey’s greatest influence on the 
subject of values came through a volume entitled Theory of Valuation 
(1939). It is this volume to which writers refer when acknowledging 
the distinction betwedn "the desired" and "the desirable."* Dewey’s 
book is also credited with demanding that values, or more precisely, 
valuation exists only to the extent that actual behavior can be 
observed.
The test of the existence of a valuation and the nature of 
the latter ..is actual behavior as that is subject to observation.
Is the existing field of activities (including environing 
conditions) accepted, where "acceptance" consists in effort to 
maintain it against adverse conditions? Or is it rejected, 
where "rejection” consists of effort to get rid of it and to 
produce another behavioral field? And in the latter case, what 
is the actual field to which,.as an end, desire-efforts (or 
the organization of desire-efforts constituting an interest) 
are directed? Determination of this field as an objective of 
behavior determines what is valued. Until there is actual or 
threatened shock or disturbance of a situation, there is a green 
light to go ahead in immediate act— overt action. There is no 
need, no desire, and no valuation, just as where there is no 
doubt, there is no cause of inquiry. (Dewey, 1939: 54)
Like Cooley, Dewey stressed that valuation should be understood 
as a process (hence his preference for the term "valuation" as opposed
*Clyde Kluckhohn, another respected theorist in the field, 
credits Dewey with this formulation.
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to "value") which changes "when menaced with disruption." Dewey’s 
stress on the value process is best shown in his reference to the 
building of a theory of valuation.
. . . the theory of valuation is itself an intellectual or 
methodological means and as such can be developed and perfected 
only in and by use. Since that use does not now exist in any 
adequate way, the theoretical consideration advanced and con­
clusions reached outline a program to be undertaken, rather than 
a complete theory. The undertaking can be carried out only by 
regulated guidance of the formation of interests and purposes 
in the concrete. The prime condition of this undertaking (in 
contrast with the current theory of the relation of valuation 
to desire and interest) is recognition that desire and interest 
are not given ready made at the outset, and a fortiori are not, 
as they may at first appear, starting-points, original data, or 
premises of any theory of valuation, for desire always emerges 
within a prior system of activities or interrelated energies.
It arises within a field when the field is disrupted or is 
menaced with disruption, when conflict introduces the tension 
of need or threatens to introduce it. (Dewey, 1939: 54)
It would be difficult to argue that Dewey’s "outline" has 
been adopted. A few of his ideas had their impact such as the 
desire-desirable distinction, and the impermanence of means-ends 
distinctions for particular values.
Howard Becker preferred the use of means and ends in his 
conception of value. Becker did not demand that a value be a means 
or an end permanently. Instead, Becker classified four types of 
means and four types of ends. Becker’s four types of means have 
a distinct Weberian "ring" to them. "(1) Expedient rationality is 
that kind of conduct in which the actor seeks to attain values by 
any means regarded as conforming to the principles of economy of 
effort, efficiency, and absence of undesirable consequences (Becker, 
1950: 24)." Whether the ends the subject has in mind are a real 
possibility and are consistent with one another and if the conduct 
is in conformance with the above named principles is unimportant.
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It is the actor’s definition of them which is important.
(2) Sanctioned rationality is "a type in which the principles 
of economy of effort and so on are followed as far as a certain 
limit; this limit is set by the character of the end itself (Becker, 
1950: 25)." The notion of sportsmanlike conduct in warfare was given 
as a case in point. The discovery that the Japanese could be 
suicidal in attaining their ends forced the naive American soldier
to suspend the sportsman’s code. The prime objective— winning the 
war— would not allow the means— "giving the guy a break"— if under 
the circumstances the guy wouldn’t give you one.
(3) Traditional ‘nonrationality "is 'marked by the dominance of 
means over ends or, otherwise put, a state of affairs in which 
actions formerly regarded as mere means become ends in themselves 
(Becker, 1950: 26)."
(4) Affective nonrationality is "definitely a catchall, 
including as it does everything from outburst of love or hatred to 
the unquestioning acceptance of a leader . . . (Becker, 1950: 29)."
The "ends" listed by Becker are (1) security, (2) response,
(3) recognition, and (4) new experience.* The fact that these "ends"
sound like "needs" is not accidental. Becker gave "needs" a central
place in his formulation of value.
There are no human needs without values; there are no human values 
without needs. Needs and values are reciprocally defined in and 
through sociation. (Becker, 1950: 252) •
*Becker recognized these as the "four wishes" of W, I. Thomas. 
Becker noted that they have variously been referred to as "wishes," 
"attitudes," and "tendencies." (Becker, 1950: 35)
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One of the most influential, if not the most influential, 
sociologists of the past 25 years is Talcott Parsons. Parson’s 
peculiar style of grand theory led C. Wright Mills to say: "The
fact is that it is not readily understandable; the suspicion is that 
it may not be altogether intelligible (Mills, 1959: 26)."* So as to 
avoid a misinterpretation of Parson's complex work, Martindale’s 
interpretation is accepted. Martindale summarized Parsons’ "argu­
ment" as follows:
I. Parsons breaks with the social-action branch of social 
behaviorism, reducing social action to the status of a 
dependent unit of one of three kinds of system.
II. The fundamental elements of action are conceived to be 
ideas, desires, and values (cognitive, cathectic, and 
evaluation orientation).
III. Action as a system is differentiated into three subsystems: 
personality, social system, and culture.
IV. A social system is, if total rather than partial, a society.
A. It is a large scale, persistent, independent system of 
social action.
B. The primary units into which it is analyzed are role- 
status: positions plus the activities appropriate to
them.
*Mills mentioned four kinds of reactions to Parsons’ theory:
To at least some of those who claim to understand it, and who 
like it, it is one of the greatest advances in the enture history 
of social science.
To many of those who claim to understand it, but who do not 
like it, it is a clumsy piece of irrelevant ponderosity. (These 
are rare, if only because dislike and impatience prevent many from 
trying to puzzle it out.)
To those who do not claim to understand it, but who like it 
very much— and there are many of these— it is a wondrous maze, 
fascinating precisely because of its often splendid lack of 
intelligibility.
Those who do not claim to understand it and who do not like 
it— if they retain the courage of their convictions— will feel 
that indeed the emperor has no clothes. (Mills, 1959: 26)
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C. The functional prerequisites of a society are those 
minimum requirements with respect to individuals, 
social systems, and culture without which society 
could not exist.
D. Institutions are large-order units formed out of the 
status-roles when they are integrated and standardized.
E. A collectivity is formed around a core of central 
institutions.
V. Social norms form the central element in status-roles and 
institutions.
VI. Institutions are of three types: relational (defining
reciprocal role expectations); regulative (defining legiti­
mate means to values); and cultural (defining cultural 
requirements).
A. Of these, relational institutions are most critical for
establishing the character of a society.
VII. Pattern alternatives of value orientation define relational 
role-expectation.patterns. There are five of these pairs:
A. Affectivity vs. Affective neutrality.
"The polarity of affectivity-neutrality formulates the 
patterning out of action with respect to this basic 
alternative.M
B. Self-Orientation vs. Collectivity-Orientation.
(The individual faces a choice of pursuing interests 
private to himself or shared with others.)
C. Universalism vs. Particularism.
"The primacy of cognitive values may be said to imply 
a universalistic standard of role-expectation, while 
that of appreciative' values implies a particularistic 
standard."
D. Achievement vs. Ascription.
E. Specificity vs. Diffuseness.
The scope of ego’s interest in the object.
Whatever merit there may be in the totality of Parsons' theory,
it is certain that his "pattern alternatives" hit at the basic
questions that all societies confront. This is not to say that
societies consciously consider each of the five pairs above but
rather, every social system has some position on each of the five
pairs. Martindale said that:
Parsons' most unique contribution to sociological functional­
ism appears at this point in his conception of what he calls 
"pattern-alternatives of value-orientations." These represent 
the possibilities in which the normative elements of relational
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institutions are defined. As he states the case: "It should
again be emphasized that we are here dealing with the foci for 
the patterning of relational institutions." (Martindale, 1960:
487)
The reader will find an example of how this framework has been 
used in Chapter VIII along with another five-point conception of value 
orientation by Florence Kluckhohn and Fred Stodtbeck.
A chapter by Clyde Kluckhohn in Parsons’ Toward a General Theory
of Action (1951) aptly summarizes the condition of the value concept.
Reading the voluminous, and often vague and diffuse, literature 
on the subject in the various fields of learning, one finds 
values considered as attitudes, motivations, objects, measurable 
quantities, substantive areas of behavior, affect-laden customs 
or traditions, and relationships such as those between individuals, 
groups, objects, events: The only general agreement is that
values somehow have to do with normative as opposed to existential 
propositions. (Kluckhohn in Parsons, 1951: 390)
Kluckhohn follows Dewey’s suggestion by insisting that
"verbalizability is a necessary test of value (Kluckhohn in Parsons,
1951: 397)." Likewise, Kluckhohn raises value above the level of
the desired and insists that a value is a conception of the desirable.
A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an 
individual or characteristic of a group, of the desireable 
which influences the selection from available modes, means and 
ends of action. (Kluckhohn in Parson, 1951: 395)
Kluckhohn spends considerable time explaining the terms of his
definition. He says that "explicit and implicit" are important
qualifiers because many values are only occasionally verbalized.
"An implicit value is, however, almost always potentially
expressible in rational language by actor as well as observer (1951:
397)." His use of "conception" with "desirable" is a recognition
that "value" is comprised of "reason" and "feeling."
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Value and Social Value 
By this time the reader may sense that there are many ways in 
which value may be understood. An important distinction, and one 
that is by no means clear in sociological writings on value, is 
between "value" and "social value." Robin Williams makes the dis­
tinction.
What are experienced by individuals as values have these qualities: 
(1) They have a conceptual element— they are more than pure 
sensations, emotions, reflexes, or so-called needs. Values are 
abstractions drawn from the flux of the individual's immediate 
experience. (2) They are affectively charged: They represent
actual or potential emotional mobilization. (3) Values are not 
the concrete goals of action, but rather the criteria by which 
goals are chosen. (4) Values are important, not "trivial" or 
of slight concern. (Williams, 1951: 440)
Of social values Williams wrote:
. . . we may follow Linton in treating all shared values as 
cultural values by definition. Social values, however, not only 
are shared by a number of individuals but are regarded as matters 
of collective welfare by an effective consensus of the group. 
(Williams, 1951: 400)
Williams' definition implies that a social value is attached
to a power base. The most powerful values are "institutions." The
church, the state, the family, the economy are all institutions.
Each is comprised of many specific values but it is the rationale,
ideology, or to use Sumner's term, the "concept" which serves as
the "socia.1 value."
Conclusion
Within sociology, "value" and "fact" have the same origin. 
That origin is the pheomenological method. As Martindale wrote: 
"The phenomenological method, in contrast to induction, may arrive 
at judgements of absolute certainty and finality. Through use of
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this method, one discovers the ultimate, a priori facts of social 
life, the inborn but plastic dispositions . . . (Martindale, 1960: 
272).”
For Scheler there was a metaphysical distinction between fact 
and value. Value is timelessly valid and fact consists of relation­
ships changing in time. Scheler warned that the two must not be 
identified. Nevertheless, Rickert connected the two by arguing that 
the "Ought" is the "standard of logical valuations." The "Ought," 
later called "value," is a transcendent standard necessary for 
establishing the objectivity of knowledge.
Max Scheler and Georg Simmel brought values and ideas out of 
philosophy. Scheler believed that ideas do not have social effects 
unless they are bound up in "collective tendencies" and "incorporated 
in institutional structures." Simmel severly limited his use of value 
by conceptualizing value in economic terms. But since Simmel was also 
trying to relate values to institutions it is not surprising to find 
him using money as the symbol or representation of value— money is 
relatively concrete.
Cooley was to follow this pattern in essence. He managed to 
minimize the importance of phenomenological discoveries— "the inborn 
but plastic dispositions." These basic dispositions, which Cooley 
called "human nature values," are so transformed by the social 
forms in which they are found that it is no longer correct to attribute 
these values to human nature. Instead Cooley claims that most values 
are "institutional values."
Giddings emphasized the institutional character of social 
values. Actually, Giddings equated the two ideas of "institutions"
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and "social values" when he defined the latter as "social appraisals 
of certain satisfactions, relations, modes of activity, and forms 
of social organization (Timasheff, 1955: 85)." Giddings* ideas in 
this regard are not unlike Durkheim*s. Durkheim, however, may be 
credited with developing an idea more diffuse than Gidding’s "social 
value." This more diffuse idea of Durkheim*s is that of "social 
ideals." "Social ideals constitute the collective conscience as it 
exists independently of individual conceptions, while values are 
manifestations of the common consciences in individuals themselves 
(Timasheff, 1955: 111)." It appears that Durkheim has laid the ground-
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work for the concept of "Ethos" with his concept of "conscience 
collective." Values are manifestations of the collective conscience 
but are not equal to it. According to Timasheff, Durkheim*s "major 
social systems" of religion, law, morals, and economics are "at once 
systems of values and ideals."
Max Weber defined actions in terms of the meanings attached to 
the actions by the actor. In doing this, Weber related "meaning" and 
behavior. Sumner was to make a similar recognition by differentiating 
between folkways and mores. The primary difference between folkways 
and mores is the way in which actors define the importance of the 
action, custom, or behavior in question. Sumner also addressed 
diffuse values. Like Giddings, Sumner saw institutions as social 
values. Sumner argued that each institution'embodied some social 
value which he called a "concept."
In the late 1930*s Sorokin was to argue that a society's 
institutions, activities, and artifacts were arranged about some 
central idea or "mentality." This mentality defines a culture’s
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orientation. In this respect Sorokin defined types of ethos.
Other sociologists contributed their ideas to the developing 
value concept. Linton expanded the meaning of value beyond its 
conventional attachment to "the good" by defining "interest" as a 
concept which encompasses "the bad" as well as "the good." John 
Dewey argued against the idea that values exist in a necessary means- 
ends relationship with one another. Talcott Parsons managed, in 
effect, to argue that cultures can be defined by their reciprocal 
role expectations. These reciprocal role expectations are best 
defined in institutions. This line of reasoning links norms, 
institutions, and ethos.
The information presented in this chapter on the origins of 
value in sociology tells us that value can be broken down most simply 
into the categories of "value" and "social value." Value pertains 
to the individual and social value pertains to the society. Weber’s 
four types of action, Durkheim’s "values" and Sumner’s folkways and 
mores all pertain to "value." Durkheim's "social ideals," Giddings 
"social values," Cooley’s "institutional values," Sorokin’s 
Ideational and Sensate cultures, and Weber's ethics all relate to 
"social values."
With regard to the Vanfossen typology of values it is apparent 
that the distinction between "value" and "social value" is virtually 
equivalent to Vanfossen's distinction between values which are 
Specific and values which are Diffuse. The precedent for such a 
breakdown is explicit in Sumner's, Durkheim’s, Linton’s, and Weber’s 
work and implicit in the focus of the work of Sorokin, Giddings,
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Cooley, Dewey, and Parsons. The following chapters will focus on 
particular kinds of specific and diffuse values.
CHAPTER III
NORMS
Norms and Values: A Common Distinction
In the Handbook of Modern Sociology (Faris, 1964) the reader 
will find an article entitled "Norms, Values and Sanctions" by Blake 
and Davis (1964: 456-484). This article was intended to summarize 
and clarify the accumulated-knowledge of-norms, values and sanctions. 
The article as a whole is confusing although "norms" and "values” are 
distinguished from one another. A norm is defined as "any standard or 
rule that states what human beings should or should not think, say 
or do under given circumstances." Values are defined as "the goals 
or principles in terms of which specific norms are claimed to be 
desirable." The norm-values distinction made by Blake and Davis 
accurately reflects the most common usage of the terms in sociological 
literature.
At least two introductory sociology texts also separate norm 
and value.* Vernon says that "value definitions specify the relative 
worth that man attributes to or imposes upon various aspects of his
*Introductory texts are not generally considered primary 
sources. They are cited here because this writers intention is to 
show the conventional usage. It is unlikely that an introductory 
volume would be the place to find a novel or unaccepted idea.
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universe. . . . Statements that specify plans of action, directly or 
indirectly, reflect value definitions. Such statements are called 
norm definitions or just norms . . . (Vernon, 1965: 98)."
Lenski says that norms are "behavioral prescriptions and 
proscriptions for the incumbents of specific roles in specific 
situations (Lenski, 1970: 496)." Values are "the generalized moral 
beliefs to which the members of a group subscribe (Lenski, 1970: 498)."
Blake and Davis, Vernon, and Lenski all distinguish norms 
from values yet relate the two with varying explicitness. For Blake 
and Davis, values justify norms. For Vernon, norms reflect values.
For Lenski, norms and ’values differ according to situational 
specificity. This similarity in definition has posed a serious problem 
for those who used the two concepts in the same context. This is 
especially true where causal connections are stated.*
Blake and Davis also discuss the "fallacy of normative deter­
minism." This simply means that it is erroneous to assume that the 
presence of a norm is the cause of behavior which is consistent with 
that norm. This contention may be approached in two ways. If 
behavior in a specific situation is patterned an observer may assume 
that the behavior is normal. The observation of a pattern only 
permits the observer to state a statistical norm, e.g., such and 
such usually occurs in such and such a situation. The assumption that
*Causal connections between values and other concepts, are 
treated in Chapter VIII.
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a "standard or rule" is behind the pattern may be fallacious.*
If a norm is understood as a prescription or proscription the 
"fallacy of normative determinism" may not really be a fallacy. If 
"determinism" is equated with "cause" then normative determinism 
is fallacious since no deviance would be possible. If "determinism" 
is understood as a contingent or a statement of probability then 
normative determinism may not be fallacious. The presence of "a 
standard or rule that states what human beings should or should not 
think, say, or do under given circumstances" is a good indication of 
what people will or will not say or do. Of course, norms are violated,
# * 4
Evidence for Relationships Between 
Norms of Different Types
The distinction between "folkways" and "mores" that was 
formalized by Sumner continues to receive empirical support even 
though the specific terms have declined in use. As discussed in the 
introduction, "customary norms” and "moral norms" are the terms used 
to refer to this distinction. Though specific research efforts are 
phrased in terms of "morals," "attitudes," "values," or "norms," a real 
difference betwTeen customary and moral norms is repeatedly evident.
In a study by Turner (1952: 70-77), open-ended questionnaires
*Robin Williams is not necessarily willing to agree that a 
standard or rule is present even if one has been verbalized. 
Williams likes a more rigid test: "The social character of a norm, 
on the other hand, can be observed only in interaction; and its 
first sign is the appearance of approval or disapproval. . . . And 
the final sign of a genuinely social norm is that the sanctioning 
is approved (accepted as legitimate by relatively disinterested 
parties)." (Williams, 1951: 413)
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were used to discover the differences in response to two hypothetical 
situations. Respondents were asked "What would you do if . . .  ?" 
type questions. The situations presented to the respondents were:
(1) a friend had stolen $500 and confided in you, and (2) a friend 
had a pre-marital affair and confided in you. Responses were of six 
types: relective— a break or limitation of the friendship; responsible—  
to assume responsibility for the action and urge rectification and 
future avoidance; moral passive— make a judgement such as disapproval 
or have less trust but make no relational change; amoral assisting—  
protect the friend or help to reduce guilt; responsible assisting— a 
personal attempt to rectify'the situation.
Response combinations were numerous but the course of action 
chosen by the respondent depended most frequently on whether or not 
the friend’s behavior had a victim other than the friend himself.*
The most interesting finding involved the rejective response. Persons 
rejective toward the sex situation were always rejective of the theft 
situation. Persons rejective of the theft situation, however, 
demonstrated no clear pattern of response to the sex situation.
There was considerable variation among the five other response types.
/
The pattern of response for the rejective choice and the two 
situations may be clarified by referring to different types of norms. 
Theft is a behavior which is far more specific with regard to the 
sanctions attached to it. Theft is a specific situation defined by
*Turners interest in this study centered on primary groups and 
roles. His conclusions were directed at this area and made use 
of psychological inferences. The discussion of norms has been 
abstracted from Turner’s data.
51
codified proscription— law. Pre-marital sex, on the other hand, is 
a situation of greater latitude in terms of law, regardless of the 
importance attached to it in an individuals upbringing. Turner’s 
findings indicate that sanction of greater severity are more probable 
in situations where customary, moral, and legal norms coincide. By 
comparison, sanctions will be less severe where customary, moral, and 
legal norms do not coincide.
The same conclusion may be drawn from a study by Smigel (1953:
59-67). This article dealt with unemployment compensation. Smigel
found that his respondents disapproved of persons who received
compensation to which *they were not entifled under law ("chiseling").
The degree of disapproval varied depending on the circumstances in
which the chiseling occurred. When the violation was unintended or
accidental the disapproval was least consistent. Disapproval
increased greatly when the chiseling was not only intentional but
involved the assistance of other persons.
Disapproval of chiseling is more consistent when social norms 
and the law are congruent. When the social norms and the law 
agree, as they do in the situations involving collusion, the 
illegal behavior is often sharply disapproved. (Smigel, 1953:
In a study of three Sinhalese villages (Tambiah and Ryan,
1957: 292-299) it was hypothesized that traditional family values 
would be weaker, or less often supported in communities having the 
greatest contact with secular forces, i.e., newspapers, radio, 
cinema, and education.
Life is considered sacred in this Buddhist culture and all 
three communities rejected birth control with about equal vehemence. 
Large families are traditional. In Elaga, the most remote village
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which has the least secular influence, the authors found the least 
support for large families— the smallest expressed ideal number.
This finding contradicted the author’s hypothesis. The village 
scoring the highest in secular influence (Colony) also expressed the 
highest ideal number of .family members.
In an effort to account for their findings the authors noted 
that Elaga had very sparse rainfall and techniques of cultivation 
not conducive to the support of a large population. The Colony on 
the other hand, did not have problems with rainfall. However, it 
was illegal to rent land in Colony. To obtain.a profit from the land 
it had to be sold or worked by the owner and his family. The authors 
noted this as a situation conducive to large families. While the 
authors suggested the importance of "ecological realities" in 
"contravening the effects of secular influence" they hypothesized 
"unique moral vitality in family mores." It is sensible to consider 
environmental conditions but it is apparent once again that custom 
is stronger when its alternatives are not reinforced by law.
Rettig and Pasamanick (1959: 856-863) performed a time study 
on "moral values" using questionnaire data from 1958 and data 
collected by Crissman in 1929, 1939, and 1949. College student 
respondents were asked to mark on a scale of from 1-10, better to 
worse respectively, how they felt abotit certain behaviors. There 
were 50 items in all. Graphing the mean scores of a moral rating 
on each item the authors were able to conclude that there was a 
general trend towards harshness of judgement. That is, from 1929 
to 1958 the same items or behaviors have been judged with increasing 
conservatism.
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A factor analysis revealed several clusters the most interesting 
of which was Factor "B." This is a "group factor" the highest loadings 
of which fall oil "seeking amusement on Sunday instead of going to 
church," "disbelieving in God,” "seeking divorce because of 
incompatability," and "not giving to support religion when able."
Though other items fell with the above group, e.g., "suicide,"
"profane language,” "not giving to charity," "birth control," 
"premarital sex," "girls smoking," and "not marrying below a man’s 
status," the former set of items formed their own "inner group." 
According to the authors this suggests that an empirical differen­
tiation should be made between judgements relating to "sinful" and 
"wrong" behavior (Rettig and Pasamanick, 1959: 862). The authors’ 
rationale for this distinction is that "sinful" originates in 
teachings derived from a superimposed authority while "wrong" has 
its origins in daily learning experiences, e.g., "the rules of 
the game." The distinction between "wrong" and "sinful" behavior 
is consistent with Sumner’s distinction of folkways and mores.
Another study (Rettig and Pasamanick, 1960: 550-555) revealed 
that the general trend towards harshness did not include "economic 
moral standards." In other words, these standards do not become 
more severe with increased age. Unlike religious morality or 
morality pertaining to the family, economic affairs are largely 
covered by enacted law. The propriety of economic norms (enacted 
law) is less visible than are those norms derived from religious 
conviction or personal family experience. Therefore, "moral values" 
pertaining to economic matters would tend to remain as they are 
unless there is a change in their perceived effects. Rettig and
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Pasamanick offered no explanation as to why economic moral standards
have not become more severe. The "visibility argument" may be
inferred from their conclusion:
On the basis of these findings, it may be predicted that, unless 
a major historical event such as deep depression, uncontrolled 
inflation, or another World War is to interfere, approval of 
economic exploitation may increase. (Rettig and Pasamanick,
1960: 555)
Historical events such as Watergate, Vietnam, current inflation, 
unemployment, and recession have probably had just such an impact.
A follow-up study would be interesting.
The information presented supports the distinction between 
customary norms, moral norms, and legal rforms. The articles by 
Turner and Smigel indicate that the severity of sanctions will vary 
depending upon the legal standing of the behavior in question. The 
article by Tambiah and Ryan illustrates that ecological and legal 
conditions will maintain traditional norms despite secular influence. 
One of the questions not asked by Tambiah and Ryan concerns the 
affective influence of secular forces: Even though behavior has
not changed because of secular forces, perhaps the local norms are 
shifting from a moral to a customary standing.
Norms are Situationally Specific 
but Conformity is Variable
A norm is conventionally understood as a situationally specific 
prescription or proscription for behavior. The concept is useful 
but presents problems because all behavior which is considered 
conforming behavior is not the same. According to Williams "there 
is usually a 'permissive1 zone of variation around even the most 
specific and strongly supported norms; certain kinds and degrees of
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overconformity and of underconformity are expected and tolerated 
(Williams, 1951: 413)."
Stouffer (1949: 707-717) posed a set of hypothetical situations
i
to college student respondents. In each situation the student was 
told to imagine that he was a proctor (student) who witnesses another 
student cheating on an examination. The proctor had five choices 
from turning in the offender directly to entirely ignoring the 
cheating. The contingents involved whether or not the other students, 
authorities, both, or neither would find out about the proctors 
decision. The range of acceptable responses to the cheating varied 
according to who did or did not know about it. Each respondent was 
asked to define the range of acceptable responses. This range could 
consist of just one action or all five possibilities. Respondents 
rarely placed their own action (what they would do) at the midpoint 
of their range. Stouffer concluded that these results lend credence 
to the idea that there is a range of behaviors which can be considered 
consistent with any particular norm. This idea opposes that which 
believes each norm to be accompanied by one acceptable behavior.
The fact that Stouffer found a range of acceptable behaviors 
may, in part, be attributed to the nature of the situations he 
posed. The respondents had to consider two sources of sanction, 
students and authorities. Students may expect that the proctor (their 
fellow student) find his allegances with them. To turn in a fellow 
student might be considered a violation of trust or a going over to 
the opposition. The authorities on the other hand, would expect 
that the proctor fulfill the obligations attached to the position. 
After all, the proctor knows the responsibilities. With two sources
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of sanction the proctor literally finds himself in a conflict 
situation; a situation in which more than one norm applies. It 
would seem that a situation in which more than one norm applies 
would have more acceptable courses of action than a situation in 
which a single norm is present. The question may be presented:
Does a situation where norms conflict have a greater or fewer 
number of acceptable alternatives than a situation where only a 
single norm applies?
Williams’ "permissive zone of variation" may be applied to a
larger theoretical issue. This issue is the controversy between the
"common value system" .perspective of Parsons and the "class-
differentiated value system" perspective espoused by Allison Davis
and Hyman Rodman. With regard to this controversy Celia Heller wrote:
As a matter of fact, the major exponents of each do not deny the 
other but rather give less importance to the other position.
Those who stress the common value system, foremost among whom 
is Parsons, also recognize the existence of "secondary or 
subsidiary or variant value patterns." On the other hand, 
those who stress that different values are held by different 
classes do not deny that a common core of values also exists.
Thus, the disagreement is mainly over the relative importance 
of common values or different class values in a society. 
Nevertheless, attempts have been made to reconcile these 
views as if they were inherently contradictory. (Heller,
1969: 251)
As a solution to the contradiction Rodman proposed a "lower- 
class value stretch." The concept recognizes that there is a common 
value system but that lower class persons "stretch" the content of 
these values so as to make them workable for their situation. Instead 
of valuing marriage and legitimate childbirth, "non-legal union and 
legally illegitimate children are also desirable."
What is this content which is "stretched"? Evidently, the
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value in question is family life. The question involved is by what 
means can family life be achieved. In other words, what are the 
norms for whom with regard to family life. Stouffer's study involved 
a situation of conflicting norms. Hyman's subject involves a 
situation where particular norms may be in conflict with the 
realities of life. As with the students in StoufferTs study, 
lower-class persons recognize a permissive zone of variation by 
which they may think of themselves as conforming to the appropriate 
values (or norms). As Heller put it, "all strata seem to accept 
certain deviations but those deviations accepted in one may not 
be accepted in another (Heller, 1969: 251)."*
Norms and Groups 
Sociologists have put considerable effort into the study of 
groups and it is not surprising to find the concept of "norm" in 
extensive use. One of the most interesting by-products of this 
interest in groups, whether we speak of primary groups or societies, 
surrounds the perception of changing norms. Becker (1960: 803-810) 
wrote that the sociologist may regard all conduct as being of a 
normative orientation. In other words, the sociologist may study 
behavior from the perspective of the prevailing norms in which the 
behavior is taking place. Because of this, Becker argued, absolute 
normlessness as seen by a subject, is to the sociologist only a lack 
(or change) of norms appropriate to some situation. To the extent 
that the subject attributes worthiness to some norms, their deterioration
*There are other ways of viewing the common values versus 
class differentiated value perspectives. These will be discussed * 
in Chapter V.
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may be regarded as the absolute deterioration of all norms. "We 
may, then, tentatively define normative 'reactions’ as efforts to 
adhere to worthy norms in the face of what is viewed as actual or 
potential normlessness (Becker, 1960: 806)." Worthy norms are norms 
regarded for their own sake (moral norms) as opposed to simple 
expediency to some end as would be the case with conventions.
Becker listed four "reactions" and conditions under which they 
might occur.
(1) Cultural lapse— the imperfect transmission of culture whereby 
zealots note a "going to the dogs."
(2) A norm has an impact such that the attainment of some mundane 
end is thwarted with the result that the value of the end is 
"officially" devalued.
(3) Innovations— where new practices must be instituted simply 
to provide a basis by which other older values may be 
maintained.
(4) Non-zealots but relevant others adopt innovations in which 
case a tightening or reaffirming of the worthy norms is
. experienced.
While Becker addressed himself to "worthy" norms when he 
discussed the above reactions, Mizruchi (1962: 391-399) thought that 
a norm's prescriptiveness or proscriptiveness was the important 
factor to be considered with regard to "reactions." Mizruchi 
thought that violations of proscriptive norms were more likely to 
be extreme ("pathological") than prescriptive norms because once a 
proscription has been broken there is no norm which dictates the limit 
or the degree to which the behavior may extend. Mizruchi also listed 
four reactions which groups may have to deviancy.
(1) Retrenchment: A casting out of the deviants with a core of
advocates remaining.
(2) Regeneration: An attempt to revitalize the norm.
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(3) Rational-Scientific Innovation: Efforts to adapt new normative
patterns to the pre-existing 
cultural system.
(4) Permissiveness: A decision to let the individual determine
the limits of his behavior.
Precisely how these reactions to deviancy are related to the nature 
of the norm was never discussed. It is important to note that the 
norms discussed dealt with drinking behavior and that hypotheses were 
derived concerning a norm’s nature (prescriptive or proscriptive) 
and the degree of deviance. Mizruchi suggested the following 
hypotheses:
H^: Given a situation in which there is proscription on the
normative leVel and deviation on the factual level, 
pathology will be high.
Given a situation in which there is prescription on the 
normative level and deviation on the factual level, pathology 
will be low.
Given a situation in which there is either prescription or 
proscription on the normative level and conformity on the 
factual level, pathology will be low.
With due regard for the fact that Mizruchi considered his 
article "an exploratory analysis," there are several criticisms to 
which his hypotheses are open. First, if pathology is high does 
Mizruchi mean that one individual is deviating frequently or that 
many people are deviating? Second, the third hypothesis is tautologi­
cal. Third, it is difficult in many cases to determine if a norm is 
prescriptive or proscriptive. For example, a norm which says "go 
to class" (prescriptive) can be stated "don’t miss class"
(proscriptive). Fourth, is there a likelihood of being caught— is 
the violation going to be visible? Fifth, what sanctions are to be 
expected for violating the norm?
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It makes sense to combine variables such as "degree of deviance"
and norms in the same hypothesis. However, it is important to know
if the norm is customary, moral or legal. It is also important to 
know the conditions under which a norm is found, i.e., are there 
institutions which justify the norm.
The reactions to deviancy (Mizruchi) and the reactions to the 
perception of deteriorating norms (Becker) are of greater insight.
It is interesting that the lists given by Becker and Mizruchi should 
parallel each other so closely. As Becker mentioned, the apparent 
deterioration of worthy norms may be perceived as the deterioration 
of all norms. It miglit also be true that if one group finds that 
another group does not conform to their norms they may assume that 
the other group has no norms. This is the idea which stimulated an 
article entitled "A Slum Sex Code" (Whyte, 1943: 24-31). Whyte 
offered this article in response to the belief among respectable 
middle class people with "definite sex standards" that people who do 
not conform to these standards have none. The Italian group to which
Whyte referred restricted pre-marital sex with local Italian but made
little or no proscription as to non-Italian non-local girls.
Virgin Italian girls were prized for marriage but were respected 
and avoided for sexual purposes because of the community sentiments 
towards courting and marriage. A man who caused an Italian girl to 
become pregnant was held responsible and marriage was expected on 
the penalty of loss of respect. Sexual activity was thus restricted 
to the known promiscuous, "one-man-lays," and prostitutes as a last 
resort. If we can accept Whyte's account of beliefs among respectable 
middle class people, then these people have reacted as the "zealots"
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in Becker’s first item— a "going to the dogs."
The sociologist may not be afflicted with the "tunnel vision" 
which allows his middle class subjects to see others as valueless or 
immoral. Instead the sociologist may go to the other extreme and 
see deviation as the representation of subcultures. This conclusion 
is not so much incorrect as it is imprecise. In other words, it 
is difficult to determine if a group is sub-cultural or not. If it
is judged to be sub-cultural then we may ask what is the culture of
which the group in question is a sub-form. Certainly, deviation is 
not the sole domain of the sub-culture.
Lerman (1968: 219-235) found that youthful peer groups considered
delinquent in slum areas did not necessarily disdain work or school,
nor were they necessarily alienated by the dominant value system.
With increasing age, the job world tends to replace the school world 
as the most stable value orientation. Though some groups have been 
found which specify illegal behavior as a requirement for membership, 
most groups float through periods of legal and illegal behavior in 
the pursuit of fun. Legality as such is quite irrelevant.
In the same vein, Matza and Sykes (1961: 712-719) attacked 
the notion that delinquents hold deviant values which are responsible 
for their deviant or delinquent behavior. "Values behind much 
juvenile delinquency are far less deviant than they are commonly 
portrayed; and the faulty picture is due to a gross over-simplification 
of the middle class value system (Matza and Sykes, 1961: 713)."
In reviewing past research on delinquents, the authors noted three 
recurring "themes." First, delinquents exhibit a restless search 
for excitement, "thrills,” or "kicks." Second they show a disdain
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for "getting on" in the work-a-day world of the middle class. Third, 
there is a preoccupation and readiness to engage in aggression.
It is on these points that the authors attacked the alternative 
value system hypothesis. The middle class also exhibits an interest 
in excitement, whether it be in the sanctioned amusements of night 
clubs or sports. Also, aggression is among the top drawing themes 
of mass media entertainment; delinquents of the lower class, however, 
seem to act it out more. Again, though the methods of the two groups 
are different, both seek a life of leisure; the middle class through 
a life of hard work; the delinquents through quick schemes as though 
the hard work technique would come to nailght for them.
It would be presumptuous and incorrect to try to pigeon-hole 
different sociological perspectives as endorsing either the common 
values viewpoint or the subculture explanation of different norms and 
values. The sociologist realizes that some values and norms are 
present throughout a society. The curious problem at hand is this: 
Matza and Sykes and Lerman both attack the alternative value system 
hypothesis, but they do so in radically different ways. Lerman 
argues that lower class delinquents are less deviant than portrayed 
and that they did not necessarily disdain work. Matza and Sykes 
argue that past research has shown that delinquents disdain the 
work-a-day world, and there is more middle class delinquency than 
often portrayed. Given these two approaches- to the same task we 
must ask: Who is deviating from whose values and what is the value
system implicated in the "alternative" value system hypothesis?
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Values, Norms, and Integration
Aberle (1950: 495-502) believes that a society’s members must
share values in order to function. However, complex societies are
not represented by one absolute set of values as might be characteristic
of simple primitive societies. He noted that it is a widely accepted
fact that complex societies are comprised of "sub-cultures" with
differing value constellations. That complex societies are
functioning is a priori evidence that these value constellations
are not mutually exclusive.* Aberle insists:
. . .  a core of common values is an integrational principle of 
any viable social system, the approach asks for future analysis 
of the value systems or sub-systems of the society, in close 
connection with the recognition that these sub-systems them­
selves must be integrated with one another, and that every 
individual participates in a number of sub-systems. (Aberle,
1950: 502)
Bidwell (1966: 119-136) wrote that the integration of complex 
social systems via values is not understood and comprises "one of the 
most vexing" problems of social theory. Although some deny that values 
serve as an "integrative force" (as classically demonstrated by 
Sumner), the most popular position is still derived from Durkheim:
*Sorokin required that there be some consistency between the 
values of a group if that group is to be considered organized:
A social group, as a totality of interacting individuals, is 
organized when its central set of meanings and values, as the 
reason for their interaction, is somewhat consistent within 
itself and assumes the form of the law-norms precisely defining 
all the relevant actions-reactions of the interacting indivi­
duals in their relationships toward one another, the outsiders, 
and the world at large; and when these norms are effective, 
obligatory, and, if need be, enforced, in the conduct of the 
interacting persons. (Sorokin in Timasheff, 1955: 237)
64
"shared values are empirically prior to social order (1966: 120)." 
Arguments to the effect that values are divisive or that they are 
cohesive are not sufficient in and of themselves. Bidwell noted that 
a variety of norms may endorse the same value and that the same norm 
may be existent "among persons with highly varied values." "The 
value-based integration of differentiated social systems need not 
presuppose any particular pattern of value commitments (Bidwell,
1966: 135)."
One study illustrated that more than a few common values or 
moral norms are necessary to guarantee integration and stability 
(Dahlke, 1945: 22-33).. To accommodate the federal requirement of 
"alternative service" by conscientious objectors during World War II, 
the American Friends Service Committee set up work camps. The camps 
were formed under the assumption that conscientious objectors were 
a homogeneous group and that the work performed would be secondary 
but instrumental to the Friend's religious observances. The 
expectations of the latter assumption were thwarted for the most part 
because of the fallaciousness of the former. Some conscientious 
objectors are secular pacifists, some are religious pacifists (of a 
variety of denominations), and others are opposed only to the particu­
lar war. The A.F.S.C. camps, which were set up in the expectation 
that its own adherents would be in the majority, saw its "programs" 
crumble with the onset of a majority of non-Eriends. "Social 
integration depends not only upon a unity of values internal to a 
social structure but also upon harmonious relations between the 
structure and the general culture pattern. In the two camps studied, 
no such relation obtained (Dahlke, 1945: 33)."
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"The Accommodation and Integration of Conflicting Cultures in a 
Newly Established Community" (Danhof, 1943: 14-23) describes the 
development of Boulder City in 1931; the community involved in the 
Boulder Dam Project. By viewing patterns of sexual relations, housing 
preferences and realities, and community activities, Danhof was able 
to conclude that groups with pre-existing cultural elements* on an 
"equal footing" (meaning the number of people) will not only exper­
ience some degree of integration but will also function as "contrasts" 
for each other.
. . . the data presented demonstrates that conflicting cultures 
are made functional parts of a single community organization not 
only through the development of common values and common patterns 
of behavior (integration) but also through the emergence of common 
conflicting patterns which permit each culture to function and 
transmit itself by opposing other cultures. (Danhof, 1943: 23)
Danhof's conclusion that opposition permits each culture "to 
function and transmit itself" implies that the opposition is instru­
mental to a particular kind of functioning and transmission. Obviously, 
cultures function and transmit themselves without intercultural 
conflict. Perhaps he means that opposition facilitates the 
ossification of certain norms. Norms that were customary attain the 
standing of moral norms as a result of conflict and become more 
difficult to change.** Perhaps he means that contact with a group 
characterized by different norms facilitates the development of
*By "cultural elements" Danhof is referring to norms.
**This interpretation would be consistent with Becker's 
"Innovation" reaction and Mizruchi's "Rational-Scientific Innovation" 
reaction. Mizruchi's "Retrenchment" reaction may also be applicable.
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previously non-existent beliefs and prejudices. If any or all of 
these possible interpretations is valid it may be said that sub­
cultural conflict facilitates sub-cultural enrichment.
The research by Dahlke and Danhof lends credibility to Bidwell's 
analysis. Arguments to the effect that values are divisive or that 
they are cohesive are not sufficient in and of themselves.
The information presented in this section does not consistently 
support either the common values perspective or the alternative value 
systems perspective. Dahlke's study revealed that different values 
prevented the integration of a social group. Danhof's study revealed 
that different values .did not prevent and* in fact aided in the 
integration of Boulder City. The conflict between Boulder City's 
different groups formed patterns. Certain places became the sites 
for verbal and occasional physical conflict. Certain topics became 
the normal basis for conflict. In short, Boulder City was growing 
with definitions that included conflict between social groups.
Bidwell is virtually understating the situation when he says 
that the integration of complex social systems via values comprises 
"one of the most vexing" problems of social theory. Common values 
are evident in contexts which lack conflict. Common values are
t
evident in contexts where there is a great deal of conflict. On 
the other hand, people may have quite different values and yet there 
may be no conflict. The theoretical problem .presented by values may 
be partially clarified by investigating the relationship between 
different kinds of values. Does conflict usually revolve around 
norms— the most concrete type of value? Does conflict usually 
revolve about the abstract values— ideals such as brotherhood, peace,
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equality, freedom? Does conflict usually occur in the areas 
dominated by institutions or in areas where institutions have failed 
to establish patterns or precedents? Answers to these questions may 
aid us in understanding the relationships between values, conflict, 
and social stability (integration).
Norms: Reciprocity and Typology
Observing that the use of "reciprocity” is implicit in much 
of functional theory as well as in many of the early works concerning 
solidarity, Gouldner (1960: 161-178) sought to provide an explicit 
definition. His discussion involved an analysis of the meanings of 
reciprocity (Durkheim: equivalent exchange; Marx: exploitation) as
well as the functioning of the "norm of reciprocity" under different 
conditions:
Both Durkheim and Marx use a concept of "exploitation" for 
analyzing social instabilities. Durkheim, however, adds an 
important element that was systematically neglected by Marx, 
namely, that unequal exchanges of goods and services are 
socially disruptive because they violate certain pervasive 
values. But the specific nature of this value element is never 
fully explored by Durkheim; we must take as problematic what 
Durkheim took as given. (Gouldner, 1960: 167)
Reciprocity and complementarity were consistently confused. Gouldner
made a distinction:
Complementarity: An obligation of alter implies a right of ego
or a duty of alter to ego implies a right of 
ego against alter.
Reciprocity: A duty of alter to ego implies a duty of ego to
alter. Each party has both rights and duties.
Reciprocity is of two kinds:
Heteromorphic: The content of reciprocation is different as
food is different from protection.
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Homeomorphic: The content of reciprocation is the same as "an
eye for an eye" or "you scratch my back and I'll 
scratch yours."
Gouldner’s definition of reciprocity clarifies the important 
difference between Marx and Durkheim in their use of "exploitation." 
Marx’s basic principle is that the economic realm dictates or 
determines what form, structure, and qualities will be manifested 
by the social order. This includes values and ideas. Durkheim 
reversed this principle in part as he thought that "shared values are 
empirically prior to social order (Bidwell, 1966: 120)." Durkheim’s 
"certain pervasive values," to use Gouldner’s terms, refers to the 
norm of reciprocity. Durkheim would consider exploitation socially 
disruptive since it violates the norm of reciprocity.
Gouldner speaks of reciprocity as a norm; usage which implies 
that reciprocity is one norm in addition to many others. Gouldner 
considered reciprocity as a norm on an equal footing with other norms. 
But rather than think of reciprocity as "a norm," we can think of 
reciprocity as a quality of all norms. Behavior which is in concert 
with the norms of the group meets with reciprocation on the part of 
the group in the form for which the group is recognized, i.e., 
friendship, acceptance, employment, etc. Conversely, a member’s 
failure to perform his duties results in the group’s withdrawal of 
the member's rights. Reciprocity then, may be considered the principle 
which binds norms and sanctions.
Reciprocation, as delineated by Gouldner, is a relational term. 
Reciprocation requires that one recognize the actor and the person 
or persons to whom the actor's behavior refers. Gouldner used "alter" 
and "ego" to emphasize this necessity. The only effort to formulate
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a typology of norms, of which this writer is aware, recognized this 
alter-ego distinction by referring to "subjects" and "objects"
(Morris, 1956: 610-613).
According to Morris, "values are individual or commonly shared 
conceptions of the desirable." "Values can be held by a single 
individual; norms cannot." Morris said that his classification is 
based upon the problem of establishing and predicting the "salience" 
of norms. Morris’ typology is as follows:
I. Distribution of Norm
Extent of knowledge of norm
(1) By subjects (those who set the norm)
very few...................... almost everyone
(2) By objects (those to whom the norm applies) 
very few almost everyone
Extent of acceptance, agreement with norm
(3) By subjects
very few..........almost everyone
(4) By objects
very few..........almost everyone
Extent of application of norm to objects
(5) To groups or categories
very few.  ............ almost everyone
(6) To conditions
in specified few..........in almost all
II. Mode of Enforcement
(7) Reward— Punishment
more reward more punishment
than punishment than reward
(8) Severity of sanction
light, unimportant....heavy, important
(9) Enforcing agency
specialized, general
designated responsibility..universal responsibility
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(10) Extent of enforcement
lax, intermittent.....rigorous, uniform
(11) Source of authority
rational, divine, inherent
expedient, absolute,
instrumental....... autonomous
(12) Degree of internalization by objects 
little, great,
external enforcement self-enforcement
required.................. .. .sufficient
III. Transmission of the Norm
(13) Socialization process
late learning from early learning from
secondary relations...... primary relations
(14) Degree of reinforcement by subjects
very little. high, persistent
IV. Conformity to the Norm
(15) Amount of conformity attempted by objects 
attempted by attempted by almost
very few...... ............everyone
(16) Amount of deviance by objects 
very great...............very little
(17) Kind of deviance
formation of patterned idiosyncratic
sub-norms......evasion.......deviation
Morris did not intend this to be a typology of norm content and as
the reader can see, all elements are conceived as continuia. Even
though norms require that reference be made to the group holding or
maintaining the norm, the alter-ego or subject-object dichotomy is
problematic. The articles by Turner, Stouffer, Becker, Mizruchi,
Whyte, Lerman, Matza and Sykes, Dahlke, and Danhof demonstrate the
usefulness of including reference groups in discussions of norms.
Because reference groups are so important to the analysis of norms,
reification is a special danger to alter-ego, subject-object
distinctions. Individuals may be subjects and objects at the same 
time. An individual may be viewed as part of the group (subject) 
which dispenses rewards and punishments or the target (object) of 
these same sanctions. This does not deny the usefulness of alter-ego 
distinctions for the purposes of explanation or analysis but serves 
as a warning that norms are not simply imposed by some people upon 
other people. The subject-object distinction which Morris favors in 
his typology would appear more useful if it were applied to legal 
norms or those derived from institutions. In this case a person 
(object) may feel that the "social pressure" to conform which he 
senses is legitimate. ‘ In this case the ’^ subject" is self evident.
A few of Morris’ items appear to be redundant. Items #3 and 
#4 ("Extent of acceptance, agreement with norm") seem barely 
distinguishable from Item #12 ("Degree of internalization by 
objects") and Item #15 ("Amount of conformity attempted by objects").
Nine years after Morris’ typology appeared, another article 
was published entitled "A Proposal for the Empirical Study of 
Values" (Fallding, 1965: 223-233). Fallding was critical of several 
value concepts. He criticized hierarchical constructs* because they 
fail to account for shifts in value and imply a static quality in 
terms of both time and place (situation).
He said that a measure of "objective" value cannot be worked 
out because the economic conception understands value in terms of 
"limited resources." "Such tests assume that a person values more 
what he forgoes more time, money or pleasure for (Fallding, 1965: 224).
^Hierarchical constructs are discussed in Chapter V.
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Third, a value holds a self-sufficient status. Though pleasures 
and interests "are capable of becoming values if they attain self 
sufficient status," some studies do not discriminate between those 
interests that have and those that have not. "The great defect of 
the Allport-Vernon-Lindsey Study of Values, in my opinion, is that it 
does not recognize this, and what it yields is a profile of interests 
(Fallding, 1965: 226)."*
Fourth, it is incorrect to assume from all behavior that a value 
is behind it. For example, "compulsions are not capable of 
exaltation into values: they compete with them rather, and so far
as a person is in the ‘grip of compulsions his capacity to pursue values 
is drained away (Fallding, 1965: 226)."
Fallding distinguished norms from values. "Norms are ends 
desired because they make a segmental contribution to the attainment 
of values (Fallding, 1965: 227)." "Value" was defined indirectly: 
a valued "object" is "a satisfaction envisaged (Fallding, 1965:
224)." In discussing the conventional variety of norms characteristic 
of Gesellschaft type societies Fallding wrote: "The segment of
their living taken up with instrumental concerns increases, and there 
is even the risk that they will become so absorbed in these that 
they will lose sight of their values and come to question, ’what is 
it all for?' (Fallding, 1965: 227)." This analysis may or may not 
be true. However, the analysis is inconsistent with Fallding’s
*This study is not treated in this paper as it is considered 
a psychological tool and does not receive much attention from 
sociologists.
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understanding of ’’norm.” If norms are "ends desired because they make 
a segmental* contribution to the attainment of values," how is it 
possible to "lose sight" of values and still have norms? Within the 
limits of Falldingfs definition, it is not possible. It is reasonable 
to conclude that Fallding implies that norms are adopted willingly 
and after thought. On the other hand, norms may be adopted unwillingly 
or may be devoid of consideration.
Fallding thought of values as being of two types; spiritual and 
egoistic. The spiritual are those values which take note of a wider 
system or entail a devotion to a wider system. Such values may be 
patriotic, familial, religious, etc., and denote a transcendance of 
pure self interest. Egoistic values, in contrast, denote a heightened 
self awareness where things are valued to the extent that they pertain 
to the self. These types are each divided along the dimensions of 
"comprehensiveness" and "intensity." This yields the following 
four types:
Membership (spiritual): An aim to stand in relation with as many
things and people as possible.
Partisanship (spiritual): An exclusive devotion to a set or
system. It may be a cause.
Ownership (egoistic): An expansion of the ego by the attach­
ment of things to it.
Interest (egoistic): These are values of a passion; a
deliberate subjugation of all other 
things to it. It may be a sport, 
hobby, profession, etc.
Fallding added a fifth type of value which is removed from the
*"Segmental" is understood as a synonym for "instrumental."
others. This fifth type he called ’’face value" and is comparable 
to Veblen’s "ostentation." This value is found where the person 
assumes the conventions of the other four. The manner in which the 
concept of face value is to be used is not explicit. Likewise, 
the utility of this typology was not demonstrated. Furthermore, and 
contrary to the implications of the title, Fallding does not explain 
how these values are to be used in empirical study.
His four basic types would appear to be more useful in 
categorizing ethics. It may be simpler to categorize a diffuse set 
of values than any specific component. In other words, it is
difficult to identify a specific norm, belief, or ideal as belonging
to the "membership,” "partisanship,” "ownership," or "interest" 
category. As Bidwell pointed out, a variety of norms may endorse the 
same value and the same norm may be existent among persons with highly
varied values (Bidwell, 1966: 135).
Why Fallding considered his typology of values an addition to 
Morris’ typology of norms is not clear. It must be inferred from 
Fallding’s effort to distinguish norm from value, his delineation 
of value types, and Morris' admission that his typology did not deal 
with norm content, that Fallding considered values to be the content 
of norms. As ‘quoted earlier, "norms are ends desired because they 
make a segmental contribution to the attainment of values (Fallding, 
1965: 227)." Fallding has fallen into a trap which is created when 
norms and values are separated and then related as though there was
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some logic inherent in a norm-value relationship.* Norms do not 
necessarily make "a segmental contribution" to the attainment of "a 
satisfaction envisaged" unless Fallding's definitions are accepted.** 
To accept Fallding’s definition is to negate the considerable amount 
of information derived from research where norm is understood as a 
situationally specific prescription or proscription for behavior.
Conclusion
The Vanfossen values typology, in contrast to conventional 
usage, subsumes "norms" under a general value concept. In other words, 
a norm is a type of value. Conventional conceptualization differ-
o ’* *
entiates between norms and values. Values have been called "moral 
beliefs," "estimations of worth,” or goals. Norms have been called 
"plans of action," standards or rules that dictate acceptable 
behavior, etc. The difficulty in distinguishing norms from values 
is found in the invariable effort to relate norms and values to 
each other. When this is done we find such propositions as "norms 
reflect values," "values justify norms," and "values are behind 
norms." This inclination to separate norms from values followed by 
efforts to relate the concepts demonstrates two theoretical 
situations: ‘ (1) The sociologist realizes that norms have some kind 
of positive or negative meaning attached to them and (2) the 
sociologist realizes that not all positive or negative meanings can
*This trap can be avoided by understanding "norm" as a type 
of value rather than something altogether different.
**In which case the norm-value relationship is true by 
definition.
be called norms. The result of these theoretical situations is that 
the concept of "norm" is used to cover behavioral elements attached 
to positive or negative meaning, and the concept of "value" is used 
to cover everything else. This "everything else" is vague and can 
cover a wide area. For example, a person may say that he values 
family life and that a person should be scientific. As values, are 
"family life" and "science" the same? The person could be saying 
that family life is important to producing good members of society.
The person could be saying that he values the fruits of discovered 
scientific principles. This person may have no real idea what 
science is even though he is expressing ar valuation. As described, 
"family life" and "science" may both be values but they are con­
siderably different.
The Vanfossen typology has adopted Sumner's distinction between 
folkways, mores, and laws. The typological categories are customary 
norms, moral norms, and legal norms. The information presented in 
this chapter clearly supports this distinction. Where customary 
norms and legal norms, or moral norms and legal norms coincide we 
may expect greater severity in the attached sanctions. It is to be 
expected that law be consistent with customary norms. An interesting 
hypothetical question might be concerned with the conditions under 
which legal norms attain the affective significance of moral norms.
In other words, when do laws become the objects of moral concern 
simply because they are laws?
The evidence indicates that it is a generally accepted principle 
that a particular norm will have a range of behaviors which are
appropriate. The obvious question concerns the extent of variation 
that could be considered acceptable for each type of norm. In 
other words, is there greater variation accepted for customary 
norms or for moral norms?
CHAPTER IV
BELIEFS
Value is often thought of as a subjective quality; validity
and rationality is a question of belief. One writer defined value as:
. . . the believed capacity of any object to satisfy a human 
desire. The quality of any object which causes it to be of 
interest to an individual or a group. Value is strictly a 
psychological reality, and is not measurable by any means yet 
devised. It. is to be sharply distinguished from utility 
(q.v.), because its reality is in the human mind, not in the 
external object itself. Value is strictly a matter of belief; 
an object, the utility of which is strictly spurious, will 
have the same value as if it were genuine until the deception 
is discovered. Ultimate values are axiomatic and are inherent 
in human nature (q.v.) itself. Their existence may be dis­
covered by social or psychological research, but neither their 
validity nor their justifiability can be demonstrated. They 
are at the same time, the final sources of the motivation of 
all conscious rational telic behavior. (Fairchild, 1944: 331)
This quotation was taken from Fairchild’s Dictionary of Sociology.
Though a volume of this sort is not what one might regard as a
primary reference, its standing as a dictionary serves to illustrate
the conventional understanding of value. Because values are thought
of as having the qualities of belief, it is rather strange to find
that little attention is paid to the concept of belief within the
context of value research. In fact, there are only five research
efforts discussed in the next section. Three of these are included
because specific reference is made to beliefs. The other two
articles may be thought of as dealing with belief because a beliefs
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explanatory quality may be abstracted from the terminology used.
All five articles speak of belief in a general way.
The section on Myths and Theories is much different from the 
chapter on norms. Just as this writer found little work which 
dealt with beliefs-as-values, there was little work which dealt 
with myths-as-values or theories-as-values. The sociological work 
discussed in this section surrounds the concepts of value, value- 
judgements, and the controversy connected with them.* Ironically, 
this controversy illustrates the common ground of myths and theories 
as being matters of belief— ’’explanations of the way phenomena are to 
be viewed and understood (Vanfossen, page 9)-.”
The Use of Belief in Value Research
In a recent article addressed to the topic of subculture there
is an attempt to distinguish a subculture through the value concept 
(Ball-Rokeach, 1973: 736-749). In this test of the "subculture of 
violence thesis" value was defined as "a belief about a desired end-
state of existence" or "a belief about a preferred mode of conduct."
An attitude is "an ongoing organization of beliefs about a specific 
object . . .  or about an ongoing activity or situation (Ball-Rokeach, 
1973: 737)." The following presumptions with regard to the above
*The chapter on norms was not compiled by researching norms 
but by examining the literature which explicitly claimed to deal 
with values. The Myths and Theories section was compiled the same 
way but resulted from epistemological arguments about value. The 
scope of this thesis would have been far too vast had this writer 
searched for material which explicitly claimed to deal with norms, 
beliefs, ideologies, and so on.
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definitions were listed:
(1) A person may have thousands of attitudes towards specific 
objects but relatively few values.
(2) Values are generalized internal standards that transcend 
specific objects or situations.
(3) Values determine attitudes and action. . . .
(4) Values are hierarchically organized by their relative 
importance to one another. . . .
(5) A persons values system, and the variations in value 
priorities account, in large part, for variations in 
attitudes and action. (Ball-Rokeach, 1973: 737)
The author supposed that questionnaire data containing "value" 
items and "attitude" items would distinguish a subculture if there 
was no one to be found. Data was collected from 363 men in a 
Michigan prison who were convicted of violent crimes, and from a 
probability sample of 1,429 adult Americans over the age of twenty 
one.
There was only a weak association between "attitudes" and 
violent behavior and little or no evidence of association between 
"values" and violent behavior. In the opinion of Ball-Rokeach, the 
"subculture of violence thesis" has been invalidated(1973: 748).
Even though this writer considers a "subculture of violence" 
to be an unlikely prospect in the first place, it is not surprising 
that Ball-RokeachTs method did not find one. Why would one expect 
that men convicted of violent crimes be the constituents of a 
subculture? The only difference between the prison sample and the 
probability sample is that the former were all convicts. The idea 
that a single variable such as conviction would serve to differ­
entiate groups of such a complex character as a subculture is
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simplistic indeed. All that could be concluded from this study is 
that no subculture has been found; not that one does not exist.
The combination of values and attitudes is all but dead in 
sociological research. The most renowned use of the two concepts in 
combination appeared over fifty years ago in Thomas and Znaniecki’s 
The Polish Peasant.* Why the use of these two concepts in the same 
context should be resurrected is a curiosity. The assumption that 
there are "thousands of attitudes . . . but relatively few values" 
and that "values determine attitudes and action" is plagued by 
circularity and conceptual problems when defined and used in the 
manner of Ball-Rokeach.
"The positive emphasis on self application, consistency, and 
achievement, are the principal holiness themes that directly converge 
with dominant American values (Johnson, 1961: 309-316) .H This was a 
conclusion of Johnson’s study: "Do Holiness Sects Socialize in
Dominant Values?" The content of these values is not so important 
as is their type and their justification. The above named values are 
stated in the form of ideals which means that the conduct implied by 
them is not very specific.** These values, however, are justified 
in terms of a wider explanatory account— religious beliefs in this 
case. Religion is only one kind of belief and Johnson’s article 
illustrates that beliefs may serve as’the justification for other 
specific values.
*See Chapter II.
**Ideals are treated in Chapter V. A definition may be found 
in the Introduction.
In an article entitled "The Deferred Gratification Pattern" 
(Schneider and Lysgaard, 1953: 142-149) is evidence which supports 
the above contention. The authors sought to test the hypothesis 
that "deferred gratification” constitutes a pattern which is 
distinctly based on socio-economic differences.
It is supposed to be a middle class "belief" that greater 
rewards are to be had by deferring gratifications of the present in 
return for preparations for the future. Elements in the pattern 
include the deferment of sexual gratification through intercourse, 
and a tendency to save money. Schneider and Lysgaard thought that 
these elements were normative. They gave as an example the street 
comer gangs in Whyte’s study whose members could not save money for 
future uses because peer group norms required a sharing by those of 
good fortune. Hoarding resulted in a loss of status.
The authors used "self evaluation of class" and "father’s 
occupation" as independent variables. Dependent variables involved 
plans for education, occupational aspirations, sexual practices (which 
the authors discounted because of problems in acquiring this infor­
mation from high school students), manners(specifically table), and 
finishing high school. Most of the results were statistically 
significant but "father’s occupation" was a better predictor of the 
deferment elements than was "self evaluation of class level." It 
is unfortunate that sexual practices could not be used as a variable. 
It is curious, however, that the use of money was not used as a 
variable. The authors named this as one of the important elements 
in the pattern. Despite the significance levels, the vast majority 
had expectations of upward mobility.
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One can conclude from this study that the belief in upward 
mobility need not have anything to do with the set of norms whose 
rationale is upward mobility.* Stated otherwise, the presence or 
absence of any particular belief does not necessarily determine the 
presence or absence of any other specific value.
With regard to upward mobility, the data used by Schneider 
and Lysgaard tells us more about what the respondents would like to 
happen than about what is happening. If the phrase ’’would like” is 
thought of as "wished would" and the phrase "what is" is regarded 
as an explanation, we have the basis for studying the relationship 
between class and existential (reality) beliefs.
In an attempt to eliminate the common values versus class 
differential values controversy, Han proposed that a distinction be 
made between "wishes" and "expectations” (Han, 1969: 679-690). In 
an empirical test, Han expected that socio-economic levels would be 
related to the "perception of limitations" (the perception of 
restricted opportunities and limited self-ability in the pursuit of 
success goals). The socio-economic level expected (SELE) was 
defined by the expected occupation, expected education, and 
expected material comfort. The socio-economic level wished for 
(SELW) was defined by the same items wished for. Han hypothesized:
(1) SELW would not be related to the perception of limitations.
(2) SELE is inversely related to the perception of limitations.
*The authors tried to demonstrate the normative character of 
deferred gratification but neither intended to nor succeeded in 
demonstrating that deferred gratification was based on any set of 
beliefs.
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(3) Socio-economic level of aspiration (SELW minus SELE) is 
positively associated with the perception of limitations.
For the sample of white, protestant-9 seniors in high school, 
all three hypotheses were supported. Han suggested that the varied 
findings with regard to differential class values and common values 
can be alleviated by distinguishing between "wishes" (common values) 
and "expectations" (class values) as well as "aspirations." Wishes, 
like ideals, need not have anything to do with the actual conditions 
under which a person is operating. Expectations, as Han demonstrated, 
are grounded in the facts of the situation. The facts are perceived 
(a la "perception of limitations"). It is not surprising that the
, • s
socio-economic level expected would be inversely related to the 
perception of limitations. It may be hypothesized that one’s 
expectations of the future (belief) are more closely related to one’s 
explanation of the present (belief) than ones hopes for the future 
(ideal).
A Typology of Beliefs
This writer is aware of only one effort to formulate a typology
of beliefs. This typology, aimed at explaining a belief’s resistance
to change, was proposed in Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values (Rokeach,
%
1968).*
Rokeach argued that beliefs exist along a "central-peripheral" 
dimension. Those beliefs that are more central are more resistant 
to change than the more peripheral beliefs. The property which relates
*Rokeach’s work usually appears under the heading of psychology. 
He is the foremost student of values in psychology however and 
much of his work tends to be sociological.
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one belief to another was called "connectedness." Those beliefs 
which are peripheral have fewer "connections" than do central beliefs.
In consequence, the greater the number of connections which a belief 
has, the more resistant to change it will be. Changing a belief 
of high centrality will involve changing a greater number of other 
beliefs than if it were a peripheral belief with few connections.
Rokeach defined five types of belief. In order of centrality 
they are: "Type A— Primitive, 100% Consensus," "Type B— Primitive—
Zero Consensus," "Type C— Authority Beliefs," "Type D— Derived 
Beliefs," "Type E— Inconsequential Beliefs." Type "A" refers to 
those beliefs learned »by direct encounter with the object of belief 
and reinforced by the consensus of ones reference groups. Beliefs 
learned by experience in which no relevant others believe are Type 
"B". Since these beliefs are not shared by others nor acquired via 
social pressure they are not amenable to persuasion since "no one 
else knows." Type "C" refers to those beliefs in persons of 
authority. For example, a belief in Billy Graham over Billy James 
Hargis would be a Type "C" belief. Type "D" beliefs are derived 
from Type "C". A persons belief in the theory that it is impossible 
to travel faster than the speed of light because a physicist says 
so is a Type "D" belief. Type "E" beliefs are arbitrary and involve 
matters of taste.
Unfortunately, Rokeach did not provide.a demonstration of the 
"central-peripheral" construct. At first glance the five types of 
belief appear quite meaningful. Everyone can think of beliefs which 
fit each type. However, when we recall that these types are ordered 
by centrality, and that "connectedness" is the property which determines
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centrality, the types present a problem. Type "B" beliefs (primi­
tive, zero consensus) are supposed to be difficult to change because 
they are not shared by others nor acquired via social pressure; 
they are not amenable to persuasion because "no one else knows."
The central-peripheral construct explains this resistance to change 
as the result of "connections." If we assume from a beliefs resistance 
to change that it has many connections we are engaging in a post 
facto exercise. How are Type "E" beliefs to be distinguished from 
Type "B" except after the fact? It is one thing to formulate a 
typology and list the types of beliefs. It is quite another to base 
a typology on a theory without establishing the relationship between 
the typological elements and the property upon which the theory is 
based. Rokeachfs listing of belief types in order of centrality is 
teleological because the "connectedness" of each type has not been 
demonstrated. Connectedness is supposed to be the factor which deter­
mines centrality.
In a later work, The Nature of Human Values (1973), Rokeach 
did not speak of the above five types of belief. The beliefs which 
he discussed were mentioned in his 1968 book and are important 
because of an explicit link with values. Rokeach's three kinds of 
belief are: descriptive or existential ("those capable of being
true or false"), evaluative ("wherein the object of belief is judged 
to be good or bad"), and prescriptive or proscriptive beliefs 
("wherein some means or end of action is judged to be desirable or
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undesirable") (Rokeach, 1973: 7).* Rokeach said that values were of 
the third kind.
A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct 
or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable 
to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of 
existence. A value system is an enduring organization of 
beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states 
of existence along a continuum of relative importance. (Rokeach, 
1973: 5)
Rokeach1s use of this definition will be elaborated more fully in 
the chapter on Complexes. The bulk of Rokeach*s work deals with 
what he calls a "value system." Despite the differences in 
terminology, it is appropriate to continue the discussion of Rokeach 
in the context of Complexes.
Myth and Theory
Ralph Linton wrote:
One school of anthropologists have devoted much time and erudition 
to proving that uncivilized peoples do not think logically. This 
is essentially correct, the only error being that neither do 
civilized ones. (Linton, 1936: 362)
The sociology of knowledge seeks to understand the relationship
between men’s ideas and the societies in which these men live. This
specialized area specifically rejects the idea that "truth" consists
of one solid, immutable body of facts. The scientist realizes that
conceptions of reality are subject to changes and modifications. Just
as Newtonian physics gave way to Einsteinian physics, explanations
*Robin Williams defined beliefs in a manner similar to 
Rokeach’s first kind:
Beliefs have primarily an existential reference: They concern
what the believer takes as reality— the properties of and 
relationships among entities and processes. Beliefs are true or 
false, valid or invalid, or not testable. (Williams, 1951: 443)
88
become myths when they fail to meet the criteria of theory. Because
conceptions of truth are in a state of flux we must recognize that
myths and theories have a common property; in explaining reality
they evaluate. In paraphrasing Max Weber, one writer said:
The concept of culture itself is a value concept. Empirical 
reality becomes culture to us because, and in so far as, we 
relate it to values. The validity of values is a matter of 
faith, not of knowledge, according to Weber: therefore the 
social sciences must investigate values but cannot provide 
binding norms and ideals from which directives controlling 
practical activity can be derived. (Timasheff, 1955: 169)
Celestin Bougie thought enough of the evaluative nature of
theories to quote Fossey’s description of how the magician is
similar to the scientist.
"The magician makes no appeal to the supernatural: The destruc­
tion of an image brings about the destruction of the original 
as fire causes water to boil. There is not the least mystery 
in it." (Bougie, 1926: 157)
If however, the paths of science are so well opened up at so 
many points by magic, it is because this latter, in separating 
itself from religion, enters effectively into more direct 
contact with things. Treating the gods more freely, it 
handles matter more freely. It delights in all sorts of 
experiments, it acquires a skill, the knowledge of which 
cannot fail to be beneficient. "It leans toward the concrete 
as religion leans toward the abstract." It mixes more and more 
in practical activities. And thus it comes to pass that it 
shelters, with its mystic authority, the budding positive 
technique. (Bougie, 1926: 159)
For an explanation to qualify as a theory it must conform to
rules far more strict than mythical explanations. Since the great
majority of people don’t know a myth from a theory it is not
surprising to find them in competition.
The best excuse ever made for astrology was that offered by the 
great astronomer, Kepler, himself an unwilling practiser of the 
art. He had many applications from his friends to cast 
nativities for them, and generally gave a positive refusal to 
such as he was not afraid of offending by his frankness. In 
other cases he accommodated himself to the prevailing delusion.
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In sending a copy of his Ephemerides to Professor Gerlach, he 
wrote, that they were nothing but worthless conjectures but 
he was obliged to devote himself to them, or he would have 
starved. "Ye otherwise philosophers," he exclaimed, in his 
Tertius Interveniens; "ye censure this daughter of astronomy 
beyond her deserts! Know ye not that she must support her 
mother by her charms? The scanty reward of an astronomer would 
not provide him with bread, if men did not entertain hopes of 
reading the future in the heavens." (Mackay, 1841: 290)
These passages by Bougie and Mackay demonstrate rather well known
splits between mythical and theoretical explanations. There are only
I
a few, relatively speaking, who endorse magic or astrology as 
practices which produce their intended results.* If magic and 
astrology are based upon unproven or discredited theories, it is 
reasonable to assume that the same process is occurring with regard 
to contemporary explanations.** Controversy seems ubiquitous with 
regard to sociological concepts and "value" concepts are embroiled 
as any.
One of the most pronounced demands of positivist though 
is the demand for "objective" data. For value to function as an
*There are numerous contemporary works devoted to astrology 
and many newspapers carry daily horoscopes. Evidently, there are 
many who still believe in it.
**John Dewey said that rules of appraisal or evaluation can 
be based upon scientific principles.
It is commonly believed that such devices as radios and 
automobiles have been greatly improved (bettered) since they were 
first invented, and that the betterment in the relation of means to 
consequences is due to more adequate scientific knowledge of under­
lying physical principles. The argument does not demand the belief 
that the influence of custom and convention is entirely eliminated. 
It is enough that such cases show that it is possible for rules of 
appraisal or evaluation to rest upon scientifically warranted 
physical generalizations and that the ratio of rules of this type 
to those expressing mere customary habits is on the increase. 
(Dewey, 1939: 21)
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active concept depends upon the possibility that values may actually 
be studied as empirical datum. Znaniecki noted that many have 
derided the use of values on "subjective-objective" grounds. This 
reasoning is erroneous, he says, because the terms are "meaningless 
unless applied to the experiences of data which are already the 
objects of scientific study (Znaniecki, 1939: 801)."* For values 
to be proved unable to be such objects, "it would be necessary" to 
show that "no experiences of values and activities can be 
scientifically standardized." The only experiences not amenable to 
standardization, says Znaniecki, are "original" experiences, which 
are gone as soon as they happen. "Reconstructive" experiences—  
those recalled, related to others, etc.— can be standardized. In 
the true sense of the word, all original experiences are subjective 
(Znaniecki, 1939: 802).
Znaniecki is not without support in this argument. That value
measurement is not yet sophisticated is not any real cause for
doubting the possibility of its development. One writer was not
particularly concerned about a present lack of sophistication:
What is fruitful depends on the level of development achieved.
At one historical stage, measurements that are crude, 
imperfect, and deficient as compared to what will be achieved 
in a later stage of development may still mark a considerable 
advance in man’s ability to describe and predict. To insist 
a priori that all mensurational techniques be judged in terms 
of their logical structure seems irrelevant and foolish.
(Handy, 1970: 198)
With regard to those who think values trivial or impossible to get at,
*Fairchild (1944: 332) defines "objective value" as a "standard 
or judgment of persons, groups or institutions constructed and 
proven by the consensus of competence.”
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this same author says "the success of value measurement depends on 
how well it aids us in describing and predicting human behavior 
that is taken as value behavior. Those who refuse to call 'valuef 
anything that can be measured are welcome to their terminological 
decisions . . . (Handy, 1970: 202)."*
Values in Science 
Values are evident in science as science is a method of 
evaluation. One author listed the following as the values of 
science:
(1) Openness before knowledge irrespective of source, and 
inquisitive probing into its meaning.
(2) Belief that change characterizes all matter, thus that 
knowledge is never complete.
(3) Belief in the superiority of the inductive method over 
the deductive method, with a built-in dedication to 
expose deductive falsity wherever found.
(4) Explanation of nature’s phenomena in terms of defensible 
theories and established laws.
(5) Thus, rejection of animism, superstition, magic, and 
religious fanaticism.
(6) In the area- of basic science, operational autonomy in a 
personal-social context; in the area of applied science .
(or technology), social and political accountability.
*Handy is making a picque at those who will not consider 
matters which do not fit into their preconceived plans. Likewise,
Mackay relayed the following anecdote:
An enthusiastic philosopher, of whose name we are not informed, 
had constructed a very satisfactory theory on some subject or other, 
and was not a little, proud of it. "But the facts, my dear fellow," 
said his friend, "the facts do not agree with your theory." "Don’t 
they?" replied the philosopher, shrugging his shoulders, "then, 
tant pis pour le faits;"— so much the worse for the facts!
(Mackay, 1841: 323)
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(7) Disavowal of any need to implement divine purpose, 
deductively conceived.
(8) Knowledge conceived as neither good nor bad apart from 
social implementation.
(9) Justification of a broad base of professional and 
financial support for basic science inasmuch as the 
latter*s purview is the universe and all mankind, the 
ultimate goal being an international brotherhood of 
scientists.
(10) Espousal of the scientific method of openness. careful
hypothesis, data gathering, and final asp.es.sinent. (Inlow, 
1972: 105)
Howard Becker, in an article entitled, "Supreme Values and 
the Sociologist," discussed the closely related goals of science, 
"prediction" and "control."’ To the extent that scientists have these 
goals,
the slogan "No value-judgements in science" must . . .  be 
expanded to read as follows: "No value-judgements in science
which derive from sources other than the supreme value-judgement 
that control is ultimately desireable is ethically permissible 
by the scientist in his specifically scientific capacity.
(Becker, 1941: 167)
But control, Becker pointed out, is subject to a paradox: Control
in some spheres gives rise to a lack of it in others. For example,
controlling the ecological balance was no problem until the devices
of technology became widespread; control over heart disease was no
problem until the control over other diseases extended the normal
lifespan. Even the supreme scientific value-judgment is not without
its irrationality. "Value-polytheism," Becker argues, is necessarily
the practice of everyone; the scientist is not a scientist in all
spheres. A "value-monotheist," even a scientific one, is not going
to escape what is eventually going to appear as the irrational.
Inlow does not mention "prediction" or "control" explicitly.
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The value "prediction" is implicit in the term "explanation." The 
value "control" is implicit in her reference to "applied science" 
in item six. Myths and theories are both explanations. Both are 
evaluative and, as such, each contains implicit or explicit values. 
Myths as they are defined, are irrational. If Becker’s argument is 
recognized, theories are also irrational in the long run if prediction 
and control are characteristics of theory.
One writer came to this conclusion in an article entitled
"Values, Positivism, and the Functional Theory of Religion: The
Growth of a Moral Dilemma" (Kolb, 1953: 301-311). Kolb argues:
When the sociologist holds a positivist view of values and a 
functional theory of religion the theory presented is moral 
because (1) it is difficult if not impossible to determine the 
right and proper behavior under the circumstances described;
(2) principles of right and wrong (ethical principles) are 
involved; (3) the problem of conformity to a standard of moral 
right and wrong is presented; (4) and, finally, the dilemma is 
a dilemma of conscience.
. . . A sociologist who believes that people must believe 
in the validity of values (functional theory of religion) but 
that such values actually have no validity (moral and ethical 
positivism) must either deceive his public or help in 
dissolving the forces which hold a society together. (Kolb,
1953: 305)
The dilemma which Kolb presents is a false one given the circum­
stances he describes. The choices which Kolb presents, "deception" 
or "dissolving the forces which hold a society together," present 
a dilemma only if you value truth and a society which is together.
It is a contradiction to believe that values have no validity and 
then be trapped in a dilemma of values. If a sociologist really 
accepts a "positivist view of values" there is no dilemma. If a 
sociologist does not accept the positivist view of values there is 
still no dilemma. The irrationality lies with positivism itself
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(as Kolb relates it to values). A positivist perspective would 
deny validity to theory as well as myth since both are inextricably 
tied to valuation. What would one expect from a positivist view of 
positivism? Positivism is truly paradoxical since it would ultimately 
deny its own validity. Becker seems correct:. "A "value-monotheist,M 
even a scientific one, is not going to escape what is eventually 
going to appear as the irrational.
Science, of course, is a method despite the inclincation of 
some persons to treat science as an object. This small section on 
the values in science serves to illustrate the valuative nature of 
science or, more specifically, theory. Kolb does this by suggesting 
that the premises of science (positivism) present moral problems. 
Becker illustrates the valuative nature of science by showing that 
the pursuit of the values of prediction and control may result in 
their antithesis.
Few scientists would argue with these ideas. It is surprising, 
however, to discover how many non-academic people believe that the 
terms "rational," and "objective" mean free from the influence of 
values. It may be an important function of the sociology of 
knowledge to determine how values^ function within the context of 
science and theory.
Fictions
A fiction is an explanatory account in which the participants 
express belief but in which there is no real belief. All participants 
must be privy to the deception. Tom Burns described fictions as "as 
if" behavior. When people act "as if" a definition of the situation
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is correct when they think otherwise their behavior is fictional.
B u m s  writes that:
occasions arise when the memberships involved in two separate, 
although proximate, situations overlap. There is then presented 
a dilemma situation of two possible ranges of norms of differing 
coverage, each with its appropriate level of consensus. . . . 
Embarrassment arises through the failure to establish or maintain 
consensus about the range of social norms affecting behavior as 
an interaction. (Burns, 1953: 662)
When the participants recognize and allow for this overlap in the
range of norms they are engaging in "polite fiction." Burns
discussed a method of maintaining two roles at once which he called
"banter."
To use banter is to play at being hostile, distant, unfriendly, 
while intimating friendliness. It is a style of interaction 
used when two roles are presented to an individual and he 
decides to retain the status appropriate to both while, as he 
must, acting out the role of only one. (Burns, 1953: 655)
"Irony" is the opposite of "banter." Irony is "the convention which
disguises hostility in a style overtly connoting goodwill, helpfulness,
friendliness (Burns, 1953: 657)."
Robin Williams defined fiction in a fashion very similar to
Burns. "Stereotyped behavior (including statements of sentiment,
feeling, value) become fictional1 only when the culturally ascribed
meaning of the behavior is in opposition to the privately held
meanings actually operative in the situation (Williams, 1951: 433)."
Williams’ discussion of fictions encompassed a larger range
of conditions than Burns' situational descriptions. Williams applied
the term "fiction" to whole sets or orderings of values.
Perhaps the phrase "culture fictions" seems to imply too harsh 
a judgement on the validity of many social beliefs to which it 
might be applied. Perhaps "ideology" would fit better as a 
label for sets of ideas and beliefs that purport to explain 
and justify existing social and cultural conditions. Ideologies
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flourish at points of actual or potential conflict of interests, 
of inconsistencies of beliefs and values, or discrepancies 
between norms and practice. The elaboration of an ideology is 
a sign that tells us to expect some underlying strain or tension. 
(Williams, 1951: 434)
Williams seems to be saying that the term "fiction” does not
apply to those situations of such grandiose importance as described
above. He suggests the "ideology be used in reference to large
scale, organized, norms, beliefs and values that are fictional.
Williams does not, however, reduce fiction to a specific situation.
He maintains the use of "fiction" on a cultural level.
. . . cultural patterns are especially likely to be perceived 
as fictional— -both by participants and by analytical observers —  
when (1) beliefs or value orientatioifs conflict, or (2) "creeds" 
enjoin beliefs without modeling the conduct required for their 
effective operation ("lip service"), or (3) certain practices 
and beliefs have ceased to command personal commitment or 
involvement from large numbers of people. (Williams, 1951:
435)
Burns speaks of fictions as they function in situations where 
demands are in conflict. Williams speaks of fictions as perceptions 
of cultural falsehoods. The failure to perceive a fiction which is 
prevalent in a group may have undesirable consequences for the 
uninitiated. We can infer the mechanics of such a failure from an 
article entitled "Upward Mobility and Class Values" (Turner, 1964: 
359-371). Turner noted that a person may often accept the values 
of the strata he is moving into before he gets there (anticipatory 
socialization). The values which he accepts are often distorted 
however, and constitute the individual’s "image" of the strata.
Turner used the terms "ceremonial" and "working" to describe the 
values which the uninitiated falsely perceives and the values which 
are actually there. The ceremonial values are those which the
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newcomer is adopting while the working values are the actual values.
To those acquainted with the working values, the newcomer is readily 
recognized (not necessarily as an upwardly mobile person) as being 
a bit different. The newcomer then finds himself in the marginal 
position which he hoped to avoid. Ceremonial values are pretend 
values— fictions. If ceremonial values may be equated with fictions* 
than fictions may be used as a tool, intentionally or otherwise, 
for distingiushing an individual’s status relative to the rest of 
the group, as well as a method of maintaining order in situations 
uncomfortable to the participants.
, » A
Conclusion
According to Fairchild, the validity of values is a matter of 
belief. As he put it, "neither their validity nor their justifiability 
can be demonstrated." According to Johnson, values may be derived 
from beliefs. According to Ball-Rokeach a value is "a belief about 
a desired end-state of existence" or "a belief about a preferred mode 
of conduct." Of course, Myths and Theories have the common element 
of "original acceptance." That is, whether a myth or theory is 
believed it is necessary that the individual accept the basic 
premises behind the explanation. The only danger presented by this 
relationship between myth and theory is that the unwary may quickly 
conclude that all explanations are equally true or false since the 
basic premises cannot be "proved." There are considerable differences 
however. Theories are systematic explanations— myths are not.
*This is the meaning which may be construed from Williams 
reference to "lip service."
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Theories must fulfill criteria with regard to the relevant data and
the explanation’s logical structure— myths do not.
In this respect, Rokeach’s Central-Peripheral construct is of 
considerable utility. According to this explanation, beliefs were 
related to one another by the property of "connectedness." A belief 
with many connections is more difficult to change than a belief with 
few connections. By comparison we may see the difference between 
theological explanations and scientific or theoretical explanations. 
Compare, for example, competing explanations about the formation 
of the world. A theological explanation might claim that the world 
was created in six or 'seven “days by an oufnipotent, omnicient, 
omnipresent entity. A person who accepted this explanation as a 
factual account would not be able to demonstrate empirically the 
existence of this entity, nor the starting and ending of this
creation period. As evidence, this person might show us a book from
antiquity which makes these claims but which does not follow the 
conventional norms of substantiation and documentation. A theoretical 
explanation would incorporate physical evidence, substantiated 
information on geology, astronomy, and what have you. As a result, 
the theory may suggest that the world was formed so many billions 
of years ago under some conditions. Unlike the theological 
explanation, the theoretical explanation will say that we simply 
don't have enough evidence to know for sure.- In terms of Rokeach's 
Central-Peripheral construct we would expect that the belief in the 
theological explanation would be difficult to change since the 
conventional criteria for "evidence" do not apply. Belief in the 
theological explanation does not appeal to the intellect. Belief
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in the theoretical explanation, on the other hand, is dependent upon
the available evidence. Given that sufficient evidence is available,
an individual could not reject the conclusions of the theoretical
explanation without rejecting the validity of everything else reached
via this system of explanation. For most people, theological
explanations and theoretical explanations have the status of "derived
Beliefs." This speculation is based on the expectation that most
people do not really know the differences between myth and theory.
As a result, most people probably float back and forth between myth
and theory. Are the differences between myth and theory simple
abstractions or are their effects quite real? According to Dewey,
"it is enough that such cases show that it is possible for rules
of appraisal or evaluation to rest upon scientifically warranted
physical generalizations and that the ratio of rules of this type to
those expressing mere customary habits is on the increase (Dewey,
1939: 21)." The differences between myth and theory are not simple 
o
abstractions; the differences are evident in human behavior.
Like the conventional relationship between norms and values 
the relationship between beliefs and values is confusing since both 
include positive and negative meaning. As with norms, the habit of 
differentiating beliefs and values followed by an effort to re-relate 
them results in a system of definitions like the one used by Ball- 
Rokeach. Part of her definition says that a value is "a belief 
about a preferred mode of conduct." Here we'find value, belief, and 
part of a definition of norms in the same sentence. Later on she 
comments that "values determine attitudes and action. . . . "  Ball- 
Rokeach has over-conceptualized.
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The Vanfossen typology subsumes "belief" under value. Since 
"norms" are also subsumed under value the reader may wonder if the 
old problem which besets the conventional norm-value distinction 
will appear between the belief-norm distinction. Such a possibility 
exists but only if one begins to impute cause to one or another, or 
define one in terms of the other. Certain norms may be justified 
in terms of some belief. For example, most religious systems make 
claims as to proper and improper behavior. There is no imperative 
in the Vanfossen typology, however, which states that beliefs justify 
norms.
What functions may be-performed by-the belief concept? First, 
we may ask if there is a significant difference between cultures in 
which mythical explanations predominate and cultures in which 
theoretical explanations predominate. Second, under what conditions 
will mythologizing flourish in contrast to the conditions favorable 
to theorizing. Third, Kolb raised the question of the possibility 
of myths (religion specifically) being necessary to the maintenance 
of society. This writer asks a more basic question. Is it ever 
possible to be rid of myths? Some of these questions will reappear 
in Chapters VI and VII.
CHAPTER V
IDEALS
Ideals and Values 
It is unusual to find values defined as ideals. The literature 
which is discussed in this chapter makes use of ideals or the usage 
and definition of value conform to this writer’s understanding of 
ideals. "An ideal is -a generalized ’good.’ Ideals are values 
representing widely agreed upon definitions of virtue or excellence 
(Vanfossen, page 13).” Ideals may be stated in the form of norms or 
beliefs, e.g., "idealized norms" and "idealized beliefs." Whether 
ideals appear in the form of norms, beliefs, or simply as a "named 
virtue," they are expressions of "abstract sentiments." "Abstract 
sentiments are what the term implies— “broad, vague, generalized 
sentiments that are idealistic-— loyalty, humanity, equality, love, 
liberty, the American Way, and so on (Vanfossen, page 14)."
Clyde Kluckhohn tried to make a distinction between values 
and ideals. Ideals, though co-extensive with values, does not imply 
"the property of choice" which "is a differentia of value." An 
ideal "carries the connotation of the unattainable as opposed to 
the desirable and possible (Kluckhohn in Parsons, 1951: 432)."
Kluckhohn recognizes that values and ideals overlap when he agrees 
with Thomas O ’Dea’s suggestion that ideals be defined as "a constructed
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embodiment of values in a hypothetically concrete situation (Kluckhohn 
in Parsons, 1951: 432)." This is essentially a definition of 
idealized norms.
Robin Williams said that "ideal norms are typically plastic 
and vague; they state a very general principle without specifying 
its detailed application (Williams, 1951: 40)."
Dewey describes a similar kind of value:
Generalized ideas of ends and values undoubtedly exist. They 
exist not only as expressions of habit and as uncritical and 
probably invalid ideas but also in the same way as valid general 
ideas arise in any subject. Similar situations recur; desires 
and interests are carried over from one situation to another 
and progressively consolidated. A schedule of general ends 
results, the involved yalues being "abstract" in the sense of 
not being directly connected with any particular existing case 
but not in the sense of independence of all empirically 
existent cases. (Dewey, 1939: 44)
Using different terminology, Blake and Davis say: "Disembodied
values— i.e., values without any norms through which they can be 
collectively achieved— are like purely private norms, sociologically 
irrelevant (Blake and Davis, 1964: 456)." This statement must be 
challenged. "Values without any norms through which they can be 
collectively achieved" derive their sociological relevance precisely 
from this fact.
Abstract sentiments emerge as central to the value system of a 
more complex society precisely because they provide a basis 
for value consensus where such consensus could not possibly 
be gained on the basis of actual behavior. What must be 
recognized here is that the only real consistency to be found 
may be in the shared disposition or value orientation reflected 
in the ideals, not' in the actual norms, beliefs, or behaviors, 
which (though more or less consistent and patterned within 
themselves may be widely diversified from group to group, 
region to region, etc. (Vanfossen, page 15)
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Ideals as Values in Research
An article entitled ’’National and Regional Cultural Values in 
the United States” (Gillin, 1955: 107-113) is an effort to characterize
V
various regions according to their prevalent values. Gillins listing 
is "tentative and suggestive.” Though Gillin does not use the term 
"ideal," his definition of value and the list of values which he 
provides readily demonstrates how "disembodied values" may be used 
to characterize massive groups of people. "A value, for present 
purposes, can be thought of as a conception, culturally held, 
concerning what is regarded as desirable with respect to human 
beings and their behavior in their relations with each other and 
with the non-human universe (Gillin, 1955: 107)." The order of 
the following items has no reference to preference or relative 
importance. The reader can see that each item represents some type 
of ideal and that each of the items can be stated as any kind of ideal 
by a simple change of style.
(1) Personal output of energy (10) Cooperation
(2) Pragmatic ingenuity (11) Honesty
(3) Mechanistic world view (12) Prestige
(4) Mobility of the person (13) Power
(5) Change and novelty (14) Recreation
(6) Optimism (15) Efficiency
(7) Individualism (16) Love
(8) Competitiveness (17) Inner-regulated morality
(9) "Fair play"
In his characterizations, Gillin notes that different regions 
may emphasize some of these values more than, others. Given these 
values, it would be virtually impossible to infer particular norms, 
religions, political preferences, socio-economic status, etc., 
without additional information. Of course, Gillin had no intention 
of making such inferences solely on the basis of these values.
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If the reader will recall, the last chapter contained a
discussion of Han’s suggested solution to the common values versus
class differential values controversy. Han (1969: 679-690) 
suggested that "wishes” be thought of as common values and that 
"expectations" be thought of as class values. A wish may be as free 
from the conditions of reality as ideals. In fact, when people speak
in ideal terms they are referring to abstract ideas which are
evaluated as "good." An ideal becomes a wish when (using Parsonian 
terms) the positively evaluated cognition is cathected.* Han’s 
recognition that "wishes" could serve as the basis of common values 
is readily understandable when (1) it is understood that people 
generally, want (hope for, wish for, etc.) what they think is good 
and that (2) people don’t begin disagreeing about the value of "good" 
things until the specific content of the good is discussed. Han’s 
usage virtually identifies wishes and ideals.
Another article from the last chapter (Turner, 1964: 359-371) 
may also be considered with respect to ideals. Turner’s "ceremonial" 
values were discussed as though they were fictions to the strata 
maintaining them. The newcomer, not recognizing their ficticious 
character, acts as though they are real, operative, or "working" 
values. As a result, the newcomer is not recognized as a member of 
the in-group. On the other hand, "ceremonial" values may be equated 
with ideals. People may be quite sincere about their "ceremonial" 
values, but since the values lack a specific behavioral component
*This means nothing more or less than that an individual 
"understands" an idea, considers it good, and desires it.
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(as would be the case of ceremonial and ideal are equated), the 
"working" values would be a necessary element. The newcomer assigns 
some specific content to the ideals which conflicts with the "working" 
values or fails to agree with the groups image of what is good.* 
Whether Turner’s "ceremonial" values are best thought of as fictions 
or ideals depends upon how one wishes to relate fictions and ideals. 
Robin Williams spoke of fictions on a cultural level. He thought 
that "cultural patterns are likely to be perceived as fictional . . . 
when . . . ’creeds’ enjoin beliefs without modeling the conduct 
required for their effective operation (’lip service’) . » .
(Williams, 1951: 435).*" Ideals also lack the specific behavioral 
element required for their effective** operation. However, an ideal 
is fictional only when it is overtly endorsed and covertly unaccepted. 
Whether "ceremonial" values are regarded as ficticious or ideal 
depends upon the regard given them by the constituents of the 
"ceremonial" values.
Idealized norms are prescriptions or proscriptions which 
purportedly apply everywhere and in all cases. Williams and Vanfossen 
agree that the detailed applications or the actual behavior expected 
is not very specific. Operational norms may, "specifically prescribe
*This is not to say that a group has an image of ideal behavior 
which is good. Rather, the group has an image of behavior which is 
not good. It is much easier to see the "bad" in a non-conformist 
than the "good" in a. conformist.
**What constitutes "effective operation" depends upon the 
intention of the actor who invokes the ideal. If a specific task is 
in question, the ideal is ineffective. Politicians may use ideals 
effectively so as to avoid making specific commitments.
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behavior which is inconsistent with the ideal (Vanfossen, page 13)."
In "Group Norms and the Active Minority" (March, 1954: 733-741) it 
is hypothesized that the more radically oriented toward the group a 
member is, the more valued he would be. March found that "radicalism" 
was an inadequate concept of explaining the high value attached to 
members because the adherence to norms, in many cases, could reach 
only a maximally functional level beyond which no good was done. 
Others, which March called "preferred-value norms," could reach only 
a maximal adherence beyond which the adherence was dysfunctional. It 
is evident that idealized norms, which "represent perfection," have 
a ficticious quality. • By definition, things which are good or 
perfect should be strived for. In actuality, such an effort proves 
irrational or dysfunctional to other values. To this extent, Turner’s 
"ceremonial" values may be fictional and ideal at the same time.
Scaling and the Problem of Establishing 
Value Priorities
When ideas such as scaling and priority are applied to values
the result is frequently an estimation of relative worth. Means-ends
dichotomies, ultimate-instrumental, self-sufficient-derived, etc.,
are examples of efforts to determine relative worth. Folsom said:
. . .  we shall regard "value" as any general pattern, situation 
or aspect of human behavior, society, culture, or of the physi­
cal environment, or their interrelationships, which is treated 
by one or more human beings as if it were an end in itself; 
it is something which people try to protect, increase, or 
attain, and apparently gain satisfaction when they succeed.
This conception of value differs from economic value in that 
it implies utility only and not necessarily scarcity; 
furthermore, it emphasizes final utility rather than instru­
mental or derived utility. (Folsom, 1937: 717)
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. . .  a value is always regarded as desirable for other persons 
as well as for the self. Anything which people want exclusively 
for themselves is not a value. (Folsom, 1937: 719)
Folsom’s definition is rather curious in that he combines 
"final" and "utility" in the same phrase. There are no other works 
of which this writer is aware that regards utility as meaning anything 
other than usefulness, usability, functional, etc., when discussing 
values. As such, utility means that something is used for something 
else. "Final" refers to the ultimate, absolute, etc. If "satis-
i
faction” is what people "apparently gain" when they attain an "end 
in itself" the question arises: Final utility for what? If "any­
thing which people want exclusively for themselves is not a value," 
then values must be very general and applicable— they must be ideals. 
Folsom's confusing and cumbersome definition is an example of what 
usually occurs when value is treated like a means-ends relationship.
A "means-value" is supposed to be a tool for achieving the ultimate, 
final, self-sufficient, "end-value." An end is necessarily absolute; 
it is a "good" in the purest form. Efforts to establish means-ends 
relationships are frequently intended to aid in decision-making. 
Unfortunately, the tool is either simplistic enough for it to be 
unnecessary, or it shows that some absolute ends are more absolute 
than others.
Testing the assertion that qualitatively unlike values are 
not quantitatively commensurable was the purpose of an article 
entitled "Exploring Techniques for Measuring Human Values" (Catton, 
1954: 49-55). Catton acquired the opinions of 20,000 soldiers on 
the order of preference which should be given for demobilization on 
the basis of four characteristics: length of time in the service,
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age, overseas service, and dependents. Each respondent was asked 
to pick the most important item for each pair of items (six pairs).
The data for each respondent would form some hierarchy. A perfect 
hierarchy would result if one item was selected as more important 
than the other three, one item more important than the other two, one 
item more important than one other, and one item less important than 
all the others. According to Catton, if these values were 
incommensurable the response hierarchies would be random. However,
90% of the respondents produced perfect hierarchies, i.e., "3, 2, 1,
0.M
In another test which Catton performed, the sample consisted
\
of ministers. They were asked to evaluate pairs of "infinite values” 
in terms of importance. The pairs were made up from a list of five 
items:*
(1) Human life itself,
(2) Man's creative achievements (such as art, democracy, and 
philosophy),
(3) Worship of God and acceptance of God's will,
(4) Fullest development of the moral character of mankind,
(5) Fullest development of human intelligence and human 
abilities.
If these were "infinite values" in the mathematical sense of
the word, then "even clergymen" should be unable to arrive at anything
but a random ordering of items. However, the mean index of hierarchy
was .989. Chance would yield an index of .429. Catton concluded that:
From such evidence it seems reasonable to infer one of two 
things: (1) that "infinite" values can be measured according
to established scaling techniques, or else (2) that clergymen 
are a bit unrigorous in their use of the term "infinite" (that
*The items were acquired from the ministers themselves via a 
questionnaire which asked them to name infinite values.
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is, they do not use it in a sense comparable to its mathematical 
meaning). In a way these are merely two phrasings of the same 
inference. . . . certain values, even if they are alleged by 
generally accepted authorities to be of infinite worth to human 
beings, are nevertheless measurable by standard scaling procedures 
applied to the responses of those very authorities. (Catton,
1954: 54)*
In 1956, Catton replicated this test of the incommensurability 
hypothesis. The hypothesis was retested using three samples of 
ministers (N=99/sample). For all three samples, the incommensurability 
hypothesis was rejected. It is curious that of 47 questionnaires 
returned for sample #1 only 39 were usable; for sample #2, only 62 
of 70 returns were usable; and for sample #3, only 58 of 64 returns 
were usable. It would be interesting to -know what proportion of the 
non-respondents did not respond because they felt they could not rank 
infinite values.
Catton1s named values were supposed to be of the highest kind.
His sample of ministers were not officially treating them as means— a 
method of attaining higher values. A study by Hornell Hart reverses 
the direction. Hart thought that decision-making, whether personal or 
organizational, would be more effective not only if the results of 
choices could be known, but if one knew which choice was preferable 
in a purely valuative sense. Hart selected happiness as the value 
at stake in his study. Of 114 descriptions, students were asked to 
divide into two groups, the happy and the unhappy, and rank order 
each group in terms of the degree of happiness or unhappiness such 
experiences would cause. The scale range was from 100 to -100,
*Some ministers, in fact, refused to rank the items because 
they felt they could not make the decisions.
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happy to unhappy respectively. From these, the 18 most "universal" 
experiences having the smallest standard deviation were chosen. The 
scale had very high reliability. It appeared to Hart that scales of 
value-judgments could be created to aid in decision making.
Even though the scale was reliable in that others would rank 
the universal experiences in the same order, its usefulness as an 
aid to decision-making is questionable. It seems that the high 
reliability and universality is partly a result of the choices 
themselves being rather clear-cut. The author himself states that 
he included experiences "which seemed to evoke a clear-cut and fairly 
consistent valuation reaction on the part of the students (Hart,
1945: 474)." If the choices are easy to make, of what use would 
such a scale be? It is reasonable to assume that assistance in 
decision-making would be necessary only when valuation reactions are 
not clear-cut or consistent.
It is true that the study of values by sociologists is pursued 
with the sincere intent to create explanations which quality as theory, 
but it is just as true that there are efforts to explain phenomena 
in terms of values which lack even the minimal requirements of theory.
A simple statement of Myrdal's An American Dilemma might read: There
is a contradiction between American values and American life with 
regard to race relations. Cornelius Golightly agrees that there is 
a contradiction between values and action but argued that guilt was 
not the primary product of this conflict. Golightly hypothesized 
that a lower order of values is maintained which mitigates what 
would otherwise be experienced as guilt. This lower order of values 
is the belief in "caste" (in practice if not in name). As a value
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however, it is not as satisfying as the higher (more inclusive)
ideal of total equality.
The fatal weakness of caste as a socially approved form is that 
it provides only artificial and second order satisfactions.
Derived hostile or aggressive impulses are satisfied but the 
primary psychological and social motivations remain thwarted.
[When perceived, the white American] repudiates the false 
gratifications for the, genuine values because the latter are 
more satisfying. (Golightly, 1947: 139)
As is evident, this analysis is fraught with theoretical problems.
First, what are "the primary psychological and social motivations"
which remain thwarted?* Second, on what basis are we to determine the
"false gratifications" from those which are true? Third, how does
Golightly know what values Are "genuine"'because they are more
satisfying?**
Despite the purpose, method, or quality of their efforts,
Catton, Hart, and Golightly all agree that values may be arranged 
in a hierarchy or exist on levels of importance. Svend Riemer 
recognized this as a basic problem which is inherent to research on
*If these "motivations" are those which might be called brother­
hood, cooperativeness, understanding, etc., there is considerable 
evidence which suggests that these "motivations" may go only so 
far. Recall Danhof's study of Boulder City where it was hypothesized 
that social groups strengthen and perpetuate themselves through 
conflict. Recall Fallding’s category of "partisanship." Would 
Golightly call this a "lower order" type of value than the "member­
ship" category? The human ability to compartmentalize seems 
sufficient to permit men a life of externally illogical and irrele­
vant satisfactions. Ridicule seems a more likely stimulus for values 
of greater inclusiveness than does some inherent satisfaction in 
them.
**While this writer probably shares many of the same "ideals" 
with Golightly, his analysis, apparently being based on them, is a 
theoretical embarrassment.
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values. Riemer agrees that values may be arranged in a hierarchy:
The "lower level” values serve as means to the attainment of the 
"summon bonum" or supreme values (Riemer, 1949: 131-136). Research 
on values that attempts to determine the appropriate means to ends 
is difficult because of disagreements surrounding the lower level 
values. Supreme values, on the other hand, are readily agreed upon. 
Riemer * s argument is as follows:
(1) Ideologies are set off against one another according to 
disparate means for the achievement of the "summon bonum."
(2) Lower level values stand in a relationship as means to the 
higher level values.
(3) Ideological conflict involves lower level values.
(4) Acceptability is reached by climbing out of the range of 
the concrete into the "lofty" heights of supreme values. 
"Consensus can never be reached if the true issue of 
concrete value specifications is avoided."
(5) Lower level values " . . .  will be justified in terms of 
their efficacy in achieving results on a higher level of 
value abstraction."
(6) Social research is challenged by the "cause-and-effeet 
relationship by which the different levels of abstraction 
are connected."
(7) The demands of research require that values be broken 
down and "commitments made to definite means of attain­
ment." This will of course be arbitrary and the focus 
selective.
(8) "For this reason the very bulk of empirical research will 
be arrested at the very threshold of the value discussion. 
(Riemer, 1949: 133)
RiemerTs understanding of the relationship between "lower level" 
and "supreme" values is problematic. Point #3 is questionable. All 
so-called "lower level" values need not stand in any means-ends 
relationship unless by "lower level" Riemer is referring to some 
pre-defined means. In terms of abstraction, moral norms are lower
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level values acknowledged for their own "rightness." Many Confucian 
dictates of prescriptive form are recognized as "good" while making 
no claim to results such as wealth, salvation, etc. They are low 
level in terms of abstraction and they are also self-sufficient.
Point #5 is also questionable. The idea of attaining supreme 
values is contradictory. Once such a goal has been attained, its 
position as an ideal is dissolved. That problem is consequent to a 
more difficult matter: All must agree that the goal has been reached.
A Note on Sumner 
Ideals are abstract sentiments. As such, they are highly 
generalizable. An interesting by-product of these characteristics 
is that new terms, having a relatively specific meaning can become 
vague or lose some of their former intensity. When this occurs, 
individuals may believe they know what an ideal means when, in fact, 
they are at a loss to explain the precise content or action which 
the. ideal is supposed to represent. Sumner was well aware of this 
and gave two names to the forms of ideals which function in this 
misleading fashion: "watchwords" and "phrases."
A watchword sums up one policy, doctrine, view, or phase 
of a subject. It may be legitimate and useful, but a watchword 
easily changes in meaning and takes up foreign connotations or 
fallacious suggestions. (Sumner, 1906: 177)
The educated classes are victims of the phrase. Phrases 
are the rhetorical flourishes adapted to the pet notions of 
the time. They are artifices of suggestion. . . . Instead of 
a rattle or a drum the operator talks about "destiny" and 
"duty" or molds into easy phrases the sentiments which are 
popular. (Sumner, 1906: 179)
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Conclusion
The most general statement which could be made about the 
writings discussed in this chapter is that ideal values are broad, 
vague, lacking in specific instructions for practice, and are highly 
generalizable. The second most general statement is that ideal 
values provide the basis of widespread consensus. The most problematic 
topic is the means-value-ends-value construct. It has not been 
demonstrated that values exist on a necessary "higher-lower" 
relationship with regard to satisfaction derived, nor is there a 
demonstration of a method for distinguishing higher and lower values—  
the exception being that th£re are different levels of abstraction 
and specificity.
In this regard, higher and lower values can be distinguished.
In the sense of abstraction we may say that the more abstract a 
value is the "higher" it is. In another sense we may say that a 
value is higher than another when there is greater consensus in its 
regard. For example, members of the 19th century Prussian military 
system probably placed "honor" above "freedom" in their order of 
values. In the second sense then, "honor" is a higher value. In 
the first sense, we no more know what constitutes "honor" than we 
know what constitutes "freedom." These values are equally abstract.
In the contemporary United States "freedom" probably has a 
high place in some value scale. Virtually everybody would think 
that "freedom" is a good thing. However, if we say that "freedom" 
means that a man has the right to build a monopoly and thereby 
control prices to the public detriment, most people would not value 
"freedom." The higher-lower, means-ends constructs must be confined
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to very small realms. Some values are specifically defined as means 
to some ends. It is incorrect, however, to pigeon-hole every value 
as a means or as an end as though it were necessarily one or another.
CHAPTER VI
SYSTEMS
Institutions and Ideologies 
Value systems are highly focused and highly visible constella­
tions of specific values which concern themselves with certain 
practices and ideas. Systems are of two types, institutions and 
ideologies. Both types will include norms, beliefs, and ideals, 
but an institution always has a structure; "highly patterned 
interrelated behaviors (Vanfossen, page 18)." "Ideologies may exist 
as systems of ideas and meanings more or less independent of any 
specific social structure. Thus ideologies may or may not be 
institutionalized, or may be institutionalized to different degrees 
(Vanfossen, page 18)." To put the matter in different terms we may 
say that institutions are ideologies which have been incorporated into 
the social structure.
Sumner’s understanding of institutions is quite similar.
Institutions and laws are produced out of mores. An institution 
consists of a concept (idea, notion, doctrine, interest) and a 
structure. The structure is a framework, or apparatus, or 
perhaps only a number of functionaries set up to cooperate in 
prescribed ways at a certain conjuncture'. The structure holds 
the concept and furnishes instrumentalities for bringing it 
into the world of facts and action in a way to serve the interests 
of men in society. Institutions are either crescive or enacted. 
(Sumner, 1906: 53)
Robin Williams writes that "institutions are organized sets of widely
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accepted and strongly supported obligatory norms (Williams, 1951: 
447).”
. . . institutional norms are: (1) widely known, accepted, and
applied; (2) widely enforced by strong sanctions continuously 
applied; (3) based on revered sources of authority; (4) inter­
nalized in individual personalities; (5) inculcated and strongly 
enforced early in life; and (6) objects of consistent and 
prevalent conformity. (Williams, 1951: 40)
Another recent work also recognizes institutions as a combination
of structure and values.
An institution is simply a social process whereby individual 
people or groups of people interact with one another in a 
commonly understood, typical, and patterned way. An institution, 
then, must consist of two parts. First there must be commonly 
understood guidelines (like rules in a game) which point out 
what is considered acceptable behavior, and on which people 
base their expectations of how other people will act. For 
example, consider as an institution the free market in labor:
The "rules of the game" declare that workers must compete 
against each other for jobs and employers must compete against 
each other for workers. Any other behavior (for example, using 
violence to force an employer to hire you) is contrary to the 
rules of the free market.
. Second, such institutional rules must be accompanied by 
people actually acting according to those rules; that is, there 
must be normal and patterned behavior consistent with "the 
rules of the game." A set of institutional "rules" does not 
constitute an institution unless people behave according to 
those rules.* (Edwards, 1972: 89)
It is stressed repeatedly that values pertaining to institu­
tions are pervasive and constitute much of an individual’s under­
standing of how things are or should be. As related by Martindale 
Parsonian social theory makes considerable use of the concept of 
institution. For Parsons, "institutions are large-order units formed
*Recall Rettig and Pasamanick’s research on norms where a 
factor analysis revealed clusters that the authors suggest is an 
indication of an empirical distinction between "sinful" and "wrong" 
behavior. The cluster of behaviors viewed as "wrong" represent 
violations of what the authors called "rules of the game"— learned 
in everyday life.
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out of status-roles when they are integrated and standardized
(Martindale, 1951: 488)." "Social norms form the central element
in status-roles and institutions (Martindale, 1951: 488)."
Institutions are of three types: Relational (defining reciprocal
role expectations); regulative (defining legitimate means to 
values); and cultural (defining cultural requirements). Of 
these, relational institutions are most critical for establishing 
the character of a society. (Martindale, 1951: 488)
Like Parsons, Williams emphasizes the orientational function of
institutions:
Institutionalized rules at any given time in a particular culture 
implicitly say: "These and these are the things that are
expected, these and these are the probable consequences of con­
formity and noncomformity." . . .  In addition to this function 
of orientation, institutions represent internalized values that 
are felt as binding for the personality . . . .  Institutions 
get inside us. (Williams, 1951: 439)
Sumner, Parsons, Williams, and Edwards all recognize the 
predominance of norms as the quality which is essential for institu­
tions to be present. Conformity to these norms is requisite for an 
institution according to Parsons and Edwards. Internalization of 
these norms is not only probable but, according to Sumner and 
Williams, necessary. When institutional norms are not internalized 
(covertly accepted as right) there is the danger that the institution 
will be challenged. The most serious challenge to an institution is 
an alternative ideology. Though Williams uses "ideology" in a fashion 
which is more inclusive than one which regards institutions as the 
target,* he implies that ideologies may function in this capacity.
*"When such beliefs (evaluative) fall together into relatively 
coherent and stable clusterings, such organized aggregates of 
beliefs and values may be termed ideologies." (Williams, 1951:
443)
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Perhaps "ideology" would fit better as a label for sets of 
ideas and beliefs that purport to explain and justify existing 
social and cultural conditions. Ideologies flourish at 
points of actual or potential conflict of interests, of 
inconsistencies of beliefs and values, of discrepancies between 
norms and practice. The elaboration of an ideology is a sign 
that tells us to expect some underlying strain or tension. 
(Williams, 1951: 434)*
An institutional ideology serves to argue the legitimacy, 
effectiveness, or purpose of the existing institutional structure.
An ideology, as previously defined, does just the reverse. An 
ideology argues that an institution is not legitimate, effective 
in substantiating its claims, or beneficial in carrying out its 
purpose.
By definition, institutions are the stronger of the two types 
of systems. It is not common for an ideology to make a complete and 
successful challenge to an institution. Usually, an institution 
adopts some of the ideology's demands and alters its structure to 
accommodate them. When an ideology is represented by a small group 
or one lacking a power base, the ideology may be entirely ignored. 
Institutional change is usually slow.
Cooley thought that enduring institutions have been able to
retain some essential idea even though its structure has changed:
Where institutions, like Christianity, have survived for a 
millenium or two, it is commonly not their organization that 
has endured, but a very general idea or sentiment which as 
vitalized successive systems, each of which has had its cycle 
of prosperity and decay. (Cooley, 1918: 31)
*This quotation appears in the discussion of "fictions" in 
the previous chapter. It may be surmised that Williams thinks 
ideologies appear when sets of values are regarded as fictional by 
the ideologues.
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Change as a Problem in Identifying Systems 
Cooley’s analysis raises difficult questions. He argues, in 
the case of Christianity, that an institution has survived in some 
aspect of its values but that its structure has changed. It is 
certain that the institutional structure of Christianity has changed 
but a good case can be built demonstrating that the values have also 
changed. In particular, the Reformation exemplifies *an ideological 
conflict culminating in a schism— the old institution remains but is 
in competition with new ones. Does the variety of churches or 
theologies demonstrate several institutions with some values in 
common or does the fact th^t some values are held in common demonstrate 
a single institution? Probably the former is correct since each 
church has its own administration.
Value systems are dynamic. Viewing a system as a closed unit 
allows a superficial examination of an institution but Cripples 
efforts to study ideologies. As a closed system, an ideology would 
necessarily remain an impotent set of ideas. Value systems, after 
all, are diffuse; ideologies vary in their degree of organization; 
and institutions overlap.
An article by Stuart Dodd describes a method for deriving 
predictors of human valuing. Dodd’s concepts were "values, valuing, 
valuers, time, space, complementary conditions, and the symbols for 
these and other combinations. (Dodd, 1951: 645)." Dodd breaks up 
values into twelve "institutional" categories: (1) domestic,
(2) scholastic, (3) economic, (4) political, (5) religious,
(6) philanthropic, (7) hygienic, (8) recreational, (9) artistic,
(10) scientific, (11) linguistic, and (12) military. Unlike
Williams, Dodd expects to predict human valuing by subjecting the 
values of each "institution" and his previously listed concepts to 
a correlation exercise. The actual cause of valuing is irrelevant,
Dodd argues, any high correlation with "valuing" may serve as a 
predictor. Dodd's understanding of value ("what a person says he 
wants") is sufficient to wreck the whole plan. Dodd does not recognize 
that institutions serve as orientational elements with regard to 
more specific values. A specific value may run across several 
institutional spheres— ideals in particular as Williams demonstrated.
It seems unlikely that an inherently dynamic idea such as valuing 
can be predicted when a dynamic and diffuse idea such as institution 
is treated statically. Future sociological work failed to reveal 
the utility of Dodd's plan.
The most violent, massive, and thorough restructuring of a 
society in modern history must be credited to The Peoples Republic 
of China. Mao Tse-Tung's version of Marxist-Leninism is credited 
with providing the impetus for a successful ideological challenge.
It is plausible that China would provide the best subject matter 
for studying institutional change because ideological debate became 
a revolution with the incumbent institution losing out. In an article 
entitled "The Marxist Remolding of Chinese Society" (Chen, 1953: 
340-346), the author discussed some of the efforts of the new regime 
to supplant the previous institutions and ideals. Chen says that 
the communists have advocated the " ’five loves’: love of the
fatherland, love of the people, love of labor, love of science, and 
care of public property." These are considered as the "highest 
virtues of citizenship (Chen, 1953: 340)." As for the institutions
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of marriage and the family: "emotions are not important, . . .
political and ideological compatibility is far more important 
(Chen, 1953: 324)." "Filial piety is condemned as a feudal survival 
(Chen, 1953, 343)."
While not in sympathy with the politics of Communist China, 
Chen insisted that one cannot help but be impressed at the social 
progress which has taken place, especially in a country whose culture 
and traditions have been rooted for so long. He added, however, that 
the immense power needed to uproot China from these positions, or 
rather, the inertia gained by the revolution may present problems 
should the communist leaders wish to establish some kind of orthodoxy.
The purges of the sixties seem to indicate this very problem. 
The fanaticism of the Red Guard was finally halted only as a result 
of its being disbanded. As for the ideals and institutions which 
Chen discussed, remnants of the old culture may be abstracted from 
the present Chinese value system. The "five loves" could easily be 
mistaken for Confucian ideas.* Of course, the five loves are ideals 
and do not describe actual behavior very well. That "emotions are 
not important" for a marriage is not new idea to the Chinese. Child 
marriages, contract marriages, and the outright sale of children were 
common practices though they are different from marriage based upon 
"political and ideological compatibility." Filial piety, where an 
individual’s devotion and responsibility are-directed at the adults, 
ancestors, and members of the family, is only a step different from
*This would be ironic since Mao Tse-Tung is quite vocal about 
his hate for Confucius.
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devotion and responsibility to the state. In all of these cases, 
under the old regime as well as the new, concerns are directed away 
from the self. To use Fallding’s terminology, both regimes emphasize 
"spiritual values." In any event, the recent history of China 
demonstrates that institutions and ideologies are not black and 
white issues.
A less successful and more familiar example of ideological 
conflict may be found in the American contra-culture. The primary 
target for the contra-culture was Vietnam. It was this situation which 
symbolized the errors of the status quo. Vietnam lacked, despite the 
official rhetoric, a clear And justifiable purpose. In Vietnam 
people were dying as the result of a special kind of war— an undeclared 
Executive action. For the contra-culture the war was an act of 
imperialism.
Vietnam was only one of the events, albeit the biggest one, to 
which the contra-culture was responding. The perpetrator of this 
and other acts came to be known as "The Establishment." "The 
Establishment" is a term which represents the institutional forms 
challenged by the contra-culture. The contra-culture attacked a 
variety of specifiable institutions. University education was 
attacked for being the servant of the military-industrial complex.
The role of the university was thought to be instrumental— it 
prepared students to fill the slots open in "The Establishment."
The contra-culture demanded education of intrinsic worth.
Marriage and family life was attacked by the contra-culture.
The young viewed the ideal of a wife, two kids, two cars, and a house 
in the suburbs as a constraining and "plastic" pattern. In response,
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the contra-culture tried communes and group marriages.
At root, perhaps, we find the religious institutions as the 
greatest targets of disdain. The persons who professed "Christian" 
values waged war in Vietnam, practiced racial and sexual discrimina­
tion, and supported capitalistic enterprises that appeared strictly 
inegalitarian. In short, it seemed that the Judeo-Christian 
tradition had been invaded by hypocrisy. In response, the contra- 
culture looked at eastern thought systems. There can be no doubt 
that some individuals profited by these novel ways of thinking but 
for the most part the new student of eastern thought was more 
pleased by the dissassociafion with Western ideas than with the 
substance of the eastern ways.*
What happened to the contra-culture? Some argue that the contra- 
culture failed: We have the same political-economic system; students
do not control the universities; people still get married and live 
in the suburbs, etc. To some degree it can be argued that the 
contra-culture got only as far as it did because it lacked con­
sistent leadership. Instead there was a variety of spokesmen for 
a variety of contra-cultural issues. Bobby Seale, Stokely Carmichael, 
H. Rap Brown, and Eldridge Cleaver served as contra-cultural 
proponents on racial issues. The Students for a Democratic Society 
represented a radical position against the established political and
*One possible indication of this idea is the new forms of mystic 
Christianity. Some among the young who particularly needed or wanted 
the earthy, basic., unadorned ideal of eastern thought but who could 
not grasp it mentally have returned to the western religious style.
The result, this writer suggests, is the "Jesus freak."
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economic systems. Abbie Hoffman was against everything. Timothy 
Leary argued for personal psychological freedom. There are, of 
course, many others. In addition to the lack of consistent leadership 
the contra-culture lacked organization. What coordination there was 
consisted of a variety of protests, sit-ins, violent and non-violent 
obstruction of a variety of events, etc.
It is safe to say that American institutions were not over­
thrown by contra-cultural ideologies. However, it would be incorrect 
to say that the contra-culture "failed." It is on this point that 
we may learn something about changing value systems. "The Establish­
ment" has adopted or incorporated some of the demands of the contra- 
culture. Universities now have students sitting on the Boards of 
Regents, Black Studies programs, Women’s Studies programs, etc. 
Contra-cultural attacks on the limits of conventional lifestyle 
have brought a greater acceptance of career women, pre-marital 
cohabitation, gay liberation, non-antagonistic divorce, and so on.
The military supplies its manpower needs not by the draft but by 
attracting recruits with a variety of training programs. Marijuana 
is being decriminalized.
What has occurred is not a displacement of one value system 
by another but' the adoption of some ideological components by the 
existing institutions. Institutional' change in China has been 
revolutionary. Institutional change in America has been evolutionary.
Systems and Delinquents 
Efforts to explain delinquency as a phenomenon of "sub­
culture" and "alternative value systems" imply that there are
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institutions or ideologies under which delinquents operate. Matza 
and Sykes' "Juvenile Delinquency and Subterranean Values" (1961: 
712-719) sought to arrest the notion that deviant values can serve 
as an explanation for delinquency. They pointed out that "excite­
ment," "aggression," and "leisure" are themes as prevalent among the 
middle class as they are among lower class delinquents. The middle 
class however, satisfies these interests through "sanctioned” 
amusements such as sports, nightclubs, and mass media entertainment. 
That middle class outlets are "sanctioned" serves as an indication 
that the recreation activities of the middle class are within the 
boundaries of the lega’l system of the larger society. That is, their 
activities have been legitimized. This suggests, in contrast, that 
the value systems of delinquents lack the organization or structure 
necessary for institutions. On the societal level, they lack the 
power base necessary to achieve legitimacy. If the ideas and values of 
delinquents have an organization or consistency* then they have an 
ideology. If delinquents believe that middle class methods for a 
successful life would not work for them they might say that these 
institutions are exclusive, i.e., discriminatory. Williams wrote 
that "the elaboration of an ideology is a sign that tells us to 
expect some underlying strain or tension (Williams, 1951: 434)." 
Ideologies appear with differing degrees of sophistication. It 
could not be expected that a gang of delinquents be able to present 
a full-blown ideology in the sense that we think of Maoism. A weak
*The concept of "vocabulary of motives" implies such a system 
however weak and transient the expressed "motives" may be.
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ideology might consist of a few beliefs, ideals, and a set of norms 
which characterize a delinquent group. Such an ideology might have 
no plan to displace dominant institutions but simply to circumvent 
them.
Kobrin suggested that high delinquency areas may be characterized 
by social forces or value systems which are at odds with the dominant 
institutions. He wrote that these areas are characterized by a 
"duality of conduct norms rather than by the dominance of either a 
conventional or criminal culture." Lerman came to a similar conclusion. 
Delinquents act in the pursuit of fun; legality is quite irrelevant. 
Given that an ideology of some sort is to be found among lower 
class delinquents, a new problem arises. Matza and Sykes noted that 
the incidence of middle class delinquency is increasing. They 
suggest that this may be the result of better research methods, 
actual increases, or both. It would be hard to argue that middle 
class youths think that institutional avenues to success are closed 
to them. However, many of the outlets for recreation available to 
middle class adults are as closed to middle class youths as they are 
to lower class youths. Some youths no doubt rejected the "accept­
able" outlets for recreation. This gives indirect support to 
Lerman's "pursuit of fun" theory. Laws— the most powerful of 
institutional norms— are breached in the delinquents pursuit of 
fun. If there is a youthful ideology of fun it is certainly a 
weak one. It is quickly dropped when the individual discovers 
that institutions are willing to accommodate him. This happens 
because he suddenly meets an institutional criterion— age.
Chen's article demonstrated the difficulty of clearly
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identifying new and old institutions under rapid change. The 
literature on delinquent values demonstrates the difficulty in 
identifying the ideologies of delinquents, not because the 
ideology is changing but because the adherents of those ideologies 
are changing the context of their lives. If there was no change of 
context we might see the development of ideologies which meet 
conventional definitions. Organized crime may be an example of 
such a development. The case of the American contra-culture 
demonstrates what is probably the typical relationship between 
institutions and ideological challenges. Those elements which 
can work within the institution and have popular backing will be 
incorporated into the institutional structure.
Economy as the Dominant Institution
It would be correct to paraphrase Marxian social theory as one
which sees a society’s economic system as the primary determinant
of other characteristics of the society. Karl Marx wrote:
In the social productions which men carry on they enter into 
definite relations that are indispensable and independent of 
their will; these relations of production correspond to a 
definite stage of development of their material powers of 
production. The sum total of these relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society— the real 
foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures 
and to whbch correspond definite forms of social consciousness. 
(Feuer, 1959: 43)
Cooley divided values into two types: "human nature" and
"institutional" values. In criticizing the value-making process
as explained by "political economy" Cooley said: It is assumed
"that these wants spring from the inscrutable depths of the private
mind. At any rate it has not been customary to recognize that they
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are the expressions of an institutional development (Cooley, 1913:
546)." To believe that wants spring from the private mind is to
place values in the category of "human nature." In 'and of itself,
Cooley considered this unacceptable.
The simple formula, "the people want it, and the law of supply 
and demand does the rest," will explain anything. But if we
allow ourselves to ask why the people want it, or just who the
people are that want it, or why they can make wants effective, 
we discover that we have everything to learn. (Cooley, 1913:
547)
Cooley limited human nature values. They are:
. . . those which may be traced without great difficulty to 
phases of universal human nature. The organism for which 
they have weight is simply man in those comparatively permanent 
aspects which we dre accustomed to speak of as human nature, 
and to contrast the shifting institutions that are built upon 
it. (Cooley, 1918: 285)
There are some (human nature values) in which particular 
senses are the conspicuous factors, as auditory and gustatory 
values. Others spring from the social sentiments, like the 
values of social self-feeling which underlie conformity, and 
those of love, fear, ambition, honor, and loyalty. (Cooley,
1918: 286)
Institutional values are:
. . . those which must be ascribed to an institutional system 
of some sort. Human nature enters into them but is so transformed 
in its operation by the system that we regard the latter as their 
source, and are justified in doing so by the fact that social 
organisms have a growth and values that cannot, practically, 
be explained from the standpoint of general human nature.
(Cooley, 1918: 286)
Unlike Marx, Cooley did not explicitly claim that the
"economic structure of society" was "the real foundation . . . ."
In a similar vein, however, Cooley argued that economies which rely
on "money" have a way of bringing all other institutions under
its influence. Cooley called this kind of institution "pecuniary
valuation."
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We have then, to do with a value institution or process, far 
transcending in reach any special sort of value, and 
participating in the most diverse phases of our life. . . . this 
mobilization of values through the pecuniary measure tends to 
make the latter an expression of the total life of society, 
so far as the values that stand for this life have actually 
been translated into pecuniary terms. Although this transla­
tion is in fact only partial and, as I have tried to show, 
institutional, still the wide scope of pecuniary value, along 
with its precision, gives it certain title to its popular 
acceptance as Value in a sense that no other kind of value 
can claim. (Cooley, 1918: 309)
Cooley understood value in a broad sense— a judgement of worth.
As such, Cooley believed that many forms of value can be translated,
to one degree or another, into pecuniary terms.
. . . it is impossible to mark off sharply the pecuniary sphere 
from that of other kinds of value. Pt is always possible that 
the highest as well as the lowest things may be brought within 
its scope. (Cooley, 1918: 314)
. . . the progress of market valuation, as a rule, is a transla­
tion into pecuniary terms of values which have already become 
in some measure, a social institution. (Cooley, 1918: 338)
Though Cooley's analysis lacks the prophetic character of 
Marx's theory, Cooley also places great emphasis on the part played 
by class. The upper class, he says, have an interest in common by 
virtue of their wealth. To maintain and propogate this wealth it 
is to their benefit to maintain the pecuniary market, the source 
of much of their wealth. It is not necessary that the persons of 
the upper class be friends or constitute a social group as such.
Even individual efforts toward the same end will have an impact, 
especially if the individual is wealthy and occupies a position of 
power.
Power is concentrated about the functions of the dominant 
institutions, and the powerful class advantage. . . .  It 
seems, then, that pecuniary valuation is a social institution 
no less than the state or the church, and that its development
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must be studied not only on the impersonal side but also in the 
traditions and organization of the class that chiefly administers 
it. (Cooley, 1913: 555)
Cooley writes about the dominance of economic institutions 
and its control by a "class" in rather matter-of-fact terms. The 
nature of this domination is discussed in a more or less cryptic 
fashion. The nature of pecuniary valuation as an institution we 
must understand to be structural, according to Cooley. He does 
not put emphasis on the role that ideas play in forming and maintain­
ing institutions. Marx is more explicit in this respect. His 
reference to religion as the opiate of the masses is well known.
Marx writes: •
What else does the history of ideas prove than that intellectual 
production changes its character in proportion as material 
production is changed? The ruling ideas of each age have ever 
been the ideas of its ruling class. (Feuer, 1959: 26)
It is not necessary that people deliberately use ideas to
deceive others for personal benefit. The fact is that ideas are
always present to buttress an institutional structure. This is
important because institutions do orient an individual’s perceptions
and conceptions.
Those in authority attempt to justify their rule over institu­
tions by linking it, as if it were a necessary consequence, 
with widely believed-in moral symbols, sacred emblems, legal 
formulae. These central conceptions may refer to a god or 
gods, the "vote of the majority," "the will of the people,"
"the aristocracy of talent or wealth," to the "divine right of 
kings," or to the allegedly extraordinary endowment of the 
ruler himself. Social scientists, following Weber, call such 
conceptions "legitimations," or sometimes "symbols of justi­
fication. "
Various thinkers have used different terms to refer to them: 
Mosca’s "political formula," or "great superstitutions,"
Locke’s "principle of sovereignty," Sorel's "ruling myth,"
Thurman Arnolds "folklore," Weber’s "legitimations," Durkheim’s 
"collective representations," Marx’s "dominant ideas,"
Rousseau’s "general will," Lasswell’s "symbols of authority,"
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Mannheim’s "ideology," Herbert Spencer's "public sentiments"—  
all these and others like them testify to the central place 
of master symbols in social analysis.
Similarly in psychological analysis, such master symbols, 
relevant when they are taken over privately, become the reasons 
and often the motives that lead persons into roles and sanction 
their enactment of them. If for example, economic institutions 
are publicly justified in terms of them, then references to 
self-interest may be acceptable justification for individual 
conduct. But, if it is felt publicly necessary to justify 
such institutions in terms of "public service and trust," the 
old self-interest motives and reasons may lead to guilt or at 
least to uneasiness among capitalists. Legitimations that are 
publicly effective often become, in due course, effective as 
personal motives.* (Mills, 1959: 36)
Cooley acknowledges the power of economic institutions by 
noting that other values, which are already institutional, come 
under its influence. If Cooley is correct, then we should expect 
to find that general ideas such as "success" and specific institu­
tions such as the family have become adorned with the connotations 
and values conducive to economic development.
Kimball described the disruption of "rural social organization" 
under the impact of two factors: technology and capital. At one
time, Kimball wrote (1949: 38-49), rural status systems were highly 
egalitarian. Social life was characteristically cooperative.
These qualities were maintained out of necessity. To use Kimball's 
example, "A" helped "B" and "B" helped "A" because neither could go 
it alone. This mutual dependence sparked an appreciation of the 
system or, in other words, gave rise to sentiments favorable to 
the systems maintenance. The close interaction between members of 
a rural community in their efforts to subsist was repeated in other
*These "master symbols" which Mills discussed seem quite 
similar to Sumner's "watchwords" and "phrases."
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areas of community life— churches, schools, recreation, etc.
New machinery, improved farming techniques, and the realization 
that farming can be big business eroded old style rural life. Men 
having capital at their disposal and who were not raised in the old 
cooperative style formed large "commercial farms." Smaller farms, 
with the aid of new machinery, could be operated singly. The 
sentiments which arose out of necessity began to decline for the 
lack of necessity. The commercial farms introduced status dis­
tinctions between owners and workers where previously, owners were 
workers. Community life was reorganized to suit status differences. 
As the life experiences of eommunity members began losing their 
similarity the homogeneous quality of other local institutions 
deteriorated.
A study by Johnson and Kerckhoff (1964: 149-156) revealed 
that adult men who favor nuclear family norms are most likely to 
accept "the value of change" and least likely to perceive a conflict
4
between family values and economic success values. The authors used 
a Likert scale and statements like the following:
Family Norms:
Children should take care of their parents in whatever way 
necessary, when they are sick.
The children should give their parents financial help.
If children should live nearby after they grow up, they 
should visit their parents at least once, a week. (Johnson 
and Kerckhoff, 1964: 151)
Value of Change:
If I could have my way I would keep things the same rather 
than having them change all the time.
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When you come right down to it, the old ways are the best.
Sometimes I feel all the changes that go on are too much for me.
I have never felt too old to try something new. (Johnson and
Kerckhoff, 1964: 152)
Respondents who give a high rating to the items favorable to the 
nuclear family and accept the value of change are most likely to 
have higher education, better jobs and income, greater experience 
in geographic mobility, and less rural experience. The opposites 
are true for those who favor extended kinship and respond negatively 
to the change items. The authors state that this supports an 
"intra-personality strain toward consistency reflecting the 
interinstitutional relationships of our society."
One would expect that there be a positive correlation between 
urbanization, industrialization, and technological growth. Kimball's 
rural community began to change under the influence of technological 
development and concentrated methods of economic success, i.e., 
commercial farms. The capital necessary to establish these 
commercial farms is symbolic of, if not equivalent to, economic 
success. A positive view of the nuclear family and the value of 
change is positively associated with urban or suburban life. Success 
defined in economic terms moves outward from the city areas. If 
this analysis is correct, Johnson and Kerckhoff's rather cumbersome 
conclusion can be changed to read as follows: Persons who define
success in pecuniary terms are likely to maintain values associated 
with other institutions which are conducive to pecuniary success.
A study by Kahl (1965: 669). sought to determine some of the 
characteristics of the success value. "Our notion of the concept
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'value' implies a verbal system, an official ideology that is 
deliberately taught to new members of given groups or strata." 
According to his definition, the success value is ideological.
Kahl combined the results of several studies which were amenable 
to the same statistical treatment (factor analysis). Four variable 
from the variety of studies could be used; "trust," "activism," 
"independence of family," and "occupational primacy." The trust 
items involved questions about human nature or the trustworthiness 
of people in general. "Activism" dealt with the methods used to 
succeed and the goals which symbolize success. "Independence of 
family" involved opinions about moving away from home or at great 
distances from relatives, and family triggered employment (pulling 
strings). "Occupational primacy" involved the importance of work 
and its accruences to life. In other words, how important is one's 
work relative to other matters. Occupational primacy, the factor 
most indicative of success as defined in economic terms, proved to 
be curvilinear. The middle class scored highest on occupational 
primacy while the upper and lower classes placed other things above 
occupation. Kahl concluded that the success goal is evident 
throughout society. Without defining the precise content of 
"success," this value remains an ideal— everybody wants it. Kahl 
agreed with Mizruchi's contention that "the 'success' goal is 
widespread throughout the class hierarchy, but that the particular 
content of this goal and the means by which it can be obtained vary 
significantly (Kahl, 1965: 678)."
It appears that "success" in particular, and ideals in general, 
serve as "master symbols" as described by C. Wright Mills, The
articles by Kimball, Kahl, and Johnson and Kerckhoff demonstrate 
the power of economic institutions in affecting the characteristics 
of an individual's physical life as well as the ideas an individual 
has about that life. Had Kimball's rural community consciously 
resisted the changed in life style depicted by Kimball (in 
consideration of the correlations in Johnson and Kerckhoff's 
article, there is good reason to believe that they would have, 
had they known what was going on) it is unlikely that the community 
would have been able to resist an institution whose legal structure 
is geared to capital investment. If Cooley's "pecuniary valuation" 
is indeed an institution of the dominant nature which he describes, 
then responses to the question "What is success?" would more often 
than not be associated with economic terms. The same should be 
expected from the question "What is value?".
Institutions and Ideologies: Their Bond in
Sentiments and the Basis of Conflict
An argument by Riemer was quoted in the last chapter,
(1) Ideologies are set off against one another according to 
disparate means for achievement of the "summon bonum."
(2) Lower level values stand in a relationship as means to the 
higher level values.
(3) Ideological conflict involves lower level values.
(4) Acceptability is reached by climbing out of the concrete 
into the "lofty" heights of supreme values. "Consensus 
can never be reached if the true issue of concrete value 
specifications is avoided." (Riemer, 1949: 133)
An earlier article by Riemer serves to illustrate what he means.
In "Social Planning and Social Organization" (Riemer, 1947: 508-516)
he says that "social planning is concerned with the concrete detail
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of its subject matter"; "social planning co-ordinates diversified
technical skills and professional training" and; "social planning
calls for the proclamation and specification of values (Riemer, 1947:
508)." There is a problem when concrete means are not provided
along with "ideal" plans.
This necessity is frequently obscured by the delegation of 
power to the social planner in terms of truisms. He is called 
upon to plan for the "welfare of the community," but it is 
left to him to specify such general statements in terms of 
tangible objectives that can serve as a guide for concerted 
community action. (Riemer, 1947: 510)
It is impossible to create a plan which implements an ideal to the
fullest because many ideals are inconsistent, vague, and as Becker
pointed out, they can be irrational in the long run. Riemer gave
the "free market" as an example: If the ideal of the free market
is carried to its extreme, monopolies will be the result; hence,
there is no more free market. Planning is also inhibited in the
United States because of the separation of powers. The judiciary
cannot implement plans. The executive must go through the legislature
to implement plans. The legislature is too large and therefore too
divided for any consensus to be attained on specific action. When
a specific action has been decided its activation requires the
money acquired through taxation.
Taxation itself is an example of a controversial government 
necessity. Bittner (1926: 442-449) contrasted the institutions 
"American Pattern of Taxation" with the ideological "Democratic 
Pattern of Taxation." The American pattern involves keeping state 
services at a minimum so as to keep taxes down; permit wide latitude 
for private enterprise; permit tax free securities; and a progressive
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tax system. The Democratic pattern contains the "belief elements" 
of a lessening of extremes of wealth; increased public services to 
the common man; taxes are necessary evils— make them light for the 
many and heavy for the few; hereditary wealth and priviledges are 
hindrances to democratic progress. Bittner noted that both of these 
systems have elements in common while those elements that conflict 
are solved only temporarily. Expenses are pushed into the future 
by incurring public debt. Public debt, usually incurred by means of 
tax free securities, undermines elements in both systems. Progressive 
taxation is undermined in that the very rich invest in tax free 
securities and severely reduce their taxable income. Taxes do not, 
in fact, turn out to be heavy for the few.
"Value conflict implies that two or more parties in society 
hold different views about the goodness, logic or beauty of some­
thing (Honigman, 1959: 35)." Honigman says that legislation is often 
unable to resolve value conflict between legislation often gives 
rise to the conflict or else makes that conflict visible. When 
legislation is effective in resolving conflict, according to Honigman, 
it is often because the constituents recognize the authority of the 
law-making body or places obedience to the law above the particular 
values in conflict.
Riemer appears to be correct. When good intentions are reduced 
to practical activity the substance of value conflict becomes evident.
Willard Waller was of a different opinion however. In an 
article primarily intended to reveal the sources of an individual's 
understanding of a situation as a social problem, Waller sets 
"organizational mores" against "humanitarian mores." When
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organizational mores produce results which are incongruent with 
humanitarian mores the student perceives "social problems." "In 
every social problem seek the moral problem; try to discover the 
complex processes of conflict, supplementation, and interference 
in our own moral imperatives (Waller, 1936: 926)." In other words, 
the problem of social problems cannot be understood apart from the 
student's motives in seeing the situation as a problem.
While Waller's reasoning behind seeing social problems as
"problems" is sensible, his criticism of "solutions" is filled with
status quo ideology.
A simpleton would suggest that the remedy for poverty in the 
midst of plenty is to redistribute income. We reject this 
solution at once because it would interfere with the institution 
of private property, would destroy the incentive for thrift 
and hard work and disjoint the entire economic system. What 
is done to alleviate poverty must be done within the limits 
set by organizational mores. (Waller, 1936: 926)
Without arguing the merits of income redistribution there are three
assumptions made by Waller which are questionable. First, Waller
makes the assumption that "thrift and hard work" are thoroughly
responsible for the success of those not hampered by poverty. This
ignores the possibility that the institutions, or the "organizational
mores" as he calls them, are themselves responsible for the poverty.
Second, he assumes that institutions should not be interferred with.
To believe that efforts to alleviate poverty must be done within
the organizational mores is to believe in the immutability of such
mores or to assume that these mores are inherently beneficient.*
*It would appear that Sumner would also take issue with Waller 
on this point. He said that we should judge the mores of our time 
and "put courage and labor into resistance to the current mores 
when we judge them wrong (Sumner, 1906: 118)."
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Had Waller used his method for analyzing social problems to analyze 
his critique of solutions he might have discovered the flaws in his 
own argument.
An article by Bowman has similarities to those of Cooley,
Riemer, Waller, and Bittner. Bowman (1943: 306-312) said that 
scientists can examine "means" (as culturally defined) as to their 
consistency with other social ideals or "ends." In other words, 
social scientists can examine plans for a course of action. Though 
he does not say that social scientists should do the planning, they 
can determine the justifiability of plans that are presented. In 
keeping with this rolq, Bowman argues, the social scientist can 
examine ideologies which espouse particular actions for the "general 
social welfare." Such an examination would reveal the sub-group 
origins and the actual interest satisfactions; the same could be done 
for institutions. This suggestion is not unlike Bittner’s earlier 
conclusion: "When a decision on policy prevails we tend to accept it
as having a reasonable basis when in fact it has chiefly a pattern 
foundation and a superstructure of rationalization (Bittner, 1926:
449)."
Though institutions may provide for the "general social 
welfare" the content of that provision and the institutional supports 
may limit the extent to which an institution has an effect. Burton 
Clark’s study of the effort to implement adult education into the 
California Public School System illustrates these limitations. The 
success or failure of this implementation was considered in terms of 
the values in proximity to the adult program and the larger institution, 
namely, public education.
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Social values may be defined as conceptions of the desireable 
that are distinctive of some human group. These conceptions 
are usually voiced in goals and standards of action— in 
relatively specific notions of what should be attained and how. 
(Clark, 1956: 328)
Clark considered adult education to be a precarious value. His
assumptions about precariousness were:
(1) Social values tend to be precarious when they are undefined.
(2) Social values tend to be precarious when the position of
functionaries is not fully legitimized.
(3) Social values tend to be precarious when they are
unacceptable to a "host" population. (Clark, 1956: 328)
The implementation of values is contingent upon the manifest ends of 
action, organizational marginality, and operating pressures. The 
manifest ends of public education are generally considered to consist 
of the transmission of knowledge for the betterment of society. Like 
other ideals such as "the public welfare," the specific content of 
action is undefined.
Adult education holds a marginal position in that there are no 
laws which can secure a predictable adult audience for these educa­
tional programs. Furthermore, the content of education itself is 
left up to the specific locale in which the education is taking 
place.
As concerns operating pressures, the content or existence of
a program depends upon some clientele to pay for them. Unlike 
# .
primary and secondary education which have a coerced audience, adult 
education must rely on public interest in specific courses.
With these things in mind, adult education requires that its 
functionaries sell the product in the same sense that companies have 
to market their products. The adoption of a function outside the
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existing institutional framework requires an adaptation of that 
framework.
We may expect that this value adaptation, where purpose is 
reduced to service, will be pronounced when (a) organizations 
attached to a precarious value (b) continue to find themselves 
without a predictable clientele, or more broadly, with no 
specific outside forces to sustain them. (Clark, 1956: 336)
The Confinement of Ideology to Politics
The term ideology is frequently thought of as a verbal facade
used to convince some group that the leaders have only the best of
intentions and that the course of action espoused by the ideologues
will have, or is having, desirable consequences.*
• •  *
In the modern world, I think we must bear in mind, power is often 
not so authoritative as it appeared to be in the medieval period; 
justifications of rulers no longer seem so necessary to their 
exercise of power. At least for many of the great decisions 
of our time— especially those of an international sort— mass 
"persuasion" has not been "necessary"; the fact is simply 
accomplished. Furthermore, such ideologies as are available 
to the powerful are often neither taken up nor used by them. 
Ideologies usually arise as a response to an effective debunk­
ing of power; in the United States such opposition has not been 
recently affective enough to create a felt need for new ideolo­
gies of rule.
Today, of course, many people who are disengaged from 
prevailing allegiances have not acquired new ones, and so 
are inattentive to political concerns of any kind. They are 
neither radical nor reactionary. They are inactionary. If 
we accept the Greek’s definition of the idiot as an altogether 
private man, then we must conclude that many citizens of many 
societies are indeed idiots. This— and I use the word with 
care— this spiritual condition seems to me the key to much 
modern malaise among political intellectuals, as well as the 
key to much political bewilderment in modern society.
Intellectual "conviction" and moral "belief" are not necessary, 
in either the rulers or the ruled, for a.structure of power to 
persist and even to flourish. So far as the role of ideologies
*According to Clyde Kkuckhohn, "ideology has today a somewhat 
pejorative sense which does not attack to value." (Kluckhohn, in 
Parsons, 1951: 433)
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is concerned, the frequent absence of engaging legitimation and 
the prevalence of mass apathy are surely two of the central 
political facts about Western societies of today. (Mills, 1959: 
41)
There must have been a mood at the time this book appeared 
which inspired sociologists to address this question. One year later 
a book appeared entitled The End of Ideology: t)n The Exhaustion of
Political Ideas in the Fifties (Bell, 1960). Mills, perhaps, hopes 
for a revival or a resuscitation of ideological commitment. Daniel 
Bell was simply declaring the end of ideological commitment— he did 
not mourn its passing. Bell’s book created a stir and plenty of 
disagreement. Before presenting the counter arguments, this writer 
must ask what Bell means by ideology. In the broadest sense of the 
term ’’political" all ideology is political. In the narrowest sense 
of "political" only those systems dealing specifically with govern­
ment forms are ideological. "Ideology" has also been subjected to 
this problem of conceptual expension and contraction. Bell said that:
. . . in popular usage the word ideology remains as a vague term 
where it seems to denote a world-view or belief-system or creeds 
held by a social group about the social arrangements in society, 
which is morally justified as being right. People then talk 
of the "ideology of the small businessman," or of liberalism, 
or fascism, as an "ideology." Or some writer will talk of "the 
dream world of ideology (in which) Americans see their 
country as a place where every child is born to ’equality of 
opportunity,’ where every man is essentially as good as every 
other man if not better.” In this sense, ideology connotes a 
’'myth" rather than just a set of values.
Clearly, such usages, by mixing together many things, create 
only confusion . . .
We can, perhaps, borrow a distinction from Mannheim, and 
distinguish between what he called "the particular conception 
of ideology," and "the total conception of ideology." In the 
first sense, we can say that individuals who profess certain 
values have interests as well, and we can better understand 
the meaning of these values or beliefs, or the reasons why 
they come forth where they have, by linking them up with the 
interests they have— though the interests may not always be 
economic; they may be status interests (such as an ethnic group
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that wants higher standing or approval in a society), political 
interests, such as representation, and the like. . . .  A total 
ideology is an all inclusive system of comprehensive reality, 
it is a set of beliefs, infused with passion, and seeks to 
transform the whole way of life. This commitment to ideology—  
the yearning for a "cause," or the satisfaction of deep moral 
feelings— is not necessarily the reflection of interests in the 
shape of ideas. Ideology, in this sense, and in the sense 
that we use it here, is a secular religion. (Bell, 1960:
399)
The moving force behind ideologies are intellectuals. The
intellectual of yesterday is more likely to be the scholar of today.
The scholar qua scholar, is less involved with his "self." The 
intellectual begins with his experience, his individual percep­
tions of the world, his priviledges and deprivations, and judges 
the world by these sensibilities. Since his own status is of 
high value, his judgements of the society reflect the treatment 
accorded to him. (Belj., 1960: 402)
To the extent that the intellectual was disenfranchised from the
desired places in society,
there was a built in compulsion for the free-floating intellec­
tual to become political. The ideologies, therefore, which 
emerged from the nineteenth century had the force of the 
.intellectuals behind them. . . , for the radical intelligentsia 
(of today), the old ideologies have lost their "truth" and their 
power to persuade. (Bell, 1960: 402)
From these quotations we can see that Bell is referring to total
ideologies having their origin in the nineteenth century when he
refers to the "end of ideology." He noted that "new ideologies"
are appearing in third world countries.
These are the ideologies of industrialization, modernization, 
Pan-Arabism, color, and nationalism. In the distinctive 
difference between the two kinds of ideologies lies the great 
political and social problems of the second half of the 
twentieth century. The ideologies of the nineteenth century 
were universalistic, humanistic, and fashioned by intellectuals. 
The mass ideologies of Asia and Africa are parochial, instru­
mental, and created by political leaders. The driving forces 
of the old ideologies were social equality and, in the 
largest sense, freedom. The impulses of the new ideologies 
are economic development and national power. (Bell, 1960:
403)
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Bell noted that a "new left" is emerging but it is impotent 
because of a lack of direction. The need for ideology is present, 
as is the energy, but there is no indication that solutions to great 
problems, "the direction," are present. As Bell put it, "any of 
the great questions that require hard thought, are only answered 
by bravura phrases (Bell, 1960: 405)."
Eight years later a collection of papers by various authors
was published in a volume entitled The End of Ideology Debate
(Waxman, 1968). C. Wright Mills wrote:
Ultimately, the end-of-ideology is based upon a disillusionment 
with any real commitment to socialism in any recognizable 
form. That is the only'"ideology" that has really ended for 
these writers. But with its ending, all ideology, they think, 
has ended. That ideology they talk about; their own 
ideological assumptions, they do not. (Mills in Waxman, 1968: 
128)
It is a kindergarten fact that any political reflection that is 
of possible significance is ideological: in its terms policies,
institutions, men of power are criticized or approved. In this 
respect, the end-of-ideology stands negatively, for the attempt 
to withdraw oneself and one’s work from political relevance; 
positively, it is an ideology of political complacency which 
seems the only way now open for many writers to acquiesce in 
or to justify the status quo. (Mills in Waxman, 1968: 131)
Though Bell’s usage of ideology is "total" the phraseology* 
that surfaces in change oriented ideologies is "political." With 
this in mind, Bell's arguments may be attacked from two positions:
(1) If by "ideology" Bell means all ideologies, then we may ask if
it is true that all ideologies are on the decline; (2) if by 
ideology Bell means socialism in particular, then we may ask if it
*The term "phraseology" is used here to avoid the tainted 
connotations of the term "rhetoric."
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is true that socialist ideologies are on the decline. Bell’s 
reference to "new ideologies" seems a sufficient indication that he 
does not mean that all ideologies are on the decline. The second 
interpretation, on the other hand, seems correct. Bell confined his 
greatest certainty of decline to the west. Even here there are argu­
ments damaging to Bell’s thesis. In his analysis of the political 
scene in Italy, Lapalombara writes:
If by decline is meant the abandonment of some of the rhetoric, 
the verbal symbols, the predictions and expectations voiced 
until the late fifties, there seems little doubt about the 
validity of such a judgement, although the more appropriate 
word would be change.
What is important is the apparent P. C. I. conviction that it 
can come up with a new strategy— a new formula for achieving 
power— for Communist parties operating in Western European and 
other countries of advanced capitalism. It is important to 
bear in mind that, in doing this, the party purports to be able 
to provide an up-dated ideological rationale for action. Some 
of the "moldiness" of "Scientific Socialism" has certainly been 
scraped away. What remains, coupled with some of the newer 
ideas currently in ferment, amounts to much more ideology 
than one might detect from the simple notation that the 
language of the late forties and early fifties is no longer 
in vogue.
The new myths, which form the core of the ideological structure 
of many intellectuals, are those of the welfare state and of 
economic planning. As Henri James rightly puts it, "The myth 
of planning is only the socialist variant of the myth of 
progress." (Lapalombara in Waxman, 1968: 328, 329, 340)
It is not true that all ideologies are on the decline. Neither does
it appear true that ideology in the form of socialism is on the
decline. Though Bell has been successfully criticized on these
counts, his most important formulation remains unscathed. Ideology
contains myth and, as such, tends to mislead as much as it tends
to inspire. Bell has been charged with serving as a status quo
ideologue. However, Bell wrote:
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Where the theme of the ’’end of ideology” is currently most 
relevant is in Eastern Europe, among the intellectuals who 
have experienced at first hand the deadening effects of an 
official ideology, and among the young generation for whom 
ideology is simply flatulent rhetoric. (It is curious that 
Mr. Aiken seems to assume that ideology is always nascent and 
passionate, and neglects its more pervasive role as a 
coercive, official force.)
. . . The intention, then, of the ’’revolt against ideology” 
is not to make one insensitive to injustice or to the need 
for a transcendant moral vision. It is, rather, to make one 
wary of the easy solution and to deny that any embodiment of 
community is final. (Bell in Waxman, 1968: 270)
Doesn't "official ideology" sound like another phrasing for the
term "institution?" Aren't institutions those value systems which 
are the status quo? It appears incorrect to call Bell a status 
quo ideologue.
It appears that the end of ideology debate is a grand example 
of people talking past each other. The questions of greatest substance
still remain. What kinds of ideologies attract what kinds of people?
What kinds of "underlying strain or tension" are most likely to 
evoke what kinds of ideology? How can ideologies be analyzed so 
as to distinguish the factual from the mythical elements? Who is 
behind what ideologies and what have they to gain?
"The Radical Right as a Minority Group" (Howard in Sagarin,
1971: 288-306) asks if the advocates of right-wing ideology constitute
i
a minority group. Howard argued that virtually everyone can be
thought of as a minority in some respect when minority is thought
of in the broadest sense of the term. His reasons for viewing the
radical right in minority group terms are as follows:
(1) In a structural sense the radical right is not a minority 
group as the concept is conventionally understood.
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(2) The perspective of many persons on the far right is
similar, however, to that of members of a minority group.
In terms of political attitudes and values many manifest 
what Hofstadter has labeled "the paranoid style."
(3) The perspective of the right derives from certain
persistent strains and tensions in the American system 
and is important in that occasionally it breaks through 
to broadly mark the course of political events.
(4) The persistence of the strains and tensions which generate
the paranoid style can be better understood if one departs
from the broadly conventional conceptualization of minority 
group and employs what might be termed a radical conception 
of the minority group phenomenon. (Howard in Sagarin,
1971: 289)
The Christian Crusade, the John Birch Society, and the Ku
Klux Klan are groups which exemplify the range of right-wing 
ideology— Christian fundamentalism, anti-Communism, and racism.
In describing the members of these groups Howard noted that the 
KKK seemed to be of lower socio-economic strata than the Birch 
Society and less "staid and respectable" than Christian Crusade 
followers.
. •
A fourth group might be added to the constituencies of the 
right: the urban, working poor, the white worker earning
$5,000 to $10,000 a year. This individual finds himself in 
a continual economic bind; he sees many of the values and 
institutions which he was taught to revere attacked and 
ridiculed. He is against the putative agents of destruction: 
niggers, peace creeps, weirdos, eggheads, commies, politicians, 
students, dope fiends, sex perverts, and anyone else whom he 
does not understand or whose difference makes him uncomfortable. 
George Wallace probably drew the bulk of his support in the 
North from among the white working poor. (Howard in Sagarin, 
1971: 292)
The higher income, higher social status conservatives have in 
common with the above group the feeling that their advantages and 
privileges are being eroded. These people wish to gain or at 
least not lose any ground in the hierarchy of advantages. Insti­
tutions embody some policy or ideology and as such they benefit
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some people more than they benefit others. The concept of "insti­
tutional discrimination" refers to the systematic application of 
procedures to the exclusion of an aggregate of people having some 
characteristic(s) in common. Unlike religious and racial minorities, 
the radical right has not been subjected to factual discrimination or 
persecution. "The persecutions visited upon the radical right are 
less visible to the dispassionate observer. It is not so much 
that the right is persecuted but that it believes it is (Howard 
in Sagarin, 1971: 294)."
Rokeach's Model of Political Ideology, • s
The study of ideologies would be enhanced if the characteristics 
of certain groups of people could be correlated with the elements or 
themes in the ideologies which they profess or with which they 
express agreement. Rokeach’s The Nature of Human Values (1973) 
contains a chapter entitled "A Two-Value Model of Political 
Ideology." Rokeach argues that politics is mainly about a concern 
with "freedom" and "equality." If each of these values exists on 
a high-low dimension in terms of the degree to which each is 
valued in ideologies, four extreme types will result. The follow­
ing figure illustrates the range of each dimension.
Communism Equality high
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Socialism
Freedom • ■  _______________________________ ____  Freedom
low high
Fascism Equality low Capitalism
Figure 1. A Freedom-Equality Model of Political Variations*
To test his two-value model, Rokeach selected 25,000-world 
samples from writings which represent the four major ideological 
orientations. Communism was represented by Lenin. Fascism was 
represented by Adolph Hitler. Capitalism was represented by Barry 
Goldwater. Socialism was represented by T. B. Bottomore, Erich 
Fromm, P. Medow, N. Thomas, and M. Titmus. Rokeach felt that no 
single individual could represent the socialist point of view. The 
samples were subjected to content analysis and counts were made of 
the absolute and relative frequency for which freedom and equality 
received positive or negative reference.** "Our results clearly
4
show that the traditional left-right dimension turns Out to be a
two-dimensional one (Rokeach, 1971: 294)." Rokeach argues
To American conservatives, social equality is perhaps seen as ’ 
a threat to individual freedom; to socialists, there can be 
no freedom for the citizenry without social equality. Similarly,
*The above diagram is a duplication of Rokeach’s Figure 6.1 
(Rokeach, 1973: 170).
**A11 of the instrumental and terminal values of Rokeach’s lists 
were obtained from these samples but are not relevant to this 
particular model. The lists may be found in Chapter VII.
151
both communism and fascism place a low value on freedom and 
advocate instead the supremacy and power of the state. But 
to fascists, the power of the state is seen as a weapon to 
coerce inequality, whereas to communists it is a weapon to 
coerce equality. (Rokeach, 1973: 184)
Rokeach added that "equality” alone can be used to differentiate 
the "major political groupings" in the United States but that it is 
inadequate for distinguishing other ideologies as they are not 
sufficiently represented in the United States. Rokeach said that 
this method could be used to analyze other political ideologies.
If this method can be used to analyze political ideologies 
there does not appear to be any reason why the same method, using 
the same or different values, could not be used to analyze more 
specialized ideologies such as those of religion, art, or whatever*
Conclusion
Institutions and ideologies are systems of interrelated meanings. 
These systems of meanings are comprised of specific values such as 
norms, beliefs, and ideals as well as their various subtypes. These 
systems of meanings (or values) are highly focused and highly 
visible. In other words, a system is a collection of values con­
centrated about some function or social concern. The family, for 
example, is an institution and concerns very many "specific" norms, 
beliefs, and ideals. The family is highly visible.
An institution, unlike an ideology, requires that its systems 
of meanings be accompanied by highly patterned, interrelated behavior. 
In other words, an institution has a structure. An ideology, by 
contrast, can exist more or less independently of any behavior 
patterns or interrelationship of roles.
For an ideology to supplant an institution requires that the 
people become disaffected with the institution(s) in question.
This means that norms associated with the institution are no longer 
complied with; that the beliefs presented by the institution no 
longer persuade; and that the ideals towards which the institution 
was directed no longer hold high esteem. Conversely, the ideology 
must gain a believing constituency and a set of behaviors con­
sistently practiced and endorsed as proper behavior. There can 
be no doubt that "myths" play an important role in persuading 
people that an institution or ideology is necessary, beneficial, 
or what have you. The fact; that myths do play a role is evident 
in the "fictions" we employ in our day-to-day dealings within 
institutions. For one reason or another we do not wish to confront 
the possibility that our explanations are mythical explanations. 
Daniel Bell and C. Wright Mills are both familiar with the role of 
myths. It is even possible that C. H. Cooley was addressing this 
issue when he debunked the notion that "human nature" could serve 
as an explanation of values. The claim, "It’s human nature," could 
serve as a powerful buttress for some institutional structure.
The literature discussed in the section on "Economy as the 
Dominant Institution" suggests two ideas. The first idea is 
attributable to Marx: A society's economic structure (institution)
determines the other features of the social order. A variant of 
this idea may be attributed to Cooley. Cooley suggested that 
pecuniary valuation, or estimations of worth as defined in economic 
terms, was an institutional phenomenon and one that was ascending. 
Cooley’s idea was not so deterministic as Marx’s. Other literature
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supported the idea that the economy was the dominant institution in 
the United States: Old style rural life was being drastically
altered with the onset of farming techniques and social relations 
designed to maximize profits (Kimball); adult men who favored 
nuclear family norms and accept the "value of change" are least 
likely to perceive a conflict between family values and economic 
success values (Johnson and Kerchkoff); there is a close relationship 
between occupational primacy and success as defined in economic 
terms (Kahl). This particular body of information suggests that 
in societies where a particular institution is dominant the values 
associated with other -institutions will be arranged in such a way 
that the subordinate institutions maximize the effects of the 
dominant institution.
Recall from Chapter II that "value" corresponds to individual 
expressions of positive or negative meaning while "social value" 
corresponds to Sumner's "concept," Williams' "matters of collective 
welfare" regarded as such by "an effective consensus," and Giddings' 
"social appraisals of certain satisfactions, relations, modes of 
activity, and forms of social organization." Perhaps the measure 
of social-value which an institution enjoys can be gauged by the 
degree of conflict which surrounds it. This conflict would take 
place not on the level of ideals but on the level of effects. Recall 
Burton Clark's study of adult education as a.precarious value.
On the level of ideals we know that people think "education" is a 
good thing. When we address the subject with regard to what is 
going to be taught, how the program is going to be supported, and 
who is going to be involved in it we discover that education does
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not hold as high a position as we had imagined. The conventional 
educational institutions would have to be transformed in order to 
actualize an adult program.
Ideology in the broadest sense refers to a total, universalistic, 
all-inclusive system which seeks to transform a way of life. Ideology 
in the narrow sense is "particular." This understanding sees an 
ideology wherever a set of ideas is vocalized about some particular 
social arrangement. It is interesting that Daniel Bell announced 
the decline of the "total" ideological system of socialism at the 
time when Americans were becoming disenchanted with their institu­
tional arrangements. ’The American contra-culture expressed a 
number of socialistic ideas in a number of institutional areas. The 
question is: Why did the American sociologist not see what was
coming?
In the opinion of this writer the "Systems" element of the 
Vanfossen typology is the most inherently sociological. Systems 
encompass the specific norms, beliefs, and ideals, but puts them 
into a perspective. The Systems concept adds the element of value 
to the structural component which is stressed in conventional 
definitions of "institution." Furthermore, the Systems concept 
allows for an alternative to institutions by considering institutions 
in terms of their ideas. The Vanfossen typology invites one to 
investigate the relationships of norms, beliefs, and ideals within 
the concept of systems.
The final argument is that the term "ideology" should be 
maintained and not discarded because it has, as Kluckhohn explains,
"a somewhat pejorative sense which does not attach to value." If
ideology really is associated with a pejorative sense it is perhaps 
because many ideologies are simply not believed. People do not 
regard negatively the sets of meanings which they do believe. What 
term shall we have for sets of meanings which lack a pejorative sense
CHAPTER VII
COMPLEXES
Complexes are diffuse sets of values., Complexes are of two
types: ethos and ethics. Complexes are diffuse in that they are
comprised of many values of differing types. Complexes permeate the
less diffuse institutions and ideologies.
That complex which incorporates all of the major values of a
society into an overall "style" may be referred to as that
societies1 Ethos; that complex which portrays the image or 
range of alternative images of man himself may be termed an 
Ethic and includes various Personality Cynosures and their 
associated Emulation Models. (Vanfossen, page 20)
While an ethos characterizes a particular society or culture, an
ethic is directed specifically at man. While an ethos is temporally
bound, an ethic may be found in different cultures at different
times. Robert Redfield makes a similar distinction between man and
society but adds other elements.
When we speak of "world view" we make one kind of attempt to 
characterize a traditional way of life. "World view" is one 
of those terms which are useful in asserting something of 
what is most general and persistent about a people. . . .
Then we find ourselves talking about fundamental themes or
patterns. Or we can place emphasis on the normative aspect 
of this great whole, and then "ethos" appears, the system of 
values. . . . And, finally in this short list, I mention 
the interest recently directed toward the characterization 
of a people, of a way of life, as if we were characterizing 
a single human being. The attempt to describe "national 
character" is of this sort. In that case a people is 
represented in terms of a "personality type," and the 
explanation of the formation of the type is found, perhaps,
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in the mode of rearing children.
The culture of a people is, then, its total equipment of 
ideas and institutions and conventionalized activities. The 
ethos of a people is its organized conceptions of the Ought.
The national character of a people, or its personality type, 
is the kind of human being which, generally speaking, occurs 
in that society. The "world view" of a people, yet another 
of this group of conceptions, is the way a people characteristically 
look outward upon the universe. (Redfield, 1953: 84)
Redfieldfs usage is slightly different from the one used here. 
Ethos is not restricted to the normative and includes what Redfield 
called "world view." An ethic, though it deals with "personality 
type," also contains normative elements and is not restricted to the 
"national character of people."
Clyde Kluckhohn makes use of the concept of "value-orientation."
Kluckhohn writes:
A value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of 
an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desireable 
which influences the selection from available modes, means and 
ends of action.
. . . any given act is seen as a compromise between motivation, 
situational conditioning, available means, and the means and 
goals as interpreted in value terms. Motivation arises in part 
from biological and situational factors. Motivation and value 
are both influenced by the unique life history of the individual 
and by culture.
It is convenient to use the term value-orientation for those 
value notions which are (a) general, (b) organized, and (c) 
include definite existential judgements. A value-orientation 
is a set of linked propositions embracing both value and 
existential elements. (Kluckhohn in Parsons, 1951: 395, 403,
409)
From these conceptions Kluckhohn proposed a scheme for 
classifying value-orientations with the following dimensions: 
modality (positive or negative), content (aesthetic, cognitive, and 
moral), intent (instrumental and goal values), generality (specific 
and thematic), intensity, explicitness (one which is stated verbally
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by actors or inferred by observers), extent (idiosyncratic, personal, 
and group), and organization (referring to position in a hierarchy, 
or isolation).
Kluckhohn-'s article was discursive and we can only infer the 
manner in which he thought this scheme should be used. Kluckhohn's 
value-orientation joins ethos and ethic so as to cut out parts of 
both. The dimension of "extent" suggests that a value-orientation 
may be discussed with reference to an individual or a group; we do 
not speak of an individual's ethos. The dimension of "generality" 
implies concern with concrete values as well as the none too specific 
"themes." It may be that "value-orientation" includes systems as 
well as complexes as implied by the dimension of "organization."
In any case, Kluckhohn's conception is difficult to classify and 
discuss as one which corresponds to any particular type of value. 
Considering the variety of value concepts it is not surprising to 
find a wide array of conceptions that deal with diffuse value sets.*
There is another framework which, like Kluckhohn's, can be 
thought of as a typology of diffuse values which entails more than 
complexes. Fallding's four types** (membership, partisanship, 
ownership, and interest) are broad enough to include the elements 
discussed by Kluckhohn but lack the specificity of Kluckhohn's 
dimensions. What would be considered "partisanship" by Fallding 
might be an orientation of low "organization," moderate
*The methods used by Parsons and F. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 
are also different. They will be discussed shortly.
**This is discussed at greater length in Chapter III.
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"explicitness," and of moral "content" for Kluckhohn; perhaps, for 
Vanfossen, this would be an ideology. Kluckhohn’s and Fallding’s 
diffuse types overlap with the "systems" concept. More often than 
not, efforts to embrace values which are called complexes mix ethos 
and ethics together with systems. The following sections attempt to 
discuss complexes in as unmixed a fashion as possible without 
destroying the meanings intended by the various authors.
Ethos
It was stated earlier that ethos are culture bound. Man
"constantly imposes on this environment his own constructions and
meanings; these constructions and meanings [are] characteristic of
one culture as over against another (Kluckhohn quoting Bateson in
Parsons, 1951: 409)." Aside from any preference of definition, the
concept of ethos is one which encompasses the transmitable as well
as the non-transmitable features of a society or culture. It follows
therefore, that some term be used which incorporates the elements
which cannot be borrowed or diffused to other societies. Though
his discussion was not explicitly directed to ethos, Ralph Linton
outlined the culture bound character of some values.
. . .  we have in all cultures those vital attitudes and values 
which lie largely below the level of consciousness and which 
the average member of a society rarely tries to verbalize even 
to himself. The practical impossibility of making such 
elements available for borrowing by the members of some other 
society is obvious. This part of any culture is simply not 
susceptible to diffusion. It can never be presented in 
sufficiently concrete and objective terms. Such things as 
religious or philosophical concepts can be communicated 
after a fashion, although probably never in their entirety. 
Patterns of social behavior can also be transmitted in the 
same uncertain way, but the associations which give them genuine 
potentialities for function cannot be transmitted. A borrowing
160
group may imitate their outward forms, but it will usually be 
found that it has introduced new elements to replace those 
which could not be genuinely communicated to it. (Linton,
1936: 339)
In a sense it may be said of ethos that it describes those
common values which give the appearance of integration. This is
not to say that a society is integrated because its members agree
on the ethos but rather, that ethos depicts a society’s wholeness.
John Sirjamaki’s conception of ethos is comprised of all of a
society's "culture configurations." "Culture configurations are the
moral principles which comprise the social philosophy of a society
(Sirjamaki, 1948: 465)."
They are patterns of covert behavior; as such they are the 
culturally approved rules or sentiments which motivate overt 
behavior and which integrate it into consistent patterns; and 
they can be deduced only from behavior. . . . When taken 
together, the configurations delineate the ethos of a culture. 
(Sirjamaki, 1948: 464)
The bulk of Sirjamaki's article is involved with descriptions 
of the culture configurations of the American family. This gives 
the impression that Sirjamaki considered the study of institutions 
as the best means of describing ethos. Sirjamaki listed the 
following eight points as the culture configurations of the 
American family:
(1) Marriage is a dominating life-goal, for men as well as 
for women.
(2) The giving and taking in marriage should be based on 
personal affection and choice.
(3) The criterion of success for marriage is the personal 
happiness of husband and wife.
(4) The best years of life are those of youth, and its qualities 
are the most desirable.
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(5) Children should be reared in a child’s world and shielded 
from too early participation in adult woes and tribulations.
(6) The exercise of sex should be contained within wedlock.
(7) Family roles of husband and wife should be based on a 
sexual division of labor, but with the male status being 
superior.
(8) Individual, not familial, values are to be sought in family 
living. (Sirjamaki, 1948: 465-470)
Most of these "moral principles" are stated as idealized norms.
Some of them would be severely contested today, particularly item
seven. If indeed these are the moral principles upon which the
American family was based in 1948 they may serve to distinguish the
difference between depicting an ethos and investigating an institution, 
v
As elements of an ethos they are taken to be "culturally approved 
rules or sentiments" and can be deduced only from behavior. As an 
institution, or more broadly, as a system these principles would be 
studied in greater detail than one finds in a depiction of the 
dominant patterns. As Cooley would suggest, we would ask whose 
rules or sentiments these are; what is the source of these rules; 
how are these rules reinforced structurally? This is not the primary 
concern when study is restricted to ethos.
The greater the degree of cultural approval of a particular 
value the more* frequently will support be voiced for this value. 
Albrecht (1956: 722-729) expected that this support would be voiced 
in literature. Albrecht noted three general assumptions about the 
relationship between literature and values:
(1) Literature reflects society and culture with respect to 
common cultural values.
(2) Literature serves as a means of social control.
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(3) It influences attitudes and behavior of people in ways 
considered in some respects desireable, in others 
undesireable. (Albrecht, 1956: 722)
Albrecht’s study was oriented toward the first of these 
assumptions. He hypothesized that "short stories read by large 
audiences . . . will express essentially the same basic values and 
ideals as the American family (Albrecht, 1956: 722)." Albrecht 
added two items to Sirjamaki's eight cpnfigurations to form the 
framework against which the hypothesis would be tested. Six magazines 
were chosen to represent three levels of sophistication. True Story 
and True Confessions represented the "lower level"; American and The 
Saturday Evening Post represented the middle level; The Atlantic and 
The New Yorker represented the upper level. Sampling was limited to 
any "regular" short stories appearing in the year 1950. An author 
expressed a value if he made a positive statement about some theme 
or a negative statement about one of the configurations alternatives. 
The direction of the plot resolution was also used as evidence.
Assuming that Sirjamaki’s eight points and the two points added 
by Albrecht were true values, Albrecht’s hypothesis would be 
supported if the literature examined embraced these ten points.
The hypothesis was supported to this extent. However, the literature 
.for each level-did not support the themes with equal weight and the 
intralevel weighting was also unequal * Though the results supported 
the idea that the stories "will express essentially the same basic 
values and ideals as the American family" there was no indication as 
to why certain levels of sophistication placed higher value on 
some themes more than others.
Albrecht’s article concentrated on "American" values concerning
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a particular institution— the family. GillinTs article, "National
and Regional Cultural Values in the United States" (Gillin, 1955:
107-113), also discussed "American" values. Gillin’s discussion
did not focus on a particular institution. Instead, he characterized
national values* and discussed geographic regions** with regard to
"special emphases" and "special values." The following excerpts
are examples of Gillin’s type of characterization.
NORTHEAST. (a) Special emphases. Hard work and thrift are still 
given special emphasis in rural subcultures. Hereditary status 
is more firmly established than in the country as a whole. Power 
over persons and groups, including those in other parts of the 
nation is emphasized, and is more explicitly justified, especially 
in cosmopolitan centers like Boston and New York. . . .
SOUTHEAST. (a) Special emphases. Protestant morality is 
especially strong. . . . Family relations are strong and include 
extended kin groups. . . . Pragmatic ingenuity, and the 
corrolaries of the mechanistic world view, especially cleanli­
ness and orderliness, are rated lower than in the country as a 
whole. . . . (b) Special values. Doctrine of white supremacy
and resulting race-castes. Idealization of women in the image 
of the "lady." Violence as a solution of interpersonal and 
intergroup problems. . . .
MIDDLE STATES. This region is often described as the "most 
typical" of the United States. (a) Special emphases. Outward 
symbols of prestige and power are devalued and emphasis is 
placed on "democratic leveling." . . . Optimism is strong.
. . . Honesty and outspokenness are especially valued and the
*These national values are discussed in Chapter V.
**Gillin defined his regions as follows: (1) Northeast: Maine,
Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut,
New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and West 
Virginia. (2) Southeast: Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas,
Tennessee, Kentucky. (3) Southwest: Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico,
Arizona, Utah, and Nevada. (4) Middle States: Ohio, Indiana,
Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri.
(5) Northwest: North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas,
Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado. (6) Far West: Washington,
Oregon, and California. (Gillin, 1955: 111)
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notion is often expressed that "Easterners are crooks," and 
"foreigners, frankly, are inferior." . . . (b) Special values.
"Isolationism," if it may be called a value, is the feature 
of the Middle States most often cited. . . . (Gillin, 1955: 112)
Gillin added that each of these regions has sub-regions with 
special emphases and special values of their own. If particular 
geographic regions are continually divided into smaller and smaller 
sub-regions, when does the ethos concept become too general? When 
do we begin talking about specific values and specific situations? 
Gillin noted that previous generalizations by "Mead, Gorer, and the 
Kluckhohns have on their own admission been suggestive rather than 
definitive (Gillin, 1955: 107)." Gillin added that this was also true
» *  4
of his attempt. It seems that any attempt to generalize about 
specific values for a large number of people would necessarily remain 
tentative and suggestive. Of course, this does not deny the 
informative capacity of efforts to depict an ethos. Like most 
concepts, ethos is useful at its particular level of abstraction.
Robin Williams' American Society (1951) contains a lengthy 
discussion of values in American society. Preceding his discussion, 
Williams wondered if such a complex society as the United States 
actually had what could be called "dominant values." Williams 
wrote:
It is clear that in our society the range of interests, beliefs, 
values, knowledge, and so on is so great that precise and 
detailed characterizations can be done only for carefully 
delimited segments of the society. Any attempt to delineate 
a national character or typical American values or a national 
basic personality type is extremely hazardous, not only 
because of serious gaps in the requisite data but also because 
of the enormous value-diversity of the nation. This diversity 
we know to be so marked that a common core of values which 
could be said to hold for the whole population would probably 
be quite highly generalized. Furthermore, values change
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through time, rendering any cross-section inventory subject
to periodic reappraisal. (Williams, 1951: 450)
For a value to be considered dominant Williams explained that it 
must compare well with other values with regard to the following 
criteria:
1. Extensiveness of the value in the total activity of the 
system. What proportion of a population and of its activities 
manifest the value?
2. Duration of the value. Has it been persistently important 
over a considerable period of time?
3. Intensity with which the value is sought or maintained, as 
shown by: effort, crucial choices, verbal affirmation,
and by reactions to threats to the value— for example, 
promptness, certainty, and severity of sanctions.
4. Prestige of value carriers— that is, or persons, objects, 
or organizations considered to be bearers of the value.
Culture heroes, for example, are significant indexes of 
values of high generality and esteem. (Williams, 1951: 448)
Williams’ discussion of dominant values was directed at 
describing value "systems." "To speak of value systems is, then, 
to imply that values are not simply distributed at random but are 
instead interdependent, arranged in a pattern, and subject to 
reciprocal or mutual variation (Williams, 1951: 451)." The values 
of which Williams speaks are of high generality. Williams discussed 
achievement and success, activity and work, moral orientation, 
humanitarian mores, efficiency and practicality, progress, material 
comfort, equality, freedom, external conformity, science and secular 
rationality, nationalism-patriotism, democracy, and individual 
personality. It must be understood that Williams discussed each 
of these at some length and paid considerable attention to their 
interrelationships. After his discussion of the above mentioned 
"concrete themes (value-belief complexes)" Williams proposed the 
following "suggestive" generalized formulations:
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1. American culture is organized around the attempt at active 
mastery rather than passive acceptance. Into this dimension 
falls the low tolerance of frustration; the refusal to 
accept ascetic renunciation; the positive encouragement of 
desire; the stress on power; the approval of ego-assertion, 
and so on.
2. It tends to be interested in the external world of things 
and events, of the palpable and immediate, rather than in 
the inner experience of meaning and affect. Its genius 
is manipulative rather than contemplative.
3. Its world-view tends to be open rather than closed: it 
emphasizes change, flux, movement; its central personality 
types are adaptive, accessible, outgoing and assimilative.
4. In wide historical and comparative perspective, the culture 
places its primary faith in rationalism as opposed to 
traditionalism; it de-emphasizes the past, orients strongly 
to the future, does not accept things just because they 
have been done before.
5. Closely related to the above, is the dimension of orderliness 
rather than unsystematic ad hoc acceptance of transitory 
experience. (This.emphasis is most marked in the urban 
middle classes.)
6. With conspicuous deviations, a main theme is a universalistic 
rather than particularistic ethic.
7. In interpersonal relations, the weight of the value system
is on the side of the "horizontal" rather than "vertical" 
emphases: peer relations, not superordinate-subordinate
relations; equality rather than hierarchy.
8. Subject to increased strains and modifications, the received 
culture emphasizes individual personality rather than group 
identity,and responsibility. (Williams, 1951: 501-502)
Williams often repeated the tentativeness of such an undertaking
as the description of the dominant values, value systems, or "ethos"
of American society. In his concluding remarks Williams reiterated
the dangers attached to the delineation of values:
It must always be kept in mind that these themes, values, and 
systems of belief do not operate as single and separate units 
but are in continually shifting and recombining configurations 
marked by very complex interpenetration, conflict, isolation 
and labeling of themes must not be allowed to leave the 
impression— to repeat an earlier caution— that values are 
disembodied elements which somehow function apart from concrete 
social relations and personalities. Although values are 
abstractions, everything described in this chapter must be 
capable of observation, in some sense, in the behavior of real 
personalities and in actual social structure, or else we have 
mistaken fancy for fact. (Williams, 1951: 500)
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According to Cuzzort, there are those who think Sorokin may 
have mistaken fancy for fact. This opinion is based on the great 
time span considered, the variety of topics discussed, and the 
disdain for Sensate culture which appears in Sorokin's mammoth Social 
and Cultural Dynamics (1937). Sorokin's Ideational and Sensate
i
cultures can be said to deal with ethos because they are the result 
of Sorokin's attempt to typify the concerns or direction of cultures. 
The following lists comprise a comparison of some of the significant 
differences between Ideational and Sensate cultures.
Ideational Culture Mentality
1. Reality is seen as eternal,
spiritual, and transcendental to 
the senses.
2. The main needs of the individual 
are spiritual. Physical desires 
are curbed.
3. "Progress" is achieved through 
self-control.
4. There is belief in "Being," and 
an indifference to transient 
values.
5. The sensual man and self are 
repressed.
6. People are introvertive and 
subjective in character.
7. Truth is based on mystical 
inner experience. Intuition, 
faith, and revelation are 
used.
8. The moral code is imperative, 
everlasting, and unchangeable,
Sensate Culture Mentality
4 .
Reality is seen as located in 
material "things." It is 
immediately apparent to the 
senses.
The primary needs of man are 
physical. Sensory indulgence 
and gratification should be 
maximized.
"Progress" is achieved through 
control of the external milieu,
There is belief in "Becoming," 
Values are transient. There 
is endless readjustment.
People are dedicated to "self- 
expression" and to sensual 
fulfillment.
People are extrovertive and 
objective in character.
Truth is based on observation, 
measurement, and experimen­
tation. Logic is used.
Morals are relativistic, change­
able, and oriented toward the 
provision of happiness.
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Ideational Culture Mentality (cont.) Sensate Culture Mentality (cont)
9. Art is symbolic and directed Art is directed toward
toward religious values. entertainment.
(Cuzzort, 1969: 239)
Sorokin’s scheme is inclined toward categorizing or typifying 
particular cultures. An examination of Williams’ propositions 
suggests with little doubt that we live in a Sensate culture. Of 
course, it would not be necessary to consider Williams’ conclusions 
to be aware of that. The characteristics listed above are far 
removed from any particular case. In other words, it would be 
unwise to consider any of the above generalities as the typifi- 
cation of a particular culture. For any particular culture there 
would probably be numerous exceptions.
Folsom and Strelsky (1944: 296-307) have also written a 
generalized, "exceedingly preliminary, tentative" article on 
Russian values and character. "He who thinks about values should 
always keep clearly in mind these distinctions:
1. The value-object, which is something outside the human 
neuro-muscular-glandular apparatus, versus the type of 
attitude with which the human being reacts to the object.'
2. Cognitive ideology (the way we conceive and categorize 
the world in order to understand or control it, including 
theological and ficticious concepts and beliefs), versus 
value-system or ethos (the way we.conceive and categorize 
the world in terms of our feelings and attitudes toward it). 
(Folsom and Strelsky, 1944: 296)
Unlike Gillin, these writers discussed Russia as a whole and 
used Germany, France, England, and the United States as contrasts.
Folsom and Strelsky discussed six categories of values and attitudes: 
nature, artifacts, symbols and ideas, human beings and their 
characteristics, society and institutions, and abstract value-objects.
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The following are a few examples of the authors’ characterizations.
1. Nature. The Russians lack the German's rapturous attitude 
toward wild nature, the Frenchman’s high aesthetic valuation 
of formal, cultivated gardens and parks, and the Irishman’s 
nostalgic affection for particular places. Their feeling
is rather for the soil of Prussia in a generalized sense, 
and it has an almost religious character. . . .
2.> Artifacts. Russian valuation of the world of artifacts is 
probably more limited and less richly varied than that of 
West-Europeans and Americans, but the Soviet era has brought 
a tremendous awaluation of machinery and large-scale 
technology. . . .
3. Symbols and Ideas. The Russians hold an instrumental rather 
than a moral, puristic attitude toward their language. In 
this they are quite unlike the French. The Russian mother- 
tongue is a flexible instrument which easily admits change.
• • •
Ideas as such have high value? in Russia; philosophy, 
theology, evolution, political theory, enter into everyday 
conversation to an extent which surprises the Anglo-Saxon, 
although to the German it is less unfamiliar. . . .
5. Society and institutions. . . . German obedience is an 
exhibitionistic passon, well symbolized by the goose-step.
It is based typically upon the family authority of an 
austere father, and readily passes into rebellion and 
hatred against the father and a blind devotion to some leader
or even to contradictory and shifting ideals. It is not
surprising that psychoanalysis, emanating from German 
culture, has made so much of the Oedipus complex, the 
super-ego, and the whole psychological problem of 
authority. . . .
. . .  it seems a reasonable interpretation of avail­
able evidence to say that the Russian has less of family­
generated hostilities and greater real respect for age. . . .
For both Russians and Germans, more than for Anglo- 
Saxons, the end seems to justify the means, but for the 
Russians the end is objectively clear, humane, and 
universal. . . . (Folsom and Strelsky, 1944: 298-300)
One would expect that the authors section of "human beings 
and their characteristics" would fit well in the context of "ethics." 
However, the authors apply their "ethical-emotional types" to whole 
cultures. As a result, the "ethical-emotional types” are discussed 
within the context of ethos as opposed to ethics. The descriptions
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which appear below conform to what Redfield called ’’national 
character.” Once again the authors said these types were ’’exceedingly 
tentative. ’’
A. Types promoting social solidarity:
1. Appolonian: harmony, moderation, conservation of the
past, social participation, self-control, guidance by 
reason, a variety of interests, both contemplative and 
active; Aristotle, Vishnu, Confucius; Greek, English, 
French, Chinese, Zuni cultures.
2. Christian: love of God and fellowmen, devotion, relin­
quishment of force, asceticism only so far as necessary 
to maintain the dominance of love and unselfishness; 
humility, tolerance; Jesus, St. Augustine; Arapesh 
culture.
3. Mohammedan: merging of self with a society of believers
for a holy war.against the unbelievers; warrior discipline 
and passionate obedience to the leader; Nazi culture.
B. Types representing varieties of individualism:
4. Buddhist: detachment from desire, sexual absistence,
relinquishment of property, solitude, practice in 
control of feelings (through postural and respiratory 
techniques et al.); Gandhi, Hindu asceticism.
5. Dionysian; exaltation of individual strength, abandon­
ment of feelings, affirmation of life, with positive 
acceptance of its conflicts and sufferings, the tendency 
to extremes, explosive and ambivalent behavior:
Nietzche, Plains Indians.
6. Promethean: technological control of environment, rest­
less activity, "unceasing making,” intelligent, rational 
effort, individual independence, multiple goals;
Goethe’s Faust, John Dewey, modern industrialism and 
science.
7. Calvinist: ceaseless competitive effort to become,
or to be convinced of being, one of the elite (or 
"elect") within a given society, in either a worldly 
or other-worldly sense. Uses rational effort and 
moderate asceticism: Northwest Indians, capitalist- 
puritanism.
According to these definitions, American character is mainly 
Calvinist-Promethean-Appolonian; German character fundamentally 
Promethean-Calvinist-Dionysian, but driven into Mohammedanism 
by the sense of encirclement and the Nazi movement; Japanese
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character is Mohammedan-Appolonian; Russian character is funda­
mentally Christian-Dionysian, with a recent development of 
Prometheanism. (Folsom and Strelsky, 1944: 303)
The "ethical-emotional types" are not specific in the sense 
that the Protestant Ethic and the Scientific Ethic are specific. 
Nevertheless, these types conform most closely with this writer's 
understanding of ethics in that emulation models are named and the 
emotional make-up or Personality Cynosures are discussed.
The articles by Gillin and Folsom and Strelsky, like any work
on the subject of ethos which this writer has seen* claims to be
tentative and suggestive. It is possible that this is simply a
%
fashion such as the reliable call for "further research."* On the 
other hand, the tentative and suggestive standing of ethos 
depictions indicates that such depictions may (1) serve the casual 
student whose main concern is to learn a little about another culture 
or (2) provide the serious student with a direction for research on 
a level of abstraction which is more specific or concrete.
Ethos and Equilibrium
Ralph Pieris (1952: 339-346) contends that ethos may be 
dichotomized into latent and operative sectors. The latent sector 
is comprised of those values which are considered desirable by a 
large portion of the population but are thought to be too "idealistic 
or utopian" to be consistently practiced. The operative sector 
consists of what is really happening or what men believe is really
*This is not to say that the call for "further research" is 
unwarranted or illustrative of modesty. Its frequency suggests 
that the call is a norm of the scientist. This writer has never 
read an article which claimed final authority.
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happening in their society. Stated otherwise, we may say that the 
latent sector is comprised of ideals while the operative sector is 
comprised of institutions. Pieris argues that a society is in a 
state of "perfect" equilibrium when there is no discrepancy between 
the latent and operative sectors. To the extent that such a discrepancy 
exists a society is in "static" or "dynamic" equilibrium. "Static" 
refers to a stable discrepancy while "dynamic" refers to a changing 
degree of discrepancy. Pieris said that his use of ethos was 
derived from Weber’s understanding of culture— the result of man's 
attempts to relate value-ideas to empirical reality. According to 
Pieris, as the value-ideas fit less and £ess well with empirical 
reality a condition of "ideological entropy" exists wherein the 
"ethos is self contradictory." When such a discrepancy is unresolved 
the result is anomie.
The standing of a value-idea is an "ideal" implies that such 
a value-idea is beyond any specific situation. In pieris’ own terms, 
the latent sector is comprised of the desirable but believed to be 
unattainable modes of action. If this is the case, what populace 
would be upset to discover that empirical facts did not correspond 
to their "utopian" conceptions? Neither does it appear surprising 
that an ethos would or could be self contradictory since there is 
nothing inherently consistent about a set of values.* It may simply 
be a quirk of Pieris' definition but the counter-posing of latent
*Recall Becker's discussion of the long-run irrationality 
of values. It would that the same applies to a whole set of 
values.
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and operative sectors seems to imply an inherent self contradiction.
Ethos and the Parsonian Method
Parsons places considerable emphasis on the role played by 
values in human activity. Lipset paraphrased Parsons emphasis: 
"Beliefs and values are actualized, partially and imperfectly, in 
realistic situations of social interaction, and the outcomes are 
always co-determined by the values and the realistic exigencies 
(Lipset, 1963: 531)."
Value-orientation is essential for the definition of role- 
expectations which are themselves essential to social interaction. 
According to Parsons, there are five pairs which constitute the 
"pattern alternatives" of value orientations. They are:
A. Affectivity vs. Affective neutrality
"The polarity of affectivity-neutrality formulates the 
patterning out of action with respect to this basic 
alternative."
B. Self-Orientation vs. Collectivity-Orientation (The individual 
faces a choice of pursuing interests private to himself or 
shared with other.)
C. Universalism vs. Particularism
"The primacy of cognitive values may be said to imply a 
universalistic standard of role-expectation, while that 
of appreciative values implies a particularistic standard."
D. Achievement vs. Ascription
E. Specificity vs. Diffuseness
The scope of ego’s interest in the object. (Martindale,
1960: 489)
Lipset used these "pattern-variables" for a cross-cultural 
comparison of the United States and the U.S.S.R. According to Marsh, 
Lipset concluded that "they are similar in the emphasis on 
universalism, achievement, and specificity. They differ in that
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the United States is more self-oriented, or less collectivity 
oriented than the Soviet Union (Marsh, 1967: 28)."*
In a different context, Lipset tried to demonstrate the 
fruitfulness of the value perspective in comparative analysis.
In this article Lipset used the dimensions of elitism-equalitarian- 
ism, ascription-achievement, particularism-universalism and 
diffuseness-specificity. Lipset did no predicting. Instead, Lipset 
used historical facts to explain why Canada, Australia, the United 
States, and Great Britain varied with regard to the above dimensions.
The dimension of elitism-equalitarianism is a sort of overall 
characteristic which Lipset-derived from«the other three.
A society may emphasize that a person in his orientation 
toward others (1) treats them in terms of their abilities and 
performances or in terms of inherited qualities (achievement- 
ascription); (2) applies a standard or responds to some personal 
relationship (universalism-particularism); or (3) relates to a 
selective aspect of another or to many aspects (specificity- 
diffuseness). (Lipset, 1963: 515)
Lipset noted that Australia was less elitist than Canada, 
which was less elitist than Great Britain. Many would consider this 
a strange arrangement, Lipset contends, since all are parts of the 
British Commonwealth. The fact that they are members of the common­
wealth is not so important as are the historical conditions under 
which they originated. Among the conditions cited by Lipset are 
Great Britain's period of feudalism, Canada's loyalty during the 
American revolution, and Australia's beginnings as a penal colony.
Another study using the Parsonian pattern variables (Zurcher,
*Folsom and Strelsky would have agreed.
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Zurcher, and Meadows, 1965: 539-548) forwarded two hypotheses. The 
authors hypothesized that (1) particularism is influenced by culture 
and (2) that more particularistic individuals working in a universalis- 
tic setting would evidence higher alienation than less particularistic 
individuals. The groups chosen to represent different cultures 
were Mexicans, Mexican-Americans, and Anglo-Americans. The authors 
claimed that the first hypothesis was supported in that Mexicans 
scored higher than Mexican-Americans and Mexican-Americans scored 
higher than Anglo Americans on a scale of particularism. The results 
for the second proposition were in the right direction but were not 
statistically significant. - -
The articles by Lipset and Zurcher are attempts to use the 
pattern alternatives developed by Parsons. As a method of analysis 
it has the advantage of being able to compare different cultures 
and intracultural groups on the same dimensions. The source of 
advantages for this method— a limited number of dimensions, each of 
which covers a total range— is also the source of disadvantages with 
respect to ethos. Though Parsons’ method allows societies to be 
typed systematically, it does not provide a means for determining 
a unique style or character of a society. In this respect, Parsons' 
pattern alternatives and ethos are complementary rather than 
alternative concepts for social analysis. For example, Lipset 
found that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are similar in their emphasis 
on "achievement." On the other hand, Parsons' method would not be 
able to discover that "Russian school children ranked bankers and 
priests near the bottom of the-occupational prestige scale, while 
American children ranked these near the top (Folsom and Strelsky,
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1944: 300)." In other words, Parsons' method focuses in five
dimensions while the method used by Folsom and Strelsky permits
a degree of detail which is limited only by their curiosity.
The use of pattern alternatives in particular, and values in
general, as dependent and independent variables has received
criticism. Lipset had written that "events structure institutionalized
arrangements (values) and predispositions and these in turn determine
later events (Lipset, 1963: 530)." Of Lipset, Marsh writes:
Values are analyzed as both dependent and independent variables.
As dependent variables, current values are said to be determined 
by factors in the history of nations in question. But where 
Lipset uses values as independent variables, he is not always 
very precise about the,relationship between values and behavior.
We find statements like "behavior 'reflects' values" or "values 
are 'manifested' in behavior.”. . .
. . . Pattern-variables and other techniques for stating the 
value orientations of societies are powerful tools for concise 
description. However, since comparativists want not only to 
describe, but to explain and predict as well, it follows that 
we cannot rely solely on "value" approaches like that of Lipset 
at this time. (Marsh, 1967: 28-29)
Three Cross-Cultural Approaches to Ethos 
It is generally the case that a societies conception of ideal 
man can be inferred from an examination of their expressed preference 
with regard to values in general. This idea is not unlike the one 
which says that man's conception of the "good" is’ influenced by his 
conception of the "true." "There can be no doubt that an individual's 
or a group's conception of what is and what ought to be are inti­
mately connected (Kluckhohn, 1951: 391)." Like the difference between
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the existential and the evaluative* "ethos and ethics" are connected; 
this is frequently the case where studies do not concentrate on one 
or another of these aspects but simply study complexes— the nature 
of man and the style of society are mixed. The three studies or 
approaches to be discussed in this section have been cited with great 
frequency** by other students of values. Each of the three takes 
a different approach to values. The method used by Morris is the 
oldest of the three and in all likelihood his method has passed its 
apex of influence. The method used by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck is 
the single most influential approach in the study of values. The 
method used by Rokeach, appearing in 1973, has not as yet passed the 
test of time. In terms of the number of citations which this work 
by Rokeach has received, it is not possible at this time to assess 
its impact.
Charles Morris
In 1942 Charles Morris published a book entitled Paths of Life. 
His method relies in the rank-ordering of "13 ways to live."
(1) Preserve the best that man has attained
(2) Cultivate independence of persons and things.
(3) Show sympathetic concern for others.
(4) Act and enjoy life through group participation.
(5) Experience festivity and solitude in alternation.
(6) Constantly master changing situations.
(7) Integrate action, enjoyment, and contemplation.
(8) Live with wholesome, carefree enjoyment.
*This difference, which this writer recognizes as a convention, 
is most obvious where two people agree on the "facts" but disagree 
on the "good."
**Rokeach is the exception in terms of his most recent book.
He is recognized as an authority on values in psychology but 
receives only scant reference in sociology.
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(9) Wait in quiet receptivity.
(10) Control the self stoically.
(11) Meditate on the inner life.
(12) Chance adventuresome deeds.
(13) Obey the cosmic purposes. (Morris in Marsh, 1967: 223)
Using a Likert scale of numerical values Morris claimed "the
attainment of a cross-cultural interval scale for measuring values 
(Marsh, 1967: 224)." The computed means for the 13 ways can be 
compared in at least two ways. First, the mean scores of countries 
for any particular "way" can be compared. Second, the ways can be 
ranked to show relative popularity in any particular country.
Further analysis by Morris made use of the statistic "D."*
The statistic "D" shows which societies have the largest differences 
and the greatest similarities. For instance, the greatest differences 
were between "(1) U.S. and China, (2) U.S. and India, and (3) Japan 
and China. The greatest cultural similarities on the ways to live 
values are between (1) the U.S. and Norway, (2) India and Japan, 
and (3) Japan and Norway (Marsh, 1967: 226)."**
The benefits and drawbacks of Morris' method are similar to 
those of Parsons' pattern variables. It is not as detailed or 
comprehensive as the Folsom and Strelsky type but it is more 
economical in terms of time and lends itself to statistical treat­
ment. Morris' method dictates that the 13 ways are presented as 
they are to the respondents. Parsons method on the other hand, can
*The statistic "D" is computed as follows: D = , where
"d" is equal to the difference between two countries mean scores on 
each way to live. (Marsh, 1967: 225)
**Morris compared Canada, the United States, India, China, 
Norway, and Japan.
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make use of situations which are realistic to the respondents; their 
position on the five pairs is inferred from their responses. Morris' 
items are stated in idealized form rather than in the more precise 
form of customary norms. Both forms could be used with Parsons' 
method.
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 
The approach used by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck is based upon a 
three-part conception of psychology. The authors noted three 
integrated elements which enable and confine valuation. These 
three elements are the cognitive, the affective, and selective.*
The combination of these three elements results in a "directive 
tendency" for valuing. The distinction between "selectiveness" and 
"directiveness" is unclear except that a "directive tendency . 
aids in the selection among possible value systems and also serves 
to give continuity to the total system (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 
1961: 8)."
Directiveness appears to be causally important in at least two 
senses. First, although the several authors cited above have 
argued strongly and convincingly that the cognitive and 
affective elements are inextricably interrelated, they do not 
go far in indicating the "why" of the interrelationship other 
than stating that it appears an irrefutable fact that what a 
people believe to be true (existential premises) is strongly 
influenced’ by their normative judgements and that contrariwise 
the normative assumptions as to what is right and proper are 
never truly separable from the existential premises.
Selectivity is discussed as an element of the total process, 
but it is not clearly defined as an element which is 
distinctive in having relating (integrating) and directive 
(processual guiding) influences upon the other elements. It 
is our view that to the extent that the cognitive and affective
*Parsons' three-part conception is the same except that he 
uses "evaluative" where Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck use "selective"; 
they seem equivalent.
180
aspects of the process are a unity it is because of the 
directive element, which is as much, or perhaps even more, 
biologically given than are the capacities for either 
intellection or affectivity.
It is on this basis that we state that in the concept of 
a value orientation as a guiding principle, it is the directive 
element which is of primary interest. This is the second way 
in which the element may be considered as a critically causal 
one. Any given value system of human beings has both a content 
and a direction which derive from biologically given capacities 
and predispositions but are not instinct bound, but it is the 
directive aspect which is most crucial for the understanding of 
both the integration of the total value system and its continuity 
through time. (Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961: 9)
A value orientation has five dimensions. The authors formulated 
these dimensions on three assumptions: (1) "There is a limited number
of common human problems for which all people at all times must find 
some solution"; (2) there is variability in solutions to all the 
problems, but "it is neither limitless nor random but is definitely 
variable within a range of possible solutions"; (3) "all alternatives 
of all solutions are present in all societies at all times but are 
differentially preferred." Each society has "variant" or "substitute" 
profiles in addition to its dominant profile of value orientations. 
There is almost always a rank-ordering of the preferences or 
alternatives.
The five dimensions (areas of "common human problems") are 
human nature (good, good-and-evil, evil), man-nature (mastery over, 
harmony with, subjugation to), time (past, present, future), 
activity (being, being-in-becoming, doing), and relational 
(individualistic, collaterality, lineality). In their research 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck did not use the "good" alternative for the 
human nature dimension because of the lack of societies with such
a positive view. Each of the five dimensions is ranked within
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itself. For example, a person may rank time as "present" is more 
important than "future" which is more important than "past."
Societies or cultures are compared on each dimension as compared 
with the rankings in another society.
The authors used a twenty-two item interview schedule to
determine an individual's position with regard to the five dimensions.
The items were distributed among the five dimensions almost equally.
For each item the individual was given three choices each of which
implied a different orientation. The following is an example of one
item from the "relational" dimension.
When a community has to'make arrangenfents for water, such as 
drill a well, there are three different ways they can decide 
to arrange things like location, and who is going to do the 
work.
A. There are some communities where it is mainly the older 
or recognized leaders of the important families who decide the 
plans. Everyone usually accepts what they say without much 
discussion since they are the ones who are used to deciding 
such things and are the ones who have the most experience.
B. There are some communities where everyone holds to his 
own opinion, and they decide the matter by vote. They do what 
the largest number want even though there are still a very great 
many people who disagree and object to the action.
C. There are some communities where most people in the 
group have a part in making the plans. Lots of different people 
talk, but nothing is done until almost everyone comes to agree 
as to what is best to be done.
Which way do you think is usually best in such cases?
Which of the other two ways do you think is better?
Which way of all three ways do you think most other persons
in would usually think is best? (Marsh, 1967:
244)
The particular task which is given as an example may be changed for 
different cultures and environmental conditions so as to be more 
realistic to the respondents.
The authors theorized that it was inadequate to speak simply 
of the "dominant values" because this fails to recognize the importance
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of acceptable alternatives. It must be recognized that social groups 
also have variant rank-orders within the dimensions which are also 
acceptable. The elements of each dimension are referred to as 
"basic values." The authors hypothesized that it is through 
persons holding "variant" orientations that change is most likely 
to occur. The stimulus for this change must be external. The 
greater the variance in the orientations of a societies members 
the more susceptible to external forces will that society be.
The implications which Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s conception 
of value orientation has for understanding change is based on "two 
major theoretical formulations."
First, and most important, is conceptualization of the 
variation in value orientations of a culture as an interlocking 
network of dominant (most preferred) value orientations and 
variant value orientations which are both required and 
permitted. . . .
The second major deductive proposition is: The difference
between the value-orient at ion systems of seemingly quite 
distinctive cultures, as well as those between the varying 
segments within a given culture, are not absolute. Instead 
they are the representatives of varying rank orderings of the 
same value-orientation components which are common to all 
cultures at all times.
The theory also postulates, as do other of the theories 
which treat of basic values, that most of the observable 
patterns of action and thought give simultaneous expression to 
all of the value elements. The degree of influence of one or 
another of the value orientations upon a particular concrete 
behavior pattern may be appreciably greater than that of 
others, but it is not often that any one of them has no effect 
at all. Therefore it follows that systems of value orienta­
tions must be examined for the degree of congruence each of 
the value components has with the others. This is obviously 
a task of great complexity when it is rank orders of value 
orientations and not just single dominant values which must 
be considered- But however complex the analysis may be, it 
is essential to the evaluation of the type and degree of 
cultural integration a social system has and its distinctive 
resistances and susceptibilities to change. (Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck, 1961: 341-342)
The ordering of each dimension would yield thirteen possible
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logical types. The thirteen possible orderings for the relational 
dimension are as follows:
Pure Rank-Order Types
1. Individualism over Collaterality over lineality. This is 
expressed as Ind>Coll>Lin
2. Ind>Lin>Coll
3. Coll>Ind>Lin
4. Coll>Lin>Ind
5. Lin>Coll>Ind
6. Lin>Ind>Coll
Linked First-Order Types
7. Individualism equals Collaterality over lineality. This is 
expressed as Ind>Coll>Lin
8. Ind>Lin>Coll
9. Coll_>Lin>Ind
Linked Second-Order Types
10. Individualism over Collaterality equals Lineality. This is 
expressed as Ind>Coll>Lin
11. Lin>Coll>Tnd
12. Coll>Ind>Lin
Nonordered Types
13. Individualism equals Lineality equals Collaterality (that 
is, there is virtually equal stress on all value orientation 
alternatives in the society) . This is expressed as Ind_>Lin>_ 
Coll. If the frequencies of preference for two pairs of 
alternatives are exactly equal, the notation would be, for 
example, Ind>Lin = Coll. (Marsh, 1967: 242)
For all dimensions, Type 13 was predicted to be uncommon.
Types seven through thirteen were understood as indications of
change. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck argued that two alternatives
which receive equal stress suggests that one of the two had been
the dominant member of the pair. According to Marsh:
An equal preference for Individualism and Collaterality, for 
example, would suggest that the society had previously preferred 
either Individualism or Collaterality but was not moving toward 
a preference for the other alternative: at the time of the 
study the society was caught in transition between the two 
alternatives. (Marsh, 1967: 243)
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck used a one-way analysis of variance 
to determine if the intercultural differences were significant 
relative to the intracultural differences. They found that "inter- 
cultural differences are significant at the .001 level relative to 
intra-cultural differences in means (Marsh, 1967: 249)." Table 1 
is a graphic interpretation which Marsh used to illustrate the 
confidence which a researcher may have in his statistics on cultural 
differences. The treatment given by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck revealed 
three categories for the Doing-Being dimension on the basis of mean 
values: "(1) the Doing-oriented Navaho, Mormons, and Texans;
(2) the Doing-Being-oriented Zuni: (3) tiie Being-oriented Spanish- 
Americans (Marsh, 1967: 250)." This means that the three groups in 
the first category are not significantly different.
TABLE 1
MEAN VALUES OF THE FIVE RIMROCK COMMUNITIES 
ON THE DOING-BEING DIMENSION
Morm<
Navaho — j
\l \
3 ns
T< 
/ \
sxas Spanish- 
Zuni
! M  \
-Americans
/
6 5 4 3 2 1 0 
Doing Being Doing = Being Being Doing
(Marsh adaptation of Kluckhohn and- Strodtbeck, 1967: 250)*
The utility of a construction such as Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck1s
*This table corresponds to Marsh’s Table 20.
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Value Orientation would be enhanced considerably if it could be 
related to other types of social analysis.* Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck hypothesized relationships between the "dominant value 
orientation patterns" and institutional "spheres." These spheres 
were designated as the economic-technological, the religious, the 
recreational, and the intellectual-aesthetic. Marsh reiterated 
three of» these hypotheses:
1. Dominant value orientations of Individualism, the Future, 
Mastery-over-Nature, Doing, and an Evil-but-Perfectible 
human nature are associated with giving priority to the 
economic-technological sphere.
*The work by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck was the result of the 
Values Project conducted through Harvard University. There was a 
great deal of work done in this Project and many people were 
involved. Evon Vogt and Thomas O'dea worked in this project and 
published a study in 1953 which was concerned with the Mormon and 
Texan communities. Rimrock was the Mormon settlement and Homestead 
was the Texan settlement. The communities had highly similar 
environmental-ecological features.
Rimrock was characterized by "community cooperation." The town 
developed an irrigation system with funds provided by the Church; 
operation is paid for by equal dues from the townspeople. A school 
was built by a contribution of either funds or labor. The streets 
were graveled by the same method.
Homestead, on the other hand, developed no irrigation system 
(partly because they lacked an appropriate source of water), a half 
built gymnasium, and partially graveled streets.
Vogt and O'dea argued that such diverse paths of development 
are attributable to different value orientations. The major differ­
ence is Homestead's preference for individual action. Wells were 
dug to supply water. Contributions to the gymnasium were voluntary. 
The streets were graveled according to the individual's willingness 
to pay for the section in front of his property.
The settlers of Rimrock arrived with a pre-established bond—  
religion. Homestead settlers had no such bond. They were mostly 
protestant and lacked the "clanish" propensity which they saw in their 
neighboring community.
In this particular case, the different patterns of community 
development is attributed to the orientation of Individualism to 
a far greater degree than any other element.
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2. Dominant value orientations of Lineality, the Present, 
Subjugation-to-Nature, Being, and Good-and Evil mutable 
human nature are associated with giving priority to a 
fusion of the religious and recreational spheres.
3. Dominant value orientations of Being-in-Becoming, Harmony- 
with-Nature, Lineality or Collaterality, and the Past or 
(less probably) the Present are associated with giving 
priority to the intellectual-aesthetic sphere. (Marsh,
1967: 252)
Unfortunately, no effort was made to test these hypotheses 
statistically.
In the sense of ethos, the value orientation method of Kluckhohn 
and Strodtbeck has the advantages of being systematic, amenable to 
cross-cultural study, and lends itself to statistical treatment. Of 
course, the value orientation method does not provide the detailed 
description of an ethos which is found in the Folsom and Strelsky 
approach. Rather, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck*s method seems particu­
larly effective as a means of classifying or categorizing "types" 
of ethos.
In the sense of ethics, the value orientation method as applied 
by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck reveals little. Since the authors were 
able to generate hypotheses relating value orientations to dominant 
institutional spheres it is plausible that the same could be done 
for dominant ethics. The orientations listed in Hypothesis #1 are 
strikingly similar to the Calvinist perspective in particular, and 
the more general "protestant ethic." The dominant institutional 
sphere in Hypothesis #1— economic-technological— is the sphere one 
might expect to be dominant where the "protestant ethic" is the major 
ethic. The dominant value orientation in Hypothesis #2 corresponds 
to the Confucian Ethic. As delineated by Weber, China was dominated
187
by its recreational sphere. The intellectual sphere would be more
correct. The intellectual sphere in China was dominated by the
"literati." Their intellectual pursuits, however, were directed at
a thorough understanding of the "classics." The "classics” are of
*
a religious nature.
Rokeach
The approach used by Rokeach is different from that used by
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck. While the later used items referring to
necessary existential judgments, Rokeach used "named" values which
may or may not be translated with equivalent meaning to another
6 * * 
language. For Rokeach:
A value is an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct 
or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable 
to an opposite or converse mode of existence. A value system 
is an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable 
modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum 
of importance. (Rokeach, 1973: 5)
This definition of value and the manner in which it is applied is
based on five assumptions:
(1) The total number of values that a person possessed is 
relatively small; (2) all men everywhere possess the same 
values to different degrees; (3) values are organized into 
value systems; (4) the antecedents of human values can be 
traced to culture, society and its institutions, and per­
sonality; (5) the consequences of human values will be 
manifested in virtually all phenomena that social scientists 
might consider worth investigating. (Rokeach, 1973: 3)
Rokeach divided his values into "instrumental" and "terminal"
groups. This is Rokeach's rephrasing of the means-ends distinction.
Instrumental refers to behavioral modes while terminal refers to
end-states of existence— as such they are ideals.
To say that a person has a value is to say that he has an 
enduring prescriptive or proscriptive belief that a specific
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mode of behavior or end-state of existence is preferred to an 
oppositive mode of behavior or end-state. This belief 
transcends attitudes toward objects and towards situations; it 
is a standard that guides and determines action, attitudes 
towards objects and situations, ideology, presentations of 
self to others, and attempts to influence others. Values 
serve adjustive, ego-defensive, knowledge and self-actualizing 
functions. Instrumental and terminal values are related 
yet are separately organized into relatively enduring 
hierarchical organizations along a continuum of importance. 
(Rokeach, 1973: 25)
RokeachTs lists of instrumental and terminal values contain 
eighteen items each. The lists which comprise his "Value Survey" 
have been revised. According to Rokeach, form "D" is the most 
reliable and is in widest use.
Rokeach1 s list of terminal values cfame from several sources. 
Besides the values named in "the literature" Rokeach used his own 
terminal values, those obtained from about thirty graduate students 
in psychology, and from a "representative sample" of 100 adults in 
metropolitan Lansing (Rokeach, 1973: 29).
The list of instrumental values was obtained through Anderson's
(1968) list of 555 "personality trait words" for which he has
reported positive or negative evaluative ratings. Rokeach had a
list of 200 after eliminating words with negative meaning.
The 18 instrumental values were selected from this list according 
to several criteria: by retaining only one from a group of
synonyms or near-synonyms . . . ; by retaining those judged to 
be maximally different from or mimimally intercorrelated with 
one another; by retaining those judged to represent the most 
important values in American society; by retaining those deemed 
to be maximally discriminating across social status, sex, race, 
age, religion, politics, etc.; by retaining those judged to be 
meaningful values in all cultures; and by retaining those one 
could readily admit to having without appearing to be immodest, 
vain or boastful (thus eliminating such values as being 
brilliant, clever, ingenious, and charming). (Rokeach, 1973:
30)
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TABLE 2*
TEST-RETEST RELIABILITIES OF 18 TERMINAL AND 
18 INSTRUMENTAL VALUES, FORM D (N=250)
Terminal Value r Instrumental Value r
A comfortable life .70 Ambitious .70
(a prosperous life) (hard working, aspiring)
An exciting life .73 Broadminded .57
(a stimulating, active life) (open-minded)
A sense of accomplishment .51 Capable .51
(lasting contribution) (competent, effective)
A world at peace .67 Cheerful .65
(free of war and conflict) (lighthearted, joyful)
A world of beauty . 66 Clean .66
(beauty of nature and the arts) (neat, tidy)
Equality (brotherhood, equal .71 Courageous .52
opportunity for all) (standing up for your beliefs
Family security .64 Forgiving .62
(taking care of loved ones) (willing to pardon others)
Freedom .61 Helpful (working for the .66
(indepenpence, free choice) welfare of others)
Happiness .62 Honest .62
(contentedness) (sincere, truthful)
Inner harmony .65 Imaginative .69
(freedom from inner conflict) (daring, creative)
Mature love (sexual .68 Independent (self- .60
and spiritual intimacy) reliant, self-sufficient)
National security .67 Intellectual .67
(protection from attack) (intelligent, reflective)
Pleasure .57 Logical .57
(an enjoyable, leisurely life) (consistent, rational)
Salvation .88 Loving .65
(saved, eternal life) (affectionate, tender)
Self-respect .58 Obedient .53
(self-esteem) (dutiful, respectful)
Social recognition .65 Polite .53
(respect, ad.miration) (courteous, well-mannered)
True friendship .59 Responsible .45
(close companionship) (dependable, reliable)
Wisdom (a mature under­ .60 Self-controlled .52
standing of life) (restrained, self-
disciplined)
(Rokeach, 1973: 28)
*This table corresponds to Rokeachfs Table 2.1.
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Each list is numbered from 1 through 18 with a blank space 
after each number. The respondent places gummed labels, on which is 
indicated a particular value, in order of importance to him, in the 
eighteen blanks. The resulting hierarchies may be compared with 
respect to individuals or the mean scores for each value may be 
used to compare groups.
The Nature of Human Values is a large book with a considerable 
number of topics.* A few of RokeachTs findings may be of interest.
When Rokeach controlled for occupation and compared those who 
planned to enter a specific occupation with those already practicing 
in the field he failed to find significant differences between them 
relative to other occupational groups.
For men and women in the "National” sample Rokeach found 
that the sexes varied in the importance placed on several values.
One might anticipate the differences: men place a significantly
higher value on "an exciting life, a sense of accomplishment, freedom, 
pleasure, social recognition, ambition, capable, imaginative, and 
logical"; women place higher value on "a world at peace, happiness, 
inner harmony, salvation, self respect, wisdom, cheerful, clean, 
forgiving, and loving (Rokeach, 1973: 58)."
"Clean" is the value which is most distinguishing of the rich 
and the poor. The poor rank "clean" second as opposed to seventeenth 
for the rich. The next most distinctive value for these groups is 
"comfortable life." The poor rank it sixth as opposed to fifteenth
*The use of values in distinguishing ideologies is discussed 
in Chapter VI.
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for the rich. Rokeach warns, however, that it is not safe to assume 
that people will value most what they don’t have. As an example of 
what people neither have nor want Rokeach gives us "imaginative’' 
and "intellectual." These two values were ranked low by most 
Americans.
Rokeach also called into question the "culture of poverty" 
thesis. If there is a culture of poverty, he explains, then we 
should find the values of the poor Black even among Blacks who are 
not poor or uneducated. First, he notes, we do not find the usual 
stigmata of hedonism more among Blacks than among Whites. "Exciting 
life" and "pleasure" are ranked the same by both groups, seventeenth 
and eighteenth respectively. "Self controlled," on the other hand, 
is ranked in the middle by both groups. When SES differences are 
controlled, the differences in value ranking disappears with the 
exception of "equality" which is still more highly valued by Blacks 
(second as opposed to twelfth). According to Rokeach, these findings 
are in direct opposition to Moynihan's conclusion of a distinct 
cultural difference between Blacks and Whites. Rokeach argues, 
aspirational (terminal) values are very similar among Blacks and 
Whites while it is the values most closely associated with adaptation 
(instrumental)- which show the greatest differences.
Ethics
The use of the term "ethic" in sociological literature is most 
frequently attributed to Max Weber. The "protestant ethic" is the 
most famous of the ethics which Weber discussed. Weber was not 
satisfied with the Marxian conception of economic institutions,
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or structural forms in general, as the determinant of future structures 
and ideas.
. . .Weber could affirm: Specific economic conditions do not
guarantee the rise of capitalism; at least one other condition 
is necessary, one that belongs to man's inner world. There 
must be, in other words, a specific motive power, the psychologi­
cal acceptance of values and ideas favorable to the change. 
(Timasheff, 1955: 172)
Weber conceived of these "values and ideas" as an "economic ethic."
"The term 'economic ethic' points to the practical impulses for
action which are founded in the psychological and pragmatic context
of religions (Gerth and Mills, 1946: 267)."
Weber's thesis on the relation of the protestant ethic to the 
development of modern capitalism may be criticized on other 
counts, but four points seem incontestable: (1) The religious
ideas and values of ascetic protestantism tally point for point 
with the ideas and motives "required" for. disciplined, ration­
alized, persistent capitalistic effort; (2) protestantism did 
precede the rise of capitalism in many areas (although not in 
others, such as northern Italy); (3) religious attitudes were 
only one of several primary causes for the development of 
capitalism, but were equally indespensable for the specific 
structure of the latter; (4) the specifically religious ideas 
evolved in a complex mutual interrelation between an environing 
social structure, a complex of religious interests (for instance, 
a sense of sin and a need for salvation), and other specifiable 
social elements. (Williams, 1951: 368)
Weber not only demonstrated that protestantism, for the most
part, preceded capitalism, but showed that capitalism did not
arise in places where the structural conditions were favorable.
. . . Tfeber tried to prove his thesis on the Chinese case by 
three steps: (1) Chinese social structure on the "material"
conditions contained a mixture of elements both favorable 
and unfavorable to capitalistic economy and the spirit of 
capitalism. Thus, the structural characteristics could not 
be a decisive factor in China's failure to develop capitalism.
(2) Confucianism, the dominant system of ultimate values, was 
consistently traditionalistic, enjoining adaptation to the 
given world and not transformation of it. (3) Taoism, the 
leading heterodoxy, was unable to alter the Confucian tradi­
tionalist trend because of its otherworldly mysticism and its
/
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own magical tradition. The consequence was that Confucian 
traditionalism was left in its dominant position which, 
together with the literati's lack of interest in economic 
production enterprises, inhibited socioeconomic innovation in 
the direction of western capitalism. (Yang in Weber, 1964:
XXXVI)
Weber’s use of ethic does not depart from the present under­
standing of an ethic as a diffuse set of values. As such, thorough 
descriptions of ethics tend to forgo simple point for point state­
ments. Weber’s description of the Confucian ethic is no different. 
Weber’s most general description of Confucisnism is also the shortest.
. . . Confucianism exclusively represented an innerworldly 
morality of laymen. Confucianism meant adjustment to the 
world, to its orders and conventions. Ultimately it represented 
just a tremendous codeof political maxims and rules of social 
propriety for cultured men of the world. (Weber, Yang ed.,
1964: 152)
Among the most important elements of the Confucian ethic 
discussed by Weber are piety, propriety, pacifism, and knowledge.
"For Confucianism the last word was ’knowledge,’ and that meant 
knowledge of tradition and of the classical norms as acquired 
through literary studies (Weber, Yang ed., 1964: 169).” For 
Confucious, the embodiment of all these qualities to the highest 
degree was called "manhood-at-its-best."*
*This is" curiously similar to Sumner’s concept of "man-as-he- 
should-be." His formulations in this regard are as follows:
Group ideals may be types of character. In the Old Testament 
the ideal type is the "just man," who conformed to ritual standards 
at all points.
In modern English-speaking society the "gentleman" is the 
name for man-as-he-should-be. The type is not fixed and the defini­
tion is not established. It is a collective and social ideal. 
Gentlemen are a group in society who have selected a code and 
standard of conduct as most conducive to properous and pleasant 
social relations. Therefore manners are an essential element of
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Ralph Linton also discussed constellations of values which 
centered about conceptions of man though he did not call them 
"ethics" nor consider them under a specific concept.
. . . they think of a particular system of interests as 
a unit. All societies recognize such systems, although their 
members may have great difficulty in verbalizing them, and 
express them in concepts such as our own concept of what 
constitutes "a lady" or "a gentleman" or "the good life." . . . 
Everyone in our society feels that he knows what constitutes 
a gentleman, but anyone will find that he has considerable 
difficulty in putting the concept into words. A moments intro­
spection will convince any reader that his picture of what a 
gentleman does with respect to a whole series of situations 
is very much clearer than his picture of the interests and 
ratings which motivate this conduct. Nevertheless, the concept 
of the gentlemen is an effective element in our culture. It 
cannot be dismissed as a mere abstraction which the observer 
derives from his dbservation of behavior patterns. Vague 
and poorly verbalized as it is, it provides a code which has 
a profound influence on the lives of many individuals. It 
gives added emotional significance to certain of our cultures 
patterns of behavior, thus ensuring their expression, and 
guides the individual in situations for which no patterns 
exist. (Linton, 1936: 436)
Linton’s inclusion of "the good life" extends his meaning 
beyond ethics. In a sense, Linton seems to be describing ideals 
in general and ideal man specifically. Of course, ethics contain 
ideals. Parsons’ "Status-Roles" is similar except that the concept 
of "ethic" and the examples given by Linton imply that high esteem 
is given to the role or position in question. Parsons’ status- 
roles— "positions plus the activities appropriate to them"— lacks 
any notion of Personality Cynosure. It is plausible that particular 
status roles have a concentration of esteem to the extent that a
this type. . . . Novels develop and transmit the ideal; . . .
A gentleman of today in the society of a century ago would be 
thought to have rowdy manners. Artificial manners are not in the 
taste of our time; athletics are. The "gentleman" always tends to 
an arbitrary definition. (Sumner, 1906: 203, 206-207)
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particular personality type and emulation are associated with it.
Generally speaking, an ethic is a large-order conception.
The "protestant ethic" may be manifested in businessmen, doctors, 
students, or whoever. The "scientific ethic" may be endorsed by 
many people having only the vaguest notion of what science, or the 
practice of it, is really about. Advertising frequently makes its 
appeals by noting that some product has been "scientifically proven," 
"tested under rigid laboratory controls," etc. The foundation or 
rationale for this type of appeal is that people believe in science. 
To the extent that many people share a belief or appreciation of 
them, we may say that the protestant ethic and the scientific ethic 
are major ethics.
On a smaller scale we might think of particular status-roles 
as minor ethics. Doctors, lawyers, and professors evoke an image 
in peoples minds of the typical doctor, lawyer, or professor. 
Generally, these occupations are considered "professions." These 
occupations have high status or prestige. These occupations are 
formally or informally governed by a code of ethics. In a study 
entitled "Social Cohesion Through Variant Values: Evidence From
Medical Role Relations" (Turk, 1963: 28-37) the author expected that 
a student physician-student nurse team would be more cohesive if the 
values which each held with regard to’the patient were different.
In operational terms, Turk expected that a "bureaucratically 
oriented" student physician (as defined by responses to a rules and 
regulations type questionnaire) teamed with a non-bureaucratically 
oriented student nurse would work together better and have fewer 
conflicts than if the members of the team were oriented the same.
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In his bureaucratic way, the student physician would be concerned 
with the patient as an "organic system" which may or may not 
malfunction. The student nurse would be concerned with the patient 
as a person. As a result there would be no conflict of function.
The hypothesis was supported.
Turk explained these results as an indication that differing 
values may be a source of cohesiveness. This interpretation is 
partially correct. However, only some values are different. The 
particular role or image of the role played by the other is the 
framework within which the doctor and nurse function. If the doctor 
behaved as the nurse then the nurse might* be puzzled or annoyed. Turk 
ignored the larger concept under which the doctor and nurse are working. 
Specifically, both hope that the patient will improve^as a result of 
their treatment. Both, if you will, are working under the same ethic 
or principle or code with only minor variations in their practice of 
that ethic.
The "ethic approach" to value research is a convenient label 
for those studies which focus on particular persons, fictional or 
otherwise, as cultural examples of good or praiseworthy qualities. 
"Culture heroes, for example, are significant indexes of values of high 
generality and esteem (Williams, 1951: 448)." It was noted earlier 
that Americans placed a higher value on achievement than upon 
ascription (Lipset in Marsh, 1967: 28). In "New Light on Changing 
American Values" (Greenstein, 1965: 441-450) the author rejected 
the "widely accepted" views of Riesman and Whyte that personal 
achievement is less valued than in the past. According to Greenstein, 
Riesman arrived at his conclusion by noting a change from an "age of
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production" to an "age of consumption"; a shift from inner to other- 
directed modes of conformity. By considering the results of old 
survey data (1896-1910) on "hero-worship" Greenstein was able to 
conclude that values have not shifted so radically as others have 
suggested. The basic shift has gone from national heroes to enter­
tainment figures. Though business and political leaders are not 
common "exemplars" now, they were not common at the time of the 
survey. "However, there is no evidence to interpret these changes 
as evidence of declining aspiration levels (Greenstein, 1964: 450)."
One writer was willing to argue that the study of ethics (the
emulations of those ethics particularly) 'would be the remedy for
the deficiencies between sociology and social anthropology.
Goldschmidt (1953: 287-293) said that social anthropology should be
directed towards establishing "(1) general social imperatives, and
(2) requisite functional relationships between certain cultural forms
in different departments of social life (Goldschmidt, 1953: 293)."
According to Goldschmidt, sociology has tended toward broad general
theorizing while social anthropology and ethnography have been very
concerned with enumerating cultural particulars. A middle ground is
needed. As an example of this middle ground Goldschmidt suggested
the concept of "arete."
The Greek word "arete" carries the meaning of those qualities 
of person, circumstance, and position that distinguish an 
individual of honor from the run of the mill, and hence those 
qualities which are the desiderata, the goals, the hopes and 
expectations of every proper person within a culture. 
(Goldschmidt, 1953: 287)
Goldschmidt did a fair job of demonstrating that arete symbols 
can be viewed in functional terms. First, land as a value symbol
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has a "requisite functional relationship" with the character of the 
economy. Second, the relationship is not always functionally 
positive or negative. Third, the direction of the relationship may 
be discovered by looking at the relationship between land and the 
esteemed members of the society.
A Note on Ethical Theories 
In a previous quotation, Linton indicates that ethics may help 
to guide men "in situations for which no patterns exist." The study 
of complexes of this type provides some indication as to how people 
might behave given some proximate ethic. On the other side of the
• * 4
coin, we find the intentionally constructed ethics which a writer 
may suggest as a solution to contemporary problems or as a prediction 
of future values. Constructed ethics usually lack an example or 
emulation of the man representative of the ethic. As such, 
constructed ethics appear more as ethical theories. Usually these 
theories are criticized on the grounds that "moral values cannot be 
derived from natural data nor from science . . . (Allport in Maslow, 
1959: 137)."* Allport provided the following types as examples of 
ethical theory which "fare badly" under social scientific analysis.
Asceticism— according to this view morality is largely a matter 
of repression or negation— a denial of much or most 
of man’s endowment for growth.
Authoritarian Morality— . . . defines goodness merely in terms
of obedience. . •. . the result, we know, 
is stultification, tyranny, and war and 
therefore the destruction of virtually 
all values.
*Though Allport is a psychologist and, as such, is outside the 
concern of this paper, his criticisms are not bound to any discipline.
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Legalistic Theories— . . . the letter of the law, being inflexible,
does not guide men in the novel and changing 
encounters of daily life.
Utopian— theories are inept . . . because they plot no pathway from 
today's quandaries to the ultimate beatitude they depict.
Utilitarian Ethics— . . . fixed men's minds on a will o' the wisp.
. Happiness can never be a tangible goal; it 
can only be a by-product of otherwise moti­
vated activity. (Allport in Maslow, 1959:
138)
Conclusion
An ethos is a diffuse constellation of values which, when taken 
together, represents a society's unique style. There are numerous 
approaches for such cultural characterizations. John Sirjamaki 
thought that an ethos was comprised of the moral principles which 
make-up the social philosophy of a society. Milton Albrecht argued 
that common cultural values are "reflected" in literature. Robin 
Williams noted that cultural heroes are significant indexes of 
values. The ethics— the guides for living and the type of person 
representative of it-— are intermixed with depictions of ethos. As 
is often the case, a cultural style or national character is 
described as though it were a person.
What can we do with the variety of approaches to depicting 
ethos? There is no indication as yet that Rokeach's method will 
work cross-culturally. Though Rokeach says that his lists contain 
items "judged to be meaningful in all cultures," this writer is not 
aware of any effort to test this judgment. If Rokeach's method were 
applied to ethos its meaning would fall between Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck and Folsom and Strelsky. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 
specify five existential judgments which may be, and usually are
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implicit. Folsom and Strelsky are wide ranging. They discuss 
relationships between men and objects, language, other countries, 
time, space, topology, etc. Rokeach specifies particular values 
stated in idealized form. A different meaning is derived from a 
description which says that a culture values a sense of accomplish­
ment, social recognition, and "ambitious," than when a description 
says a culture emphasizes the "Doing" alternative of the "Activity" 
dimension.
Rokeach said that the five dimensions of Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck can more aptly be thought of as "basic philosophical 
orientations than as value orientations." In a sense he is right. 
Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck call their alternatives "basic values."
This implies a framework within which other values are organized.
Such a framework is literally an orientation. On the other hand, 
Rokeach’s use of idealized values is only slightly less "philosophi­
cal." This is only because each of his values implies a content— a 
content which is specifically behavioral. Since Kluckhohn and 
Strodtbeck confront their respondents with concrete situations to 
which they must react, their method seems a more reliable basis for 
predicting behavior than Rokeach’s instruction: "Study the list
carefully and pick out the one value which is most important for 
you. . . . Then pick out the value which is second most important 
for you (Rokeach, 1973: 27)."
When we examine the "values" used in the investigations carried 
out by Albrecht, Sirjamaki, Gillin, Golsom and Strelsky, Sorokin, 
Williams, Morris, and even Parsons, we see that they have in common 
an interest in themes, or ideals, or broad patterns. This is the
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nature of Complexes. These types of values cannot tell us what a 
particular person is going to do. or for what reason he is going to 
do it. If Rokeach’s limited comment can be expanded, then Complexes 
are very much like philosophical orientations. With this idea in 
mind, it can be understood why Williams warned of the dangers of 
inferring or deducing particulars from generalized propositions.
A good depiction of ethos or ethics must be arrived at inductively. 
And the more complex the society which is being examined, the more 
important it becomes to remember that "ethos" is an abstraction 
which does not apply to any single individual, but which is not 
completely removed from any'individual. *
Since Complexes are abstractions which permeate a society they 
are not entirely removed from specific values. The relationship 
between the specific values and the diffuse is explicit in the 
Vanfossen typology. Their relationship is also implicit in any of 
the methods used by the above named researchers. Sirjamaki utilized 
ideal norms in describing part of the American ethos. Sorokin 
observed the literature, art, music, law, religion, and many other 
cultural elements to derive his Sensate and Ideational concepts. 
Williams discussed norms, "humanitarian mores," beliefs, and what 
have you in order to illustrate the American value systems. Why 
are Complexes an important addition to norms, beliefs, ideals, and 
systems? Complexes are important because they represent the 
Gestalt of a culture which will not be found by studying only the 
norms of a delinquent gang or some other comparatively small entity. 
Complexes remove specific values from isolation and treats them 
within the context of a larger social entity. Is there a best method
for doing this? The best method is one which considers an array 
of value types from a variety of sources. In other words, a 
thorough depiction of ethos would follow in the style of Williams 
or, on a smaller scale, the method of Sorokin. The methods of 
Parsons and Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck would have the advantages of 
economy— several cultures could be compared on the same dimensions 
in quantifiable terms. The methods used by Williams and Sorokin, 
though more detailed and well rounded, could not be done nearly 
as quickly as those of Parsons and Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck. The 
method used by Rokeach is too narrow to employ only his idealized 
values. Rokeach’s technique would betteif serve as an augmentive 
tool to other methods.
CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
A Theory of Value 
In 1959 an article was published in the American Sociological 
Review entitled "A Theory of Value" (Catton, 1959: 310-317). Catton 
defined value as "a conception of the desireable which is implied 
by a set of preferential responses to symbolic desiderata (Catton, 
1959: 312)." The theory is composed of the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1:
Corrolary la:
Corrolary lb:
Corrolary lc:
Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 3:
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Socially acquired conceptions of the desireable 
(values) influence human choices among non- 
symbolic desiderata.
Significant correlations may be found, at any 
given time, between values and personal desires.
Within an isolated social system, such 
correlations tend to increase through time.
That is, there is a strain toward alignment of 
desiring with socially acquired values.
The influence of values (as defined above) upon 
human choices among non-symbolic desiderata is 
conditioned by socially acquired knowledge of the 
characteristics of the desiderata..
When values are held constant, desiring (or 
"motivation") varies inversely with the'"distance" 
(in an n-dimensional psychological space or value 
space) between the valuer- and the desideratum.
When values and desideratum-to-value distances 
are held constant, desiring varies with the' 
activation of levels in some prepotency hierarchy.
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4: A valuer’s responses to sets of subsidiated
desiderata are more predictable than his 
responses to sets of independent desiderata.
5: A valuer's responses to sets of congruent
desiderata are more predictable than his 
responses to sets of independent desiderata.
6: When values are held constant, the order of
preferences among a set of desiderata may 
nevertheless vary from person to person or from 
group to group as a result of the failure of 
each person or group to be fully cognizant at 
all times of all the dimensions of the value 
space. (Catton, 1959: 312-317)
This is the only formal "theory of value" which this writer 
discovered in the sociological literature. Unfortunately, this 
theory is inadequate. Two criticisms can be made of the first 
hypothesis. First, if "conceptions of the desireable" influence 
choices then it is also true that conceptions of the undesirable will 
be influential.* Second, it doesn't seem possible to test the first 
hypothesis since "non-symbolic desiderata” cannot be symbolized 
without destroying the desideratum's condition of being non-symbolic.
Even though people do not always desire those things which 
they think desirable, more often than not there will be a consistent 
relationship. As a result, Corrolary la is virtually tautological. 
Corrolary lb is as tautological as la. Furthermore, why does Catton
*For example, in parts of Africa there was a high incidence 
of blindness due to glaucoma. This disease was transferred to the 
human eye by flies. Medical technicians from the World Health 
Organization drastically reduced the incidence of glaucoma by simply 
teaching the local people to brush the flies from their faces. 
Without being aware of the relationship between flies and blindness, 
the presence of flies on the face was a neutral conception. Wien 
they became aware of the relationship between flies and blindness, 
flies on the face became a "conception of the undesireable" and the 
people thus preferred to brush away the flies.
Hypothesis
Hypothesis
Hypothesis
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use the phrase "socially acquired values" in one place and simply 
"values" in others? Also, what is the tension implied by Catton's 
use of the term "strain"? As for 1c, what does Catton mean by the 
term "conditioned"? How does one gain "socially acquired knowledge" 
of desiderata which are non-symbolic? "Socially acquired knowledge" 
implies the transmission of information. This transmission in turn 
implies the interplay of symbols (words, mannerisms, etc.).
Hypothesis 2 suggests that the farther away the valuer is from 
acquiring some desiderata the less the valuer will desire it. Rokeach 
found that Americans neither had nor wanted the values of "intellectual" 
and "imaginative."* This would support Catton's hypothesis. Rokeach 
also found that persons who did not live in clean environments were 
more likely to value cleanliness ("clean"). This is in contradiction 
to Catton's hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 is most curious. What does Catton mean by 
"activation"? A prepotency hierarchy implies that some values are 
of greater power or influence than other values. Hypothesis 3 might 
be restated: A person has a greater desire for desiderata which are
more desirable.
Hypotheses 4 and 5 are subject to the same qualification. Both 
require that the individual be aware of the subsidiary and congruent 
characteristics of the sets of desiderata to which they are responding,
The provability of hypothesis 6 requires that the researcher is
*Catton's second hypothesis is consistent with dissonance 
theory. In these terms, the valuer would have less desire for the 
desideratum which is farther away so as to reduce the dissonance 
produced by the situation of high desire coupled with a low 
probability of satisfaction.
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also aware of "all the dimensions of the value space."
Franz Adler criticized Catton's theory by saying that "the 
valuations of individuals, singly or in the aggregate, can be known 
only from their actions (Adler, 1960: 85)." Using this interpretation, 
Adler translated Catton's theory with results that are similar to 
this writers criticisms. Catton defended himself by saying^ that 
"peoples values are not the objects they desire, nor even their 
desires for those objects, nor their strivings (actions) for those 
objects . . . (Catton, 1960: 87)."
Uses of Value and Criticisms of Value 
Belshaw
According to Belshaw in "The Identification of Values in 
Anthropology" (1959: 555-562), the use of values may be categorized 
into three major groups. S.* F. Nadel characterized the first group 
with his definition that "values are ideas about worthwhileness 
(Belshaw, 1959: 555)." Clyde Kluckhohn characterizes the second 
group. He "holds that a value is a conception relating to a code 
or standard. It implies the desirable— but just any kind of desire 
will not do: it must be justified morally, by reasoning, by
aesthetic judgment or by some combination of these (Belshaw, 1959: 
556)." The third usage, which is more general than the other two, 
derives values from action, i.e., peoples values are reflected in 
their actions.
Belshaw added that each use of "value" implies a method for 
investigation. Nadel's kind of value is tapped through questions 
about what a subject desires. This kind of investigation may cover
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a very wide range. Morris' 13 ways to live may be included within 
the range of a subject's desires. The same is true of Rokeach's 
instrumental and terminal values. Since "desires" is such a broad 
qualifier, studies concerned with norms, beliefs, or ideals may all 
fall within this category.
Like Nadel, Kluckhohn's use of value requires that the subject 
conceive of his values. That is, a value is a conceptualization. 
Kluckhohn's usage is more specific. The subject must be able to 
verbalize the value and justify it. As a result, Kluckhohn's type 
of value is suited to institutional or ideological research where 
values are frequently‘buttressed by rationalizations. Kluckhohn 
requires more than an idea about worthwhileness. His stress on a 
value's influence on the "selection from available modes, means, and 
ends of action" adds the specific behavioral component lacking in 
Nadel's formulation. Kluckhohn's concept can be used in questionnaires 
but the items would have to be more specific than Rokeach's "named" 
values.
The third use of value which Belshaw discussed covers the 
widest range of possible meaning. If peoples values are reflected 
in their actions then the method for investigating values is simply 
to observe behavior. This understanding is the one which has 
received the most severe criticism. Fallding's criticism of concepts 
which place values in a causal position demonstrates the basis of 
this conceptualization's weakness. The practice of inferring values 
from behavior has been used as a criticism of questionnaire techniques. 
As the critics would say, what a subject says about his values has 
the same weakness as an observer's interpretation of action since
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"verbal" and "non-verbal" are merely distinctions in behavior.
Rokeach explained his reasons for choosing the method he used 
rather than other techniques. Two other methods were considered and 
rejected.
One concerns the drawing of inferences about a person’s values 
from his behavior in structured situations. This approach was 
rejected because it had too many drawbacks: It is time- 
consuming and,expensive; it cannot be employed with large numbers 
of people; it is difficult to interpret and quantify; and it may 
be biased by the observer’s own values. A second approach is 
to ask a person to tell us in his own words about his values— a 
simple phenomenological approach. This was also rejected because 
it has drawbacks: A person might not be willing or able to tell
us about them, or he might be highly selective in what he 
chooses to tell us.
To get around such limitations, we presented the respondent 
at the outset with previously constructed lists of terminal and 
instrumental values, wherein the only burden placed upon him 
is to rank them for importance. The two lists were designed to 
be reasonably comprehensive and were at the same time worded in 
a manner that would, it was hoped, yield phenomenologically 
valid data. That is, the measuring instrument was designed to 
elicit information about values that the respondent would be 
willing or even eager to admit he had, which meant that it 
could neither be couched in negative terms (e.g., cowardly, 
irresponsible) nor in terms so positive as to give the impression 
of immodesty or boastfulness (e.g., brilliant, clever). (Rokeach, 
1973: 26)
Fallding
Fallding (1965: 223-233)* also directed himself to criticisms 
of value concepts. He argued that hierarchical constructs are 
inadequate because they fail to account for shifts in value and imply 
that time and place are static. This criticism is unimportant when 
the student is interested in a particular temporality. The adequacy 
of a value concept9, like any concept, depends upon the purpose
*Fallding’s formulations are discussed at greater length in 
Chapter III.
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intended for the concept. Rokeach's rank-orderings of "instrumental" 
and "terminal" values may not explain change over time but it does 
indicate something about the "values" that different people with 
different characteristics endorse' at a particular time.
Fallding also argued that a value holds a "self-sufficient" 
status. Pleasures and interests "are capable of becoming values if 
they attain self-sufficient status." This criticism is also 
problematic because it necessitates that one determine self-sufficiency. 
Fallding's best criticism is that it is incorrect to assume that all 
behavior is value-oriented. Compulsions "are not capable of exalta­
tion into values: they compete with them rather, and so far as a
person is in the grip of compulsions his capacity to pursue values 
is drained away (Fallding, 1965: 226)."
Perhaps the most difficult problem involved in relating values 
to behavior is the problem of establishing a causal relationship 
between the two. This is subject to the fallacy of circularity.
With regard to values, an argument is circular when (1) one infers 
the existence of a value from an observed behavior and (2) then 
explains the behavior as though it were caused by the value.
Means-Ends
A different though closely related problem surrounds means- 
ends constructs. Parker (1967: 463-466) said:
If they can be distinguished, (intrinsic values from 
means), the social scientist, at least by implication, is 
assigned a new role: the scientist displaces the political
actor as the validating agency of desired ends. The scientist, 
by estimating their relative "yield" in terms of the degree of 
satisfaction afforded (which involves considering their 
relative "cost" in terms of the extent of other values 
sacrificed), determines the desireability of desired ends.
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Informed by his normative concepts and theory, the scientist 
makes characterizing and especially predicting value judgements 
which form the basis, an objective one, for the selection of 
desired ends. His sphere of competence being so extended, 
the scientist is qualified to assume the responsibility 
previously regarded as an attribute of the political actor. 
(Parker, 1967: 466)
Without becoming involved in Parker's new role for the scientist
we can examine the basis for his distinguishing means from ends
(intrinsic values). The difference between means and ends appears
clear until one examines the substance of the two categories. Some
have argued that norms are the "means" for the attainment of^yalues.
Unfortunately, norms may be valued for themselves irrespective of
the effect of the norm or the "end" result of the norm. As Riemer
pointed out, the basis for disputing policies or plans of action is
not on the level of results. The results are anticipated in ideal
form. The disputes occur on the level of specific courses of action.
An example from current events will illustrate the problem. Given (
several population problems, i.e., too many people, the inability
of some persons to care for offspring, the lack of desire for some
persons to have children, the necessity of public assistance (ADC,
Welfare) for those who lack the physical means of child care, there
are several proposed solutions. Among those allowed by the Supreme
Court is the right to abortion. Abortion is viewed by some as one
means of avoiding or alleviating the problems cited above. Right to
Life groups consider abortion to be an immoral "means" of approaching
the problems. For these groups, the having of children is an "end."
To these groups, giving birth is considered and end no matter what
basis or rationale is used as a substantiation. Rationales may be
religious, philosophical, legal, or simply based on a conception
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of the "woman's role.” Is giving birth a means or an end? It is 
both.*
As a value concept the means-ends distinction is inadequate.
It is a workable approach only in highly restricted areas. It is a 
principle behind cost-benefit analyses undertaken by business and 
government, but this implies the economic conception of value which 
is virtually dead as a sociological approach. Means and ends lack 
conceptual clarity when discussion involves social conceptions of 
right and wrong.
Franz Adler
In the broadest sense, all value research relies on behavior.
It is because of this that "value" has received such sharp criticism. 
Franz Adler’s "The Value Concept in Sociology" (1956: 272-279) 
is directed at four basic categories of value concepts. Adler's 
intention was to show that values were either inaccessible to research 
or that the reliance on behavior for manifestations of values makes 
the concept altogether inadequate.
*John Dewey recognized the impermanence of means-ends 
distinctions:
In all the physical sciences (using "physical" here as a 
synonym for non-human) it is now taken for granted that all 
"effects" are also "causes" or, stated more accurately, that 
nothing happens which is final in the sense that it is not part 
of an ongoing stream of events. If this principle, with the 
accompanying discrediting of belief in objects that are ends but 
not means, is employed in dealing with distinctive human phenomena, 
it necessarily follows that the distinction between ends and 
means is temporal and relational. Every condition that has to 
be brought into existence in order to serve as means is, in 
that connection, an object of desire and an end-in-view, while 
the end actually reached is a means to future ends as well as a 
test of valuations previously made. (Dewey, 1939: 43)
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In the first category (1) "values are considered as absolutes, 
existing in the mind of God as eternal ideas, independent validities, 
etc." In the second, (2) "values are considered as being in the 
object, material or non-material." In the third, (3) "values are 
seen as located in man, originating in his biological needs or in 
his mind. Man by himself or man in the aggregate, variously 
referred to as group, society, culture, state, class, is seen as 
'holding' values." In the fourth, (4) "values are equated with 
action. There are in addition, some mixed types (Adler, 1956:
272)." Adler’s critique is as follows:
Values according to'(3) are as irfaccessible to the methods 
of the natural sciences (at the present state of our knowledge 
concerning internal mental and emotional phenomena) as values 
according to (1) and (2). Current scientific psychology has 
nothing to say on the subject. In such a quandry the theorist 
who wishes to base his sociology (or his economics, political 
science, or whatnot) on values either must use a philosophical, 
non-empirical psychology already in existence or must make up 
one of his own. It is very improbable that pure speculations 
different from, and competing with Newtonian and Einsteinian 
physics would gain any respectability in our day and age. Why, 
on the other hand, speculative psychology should be given 
preference by serious thinkers to experimentally gained and 
scientifically organized ones is a riddle that has not yet 
been seriously investigated.
The psychology used by present-day American value 
sociologists is generally derived from German phenomenological 
philosophy through the mediation of Max Weber and fortified 
with Mead's and Cooley's social interactionism, The result 
is "interpretive" or "verstehen” sociology. (Adler, 1956:
275)
Adler says that the link between phenomenological philosophy 
and social interactionism gives rise to the fourth type of values. 
These are criticized on the basis of the fallacy of circularity.
Adler suggests that the value concept should be dropped:
In the past emphasis on values has slowed down the advance­
ment of the social sciences rather than furthered it. Znaniecki, 
in one of his most recent works, embodying some of the fruits
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of a lifetime of sociological endeavor, states: "Even a
superficial survey of the evolution of some sciences of culture 
indicates that their methodological progress is correlated with 
the growing emphasis on the study of human actions rather than 
on the study of cultural values abstracted from the actions 
in which they occurred." There is no reason to believe that 
this relationship would be reversed in the future. (Adler,
1956: 279)
It would seem that Znaniecki’s comment could be more meaningful 
if the term "quantitative" is substituted for the term "methodologi­
cal." This would be a reasonable substitution because the progress 
of methodology is generally gauged by the sophistication of 
quantitative technique. Quantitative analysis is considered the 
benefit derived from an emphasis on empiricism. And as C. Wright 
Mills put it, "any style of empiricism involves a metaphysical 
choice— a choice as to what is most real . . . (Mills, 1959: 67)." 
Adler apparently believes that "values abstracted from" actions 
are not as real as the actions themselves.
Reconsider Adler’s first sentence in the paragraph quoted 
above. There is no basis for believing that "emphasis on values 
has slowed down the advancement of the social sciences.". It may be 
true that as emphasis on values decreased the sophistication of 
quantitative technique increased; but it is another thing to suggest 
causality where there may simply be a spurious relationship. Adler's 
unqualified use of "advancement" and "slowed down" impute cause where 
none has been demonstrated. It is arguable that computer technology 
and "the research institute" have more to do with a lowered emphasis 
on values and the "advancement" of the social sciences than does 
the concentration of research upon human actions.
When Adler insists that the study of human actions is the
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means by which social science is advanced he forgets that Durkheim 
had emphasized actions in his early years only to stress subjective 
factors in his later work. Adler forgets that Weber did not consider 
"verstehen" an end product but as a correlative or complementary 
method for the development of causal explanation.
The relationship between an emphasis on values and an emphasis 
on actions is similar to the relationship between theory and research—  
if one or the other is neglected the results lack either meaning or 
substance. George Lundberg is as behavioristic as Adler yet 
subjective factors manage to play a part in his formulations:
* . . Lundberg considers quant it activism as almost inseparable 
from behaviorism. His opposition to introspection is outspoken: 
such terms as will, feelings, ends, motives, and values, he 
claims, are "the phlogiston of the social sciences."
It is noteworthy that Lundberg!s uncompromising position 
supporting behaviorism does not prevent him from considering 
the study of values and ideals to be an important task of 
sociology. He defines value operationally as that toward which 
people respond so as to decrease or avoid the "value" in question. 
On the other hand, institutions are defined at one point as 
mechanisms which men have established in order to secure or 
achieve their primary ends— and here we see the intrusion of 
the presumably unscientific concept of "end." Lundberg proposes 
various empirical procedures to study values and institutions, 
favoring especially attitude questionnaires which incorporate 
quantitative techniques. (Timasheff, 1955: 194)
Recommendations for the Value Concept 
Taken as a group the various writings on the subject of values 
that have been discussed in this paper support Clyde Kluckhohnfs 
characterization of the literature as being "often vague and diffuse." 
What must be done for the value concept to have greater impact on 
and utility for sociology? Barron (1951: 208-214) addressed the 
study of juvenile delinquency and listed three major requirements 
for value to have an impact on that area.
(1) Social values will have to be refined conceptually in at 
least three dimensions;
A. A distinction between "official" and "unofficial" values,
B. A typology of negative as well as positive values,
C. A distinction between "social processes or norms," and 
"social objectives or goals."
(2) We will need hypotheses to explain the relation of incon­
sistent values held by the delinquents to inconsistency 
in the delinquents behavior.
(3) A more versatile utilization of methodological techniques.
To what extent are these recommendations valid and what does
the information in this paper say with regard to the utility of 
these recommendations? With regard to "1A" the distinction between 
"official" and "unofficial" must be addressed by asking: To whom are
a '*  *
we referring when we say that a value is "official"? This may be 
answered at two levels: There is the legal structure in which case
"official" values are identified with institutions which are either 
legitimate (that is, there is consensus in the population that the 
institution is justified) or powerful enough to enforce its rule.
The second level is the group which considers itself outside of, or 
in opposition to the institution. In this case, the "official" 
values are the ones which are recognized and practiced by the members 
of the group. As a whole it is easier to speak of the legal structure 
as "official," and the values of any social entity are seen as being 
consistent or inconsistent with that structure.
"IB" is an important recommendation. In the literature dis­
cussed in this paper, there is no typology of negative values. There 
are, however, occasional comments to the effect that such a typology 
is needed. For example, Ralph Linton’s concept of "interest" is 
supposed to encompass "value" (which implies "good") as well as those
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matters or themes towards which people have an aversion, e.g., 
murder. It would seem possible that the methods of Rokeach could 
be used to rank those qualities (negative values, aversions, 
objections, or whatever name) which men do not wish to experience 
or have as a characteristic of themselves or others. Just as every 
culture has its heroes, so they have their villains. If it is 
useful to know those things x^hich a culture holds in high esteem, 
then by implication it must be useful to know those things which a 
culture maintains as the subject of ridicule.
"1CM has already been discussed in effect. "Social processes 
or norms" may be ends in themselves and "social objectives or goals" 
may be so abstract that we do not know what in fact we are striving 
for. A social objective or goal may be concrete: There is nothing
abstract about an idea such as full employment. The only objection 
to be made for recommendation "1C" is that "social processes or 
norms" and "social objectives or goals" are not necessarily distinct 
in fact.
The second recommendation is applicable to values in general—
not just to delinquents. People generally profess inconsistent
values and act inconsistently as well. This fact is pleasantly
illustrated by LaPiere:
For example, thousands of Americans devote tens of thousands 
of hours and dollars each year to casting artificial flies out 
onto the waters of lakes and rivers. Casting is itself a 
complex skill requiring, in addition to considerable and 
costly equipment, a good deal of practice. The flies, or 
lures, are made in great variety; and although devotees to 
the activity may differ in their beliefs, all operate on the 
assumption that there is one specific kind of fly that will 
prove irresistible to a specific kind of fish on a given day 
in a given place and with the light and wind as specified.
The practitioners of what is usually termed "fly-fishing"
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have, furthermore, relatively fixed ideas concerning how heavy 
a line is permissible to use, etc. Equipped in accordance with 
the standards to which he subscribes, a fly-fisherman will wade 
for hours through icy water casting here and there to locate 
the fish for which that fly was designed.
Taken from their general context— vacationing, the fishing 
lodge, etc.— and without regard for the actual values they 
serve, the activities of a fly-fisherman appear to be completely 
irrational, a system of elaborate and fruitless rituals.
Clearly, fishing in this complicated manner is not conducive 
to the catching of fish. . . .  In terms of its context and the 
values of the fly-fisherman, however, fly-fishing is actually 
an effective procedure— as effective in its way, no doubt, 
as the fishing procedures of the primitive are in theirs. For 
one thing, fly-fishing makes the catching of fish so very 
difficult that few fish are caught, with the result that a 
number of values held by the fisherman are served: (1) streams
and lakes will not be fished out, and there will be fish to 
not-catch in subsequent years; (2) there will not be so many 
fish to eat that the very idea of fish becomes repugnant; and
(3) the man who does catch a fish in this difficult manner 
will be acclaimed by his fellows for his exceptional skill. 
(LaPiere, 1954: 131)
There are no hypotheses to explain the inconsistencies in the values 
and behavior of people in general. The closest thing to an explana­
tion for this phenomenon is that people do not live in consistent 
environments, socially or otherwise. For everyone to act in a 
consistent fashion would require a greater degree of intellect and 
insight than most people, or perhaps anyone, has available. Barron's 
second recommendation might be restated: Why do delinquents appear
to be more inconsistent in their values and behavior than other 
people?
With regard to the third requirement, there is quite an array 
of methods for getting at human values. Most of these methods imply 
a particular concept of value. As Kluckhohn put it, "one finds 
values considered as attitudes, motivations, objects, measurable 
quantities, substantive areas of behavior, affect-laden customs or 
traditions, and relationships such as those between individuals,
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groups, objects, and events (Kluckhohn in Parsons, 1951: 390)." As 
the reader is quite aware, there are more definitions than these. 
Marsh came to a conclusion with regard to the study of "comparative 
values" that is generally applicable to the study of values: "the
richness of methodological innovation and continuities in research 
is somewhat offset by the dearth of easily codifiable findings (Marsh, 
1967: 254)." This condition, this writer proposes, is due to two 
factors.
The first factor is directly related to the fact that there 
are so many value concepts. There are many people applying many 
approaches with the result that a great cfeal of information is 
collected that can not be interrelated with great certainty. The 
recommendation to be derived from this is that value researchers 
consistently apply the same concept in the same way— the result, 
hopefully, would be a great deal of information that can be 
systematized.
The second factor involves the conceptualization of value 
itself. When a person decides to study the values of some group 
or social entity that person adopts or develops a concept of value 
to suit his purpose. Of course, there are many sociological 
concepts that have varied definitions, but there are few if any 
that have the great variability of the value concept. Some might 
argue that this demonstrates that the value concept has little to 
offer. On the other hand, the variation in value concepts suggests 
that the concept has a great deal to offer. Everyone experiences 
values as truths or facts; as a sociological concept, value is a 
heuristic principle the form of which changes depending upon the
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level of abstraction at which the thinker is working. Parenthetically, 
what is meant by "the values of a fly-fisherman" does not have the 
same meaning as "the values of America." The second factor then, 
suggests that "the dearth of easily codifiable findings" has 
resulted from the attempt to relate many different kinds of value.
With these two factors in mind, this writer must argue that the 
potential of the value concept lies in the consistent application 
of single concepts, but no single concept can effectively encompass 
the total range of meaning. This idea can be explained by referring 
to some general characteristics of the value concepts employed by 
the researchers discussed in this thesis. Two points stand out:
(1) Value concepts which are defined in terms of "desires," "the 
desirable," or "worthwhileness" are broad in that they include almost 
the whole range of possible definitions of "value." The all- 
inclusiveness of this kind of definition is marred by the lack of 
internal discrimination. It includes considerable undifferentiated 
diversity. (2) Definitions which are highly discriminative or are 
very precise about what constitutes a value and what does not 
constitute a value usually exclude a great area of meaning. For 
example, any economic conception would be guilty of this exclusion. 
What is necessary then, is a format under which we have the 
inclusiveness of the first point and the differentiation mentioned 
in the second point. The fact that the Vanfossen typology was used 
as the framework for organizing the varied value concepts discussed 
in this thesis exposes this writer's belief that the Vanfossen 
typology constitutes this format.
220
Comments on the Vanfossen Typology
Has the typology effectively met the requirements and avoided 
the problems involved in-the two points discussed above? As the 
reader is able to see, "value” has been considered in terms of each 
of the three specific kinds of value in the typology. For the most 
part, the diffuse kinds of values (Systems and Complexes) are 
considered "values" by various researchers only in the sense that 
institutions, ideologies, ethos, and ethics endorse or contain 
"specific" values. The exception to this generality is that some 
researchers will deal with "value" as a cultural phenomenon. Sumner’s 
"concept," Williams’ "social value," and Sorokin’s mentalities are 
examples of these. The Vanfossen typology has overcome the differences 
by permitting the values of "specific" content, endorsed by specific 
people to coexist in the same conceptual realm with values which 
contain a multiplicity of content, and lack a specific valuer(s).
This writer does not find a great deal in the Vanfossen typology 
which is new. The body of literature discussed in this thesis is 
ample evidence that each of the particular ideas in the Vanfossen 
typology has been proposed before. The novelty of the Vanfossen 
typology is that it serves as a principle of organizing various 
levels of positive and negative meaning. In no way has Vanfossen 
dissolved the particular senses which attach to "ethos" or "belief" 
or any other type of value. Certainly, a "norm" is not an "ideology" 
and a "belief" is not an "ideal," but each of these implies 
"meaning" and is, to this extent, classifiable under a common 
rubric— "value." -At the present there are not very many established 
relationships between the different typological elements. We are
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aware that myths play a necessary role in the formation and maintenance 
of ideologies. We know that norms can be legitimized in terms of 
some belief. It appears that a culture’s image of man (Ethic) is 
related to its style (Ethos). The "how" of these relationships is 
yet to be determined.
The harshest criticisms which value concepts have received 
involve the concept’s causal status, or its status as an independent 
variable. When a theory is formulated which maintains that "values 
cause actions," or that "values determine attitudes and action," 
value is considered as an independent variable. Values cannot be 
seen or touched; there is no physiological location for values.
In this regard, the idea that "values cause . . . ," has no more 
theoretical validity than the idea that "God causes . . . ." The 
idea is complicated even further when causation is attributed to 
one kind of "meaning" which then causes another kind of "meaning."
The idea that "values cause attitudes" is guilty of this fallacy.
In general, values are inferred from behavior of some kind. It is 
erroneous then, to explain the behavior on the basis of the inferred 
values. Logically, this is known as the fallacy of circularity.
However, most everyone believes that what he values is 
related to or influences what he does. This idea is not so much 
false as it is unoperational. At the moment, we don’t know how to 
measure what "it" is that influences our behavior. Fortunately, 
the Vanfossen typology does not attribute causal status to values. 
However, the typology implies that values may function as contingents 
for behavior. For example, we wouldn’t expect that an overtly 
atheistic person could be elected president in an overtly Judeo-
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Christian country. Obviously, values would have something to do 
with the probability of this individual’s winning the election. We 
have not, however, said anything about ’’cause."
The Vanfossen typology also' allows for the existence of 
negative values. Unfortunately, this aspect is as yet undeveloped.
The typology explicitly recognizes the role of cultural heroes but 
says little about the villains; what is a bad guy like and what 
does such a conception say about the society. With regard to ideals, 
is there a corresponding negative meaning. "Evil" is an example.
Like positive ideals, we feel some affective reaction to the idea 
but we are not certain as to its content. What is "evil?"
Perhaps an addition could be made to the typology. It appears 
to this writer that there is no real place for what Sumner called 
"watchwords" and "phrases" (Chapter V). Along with "watchwords" 
and "phrases" we might include "icons" and other symbols such as 
flags, idols, and emblems such as the swastika, the hammer and sickle, 
or the skull and crossed bones. This addition is suggested because 
these symbols convey meanings to those who are familiar with them.
A Final Note on the Role of Values 
This writer thinks of sociology as the history of efforts to 
elevate an interest in human activity to the level of a science. In 
the effort to become scientific, empirical, and quantitative, the 
sociologist has become more and more concerned with "operationaliz­
ing," determining "reliability" and "validity." Like other concepts, 
"value" has been carried along in this trend. The very term "value" 
connotes something important and significant to people. It is only
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reasonable to expect that sociologists would try to give value a 
"scientific” status. It seemed self-evident that values were 
causes— the trick was to measure them. However, the idea of values 
as causes would not hold up logically. As the material presented 
in this thesis indicates, all kinds of definitions, operationaliza­
tions, and methods have been tried.
This writer thinks that it is unimportant to give value a 
causal status. It is an effective and sufficient role for value 
to serve the function of interpreting the different levels of meaning 
of which man is capable. "Value" adds an affective element to the
, •• 4
cognitive. The Vanfossen typology, of course, serves the purpose of 
systematizing the various usages which have been attributed to 
"value." For Max Weber, sociology was "that science which aims at 
the interpretive understanding (Verstehen) of social behavior in 
order to gain an explanation of its causes, its course, and its 
effects (Coser, 1971: 220)." The value concept can aid in "inter­
pretive understanding" without purporting to explain causes. Like 
Verstehen, the value concept can be used as a "correlative" exercise 
or complementary principle in the development of causal explanations.
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